Jackson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: JAWS S. MOODY
• Decision Date: 27 March 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO: 8:11-cv-445-T-30EAJ
• Citation: Jackson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., CASE NO: 8:11-cv-445-T-30EAJ (M.D. Fla. Mar 27, 2012)
• Parties: LAMONT JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

LAMONT JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

CASE NO: 8:11-cv-445-T-30EAJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

Dated: March 27, 2012

ORDER

Lamont Jackson, an inmate in the Florida penal system proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his conviction for robbery entered by the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court, Sarasota County, Florida. After considering the arguments of the parties and reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Jackson's Amended Petition (Dkt. #4) should be denied.

Factual Background

The factual background is taken from the facts as described in the state court record, principally from Jackson's initial brief and the state's answer brief on direct appeal. Jackson and the victim, Mr. Llanes, encountered each other one evening while Llanes sat on a public bench waiting for a friend to transport him home. Jackson approached Llanes and asked for a cigarette. Llanes reached into his fanny pack to give Jackson a cigarette. As Llanes did so,Jackson punched Llanes in the face and took Llanes's fanny pack. As Jackson fled, Llanes saw an approaching police unit and signaled the officers.

Officers Conway and Wagner were patrolling the area when they saw Llanes trying to get their attention. The officers saw that Llanes was about ten to fifteen feet behind Jackson. Llanes told the officers that Jackson had hit and robbed him. The officers turned their attention to Jackson, and Jackson increased from a brisk walk to a jog. Officer Wagner got out of the police car and ordered Jackson to stop.

Jackson threw the fanny pack on the ground near some bushes and continued to run. Llanes identified Jackson as the individual who had just robbed him. The officers recovered the fanny pack and examined its contents. The officers saw some personal papers in the fanny pack, along with a wallet, a set of keys, a pack of cigarettes, and a lighter. The officers did not find any drugs or drug paraphernalia and eventually released the fanny pack to Llanes. The officers prepared an inventory sheet describing the contents in the fanny pack, which Llanes signed.

After the officers arrested Jackson and read him his Miranda rights, he made a brief statement to a police detective about the events leading to his arrest. Jackson told the detective that he "didn't take anything from [Llanes], this is mutual combat, I punched [Llanes] or I hit [Llanes], something like that, and that was it. It was a mutual fight, I didn't take anything from [Llanes]." (Dkt. # 10, Apx. C, Vol. III, p. 209).

Before Jackson's trial, the State filed several motions in limine to prohibit the defense from asking Llanes about the presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia in the fanny pack.The State's motions were based on the attending officers' inability to find any evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the State's motions in limine. Although defense counsel was present at the hearing, Jackson was not present at the beginning of the hearing because he was changing clothes. The court granted the State's motion but allowed the defense to ask about the contents in the fanny pack.

At trial, Jackson testified to a different set of facts, mainly that the fanny pack and its contents belonged to him. Jackson testified that as he walked near Llanes, Llanes asked him for some cocaine. Jackson shared with Llanes a "stem"¹ that Jackson had with him in his fanny pack. After using the "stem" Llanes wanted more cocaine, but Jackson refused to give Llanes any more. The confrontation quickly escalated into a physical altercation. Jackson threw Llanes to the ground and left. Jackson walked away with his fanny pack. Llanes remained close behind Jackson and continued to argue with him. Jackson explained that he ran from police and then threw away his fanny pack because it contained drugs and drug paraphernalia.

In rebuttal, the prosecutor sought to recall the police detective who interviewed Jackson after his arrest. The prosecutor wanted to impeach Jackson's trial testimony with Jackson's post-Miranda statement. The court expressed skepticism that Jackson's post-Miranda testimony was proper rebuttal. The court discussed the prosecutor's request with defense counsel. Defense counsel indicated she "wasn't even going to object" and thatit was "fine with me" because defense counsel believed the prosecution sought to introduce Jackson's exculpatory statements. The court granted the prosecutor's request to recall the police detective. After confirming Jackson's post-Miranda statement, the prosecutor and the detective engaged in the following colloquy:

Q: Did [Jackson] ever say anything to you that the fanny pack was his?

A: No.

Q: Did [Jackson] ever say in his statement that he sold cocaine to Mr. Llanes?

A: No.

Q: Did [Jackson] ever tell you that he shoved Mr. Llanes during their cocaine transaction and that Mr. Llanes became angry because of that?

A: There was no mention of any cocaine transaction whatsoever.

Q: Did [Jackson] tell you that he saw Mr. Llanes again at Hollywood 20 and he and Mr. Llanes began fighting about the cocaine transaction and the fact that Mr. Llanes was cheated of some money?

A: No.

Q: And when you gave [Jackson] an opportunity to explain that he threw the fanny pack, did [Jackson] say, "Hey, man, it was my fanny pack and I had drugs in it?"

A: No, he said he didn't know what I was talking about. I didn't take anything from him. I didn't have anything.

(Dkt. # 10, Apx. C, Vol. III, p. 209-10).

The jury found Jackson guilty on one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony in violation of Florida Statute 812.13. The trial court entered judgment against Jackson on July 5, 2007. At sentencing, the court proceeded to determine Jackson's status as a habitual felony offender pursuant to Florida Statute 775.084. The State introduced Jackson's in-state felony convictions for the court's consideration: battery on a person 65 years or older, sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine, and child abuse. The State also informed the court that Jackson received sentences on 22 counts of felony theft, criminal conspiracy, and receiving stolen property in Pennsylvania from 1988 to 1989.

The court found that Jackson had two prior Florida state felony convictions: the first on June 2, 2002, case number 2001-CF-1962 for felony child abuse; and the second on September 29, 2006, case number 2006-CF-12513 for felony battery on a person 65 years of age or older. Relying on those two felony convictions, the court determined that Jackson qualified as a habitual felony offender and sentenced him to 30 years with the Florida Department of Corrections (Resp. Appx. C, Ex. 2, Vol. 7, T 24).

Procedural Background

The trial court's judgment and Jackson's sentence were summarily affirmed on direct appeal. See Jackson v. State, 982 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Jackson sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was denied. Jackson appealed his denial of post-conviction relief. On January 7, 2011, the state appellate court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision. See Jackson v. State, 49 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

On February 28, 2011, Jackson filed his petition for habeas corpus relief (Dkt. 1). The Court agrees with Respondent that the petition is timely. Subsequently, Jackson filed an "Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody" (Dkt. 4). Unlike the original petition, Jackson used a pre-printed § 2254 form for his amended petition. The State responded to Jackson's amended petition and Jackson filed a "Reply to Respondent's Response to Petition".

Standard of Review

Because Jackson filed his federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governs this proceeding. Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2009). Section 2254(d) of Title 28, U.S.C., which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of state court adjudications, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Section 2254's "standard of contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law is difficult to meet, because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure thatfederal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction." Greene v. Fisher, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. —, —, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

"A state court decision is 'contrary to' clearly established law if the court arrived at a conclusion opposite to one reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court confronted facts that are 'materially indistinguishable' from relevant Supreme Court precedent but arrived at a different result." Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)).

"A state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of clearly established law if the state court unreasonably extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context." Id. at 1293 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407). "An...