Jackson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., CASE NO. 6:09-cv-1219-Orl-36DAB
| Decision Date | 21 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 6:09-cv-1219-Orl-36DAB |
| Parties | IRA C. JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner initiated this action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254 (Doc. No. 1). Upon consideration of the petition, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. Thereafter, Respondents filed a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus in compliance with this Court's instructions and with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases for the United States District Courts (Doc. No. 9). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Doc. No. 17).
Petitioner alleges four claims for relief in his habeas petition: (1) the State improperly shifted the burden of proof at trial; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present documentary evidence and testimony; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a thorough impeachment of the State's witnesses; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper arguments made by the prosecutor. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims.
Petitioner was charged with one count of trafficking in cocaine. The State offered a negotiated plea whereby Petitioner would plead guilty and received a ten year sentence. Petitioner declined the plea offer and proceeded to trial, after which he was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an eight-year term of imprisonment with a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. Petitioner appealed, raising one ground for relief. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus follows.
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Brown v. Patton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S.634, 638-39 (2003). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Calliper, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). "[T]o be 'contrary to' clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts." Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown, 544 U.S. at 134; Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000); or, "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The "unreasonable application" inquiry "requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous"; it must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003) (citation omitted); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18; Ward, 592 F.3d at 1155.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed under the standards established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1183 (11th Cir. 2008). Post-AEDPA, the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), remains applicable to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in this case. Newland, 527 F.3d at 1184. In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.1 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also Bobby Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009). A habeas court's review of a claim under the Strickland standard is "doubly deferential." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (April 4, 2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayanze, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009)(citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003)).
States may "impose whatever specific rules . . . to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented," but "the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices." Bobby Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17 (internal quotations and citations omitted). It is petitioner who bears the heavy burden to "prove,by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable." Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Allen, 127 S. Ct. 619 (2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690), applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Id. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. An attorney is not ineffective for failing to raise or preserve a meritless issue. Ladd v. Jones, 864 F.2d 108, 109-10 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ladd v. Burton, 493 U.S. 842 (1989); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (). Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).
Petitioner claims the State improperly shifted the burden of proof in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In support of this claim, Petitioner points to the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments in which he argued that Petitioner failed to produce documents or letters showing that he owed child support, which wouldhave explained why Petitioner was carrying such a large sum of money on his person at the time of his arrest (Doc. No. 1 at 7). Respondents argue that the instant claim is unexhausted because the claim was not raised as a federal constitutional claim in the state court.
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal courts are precluded, absent exceptional circumstances, from granting habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999). In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state petitioner must "fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). The petitioner must apprise the state court of the federal constitutional issue, not just the underlying facts of the claim or a similar state law claim. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Court has reviewed Petitioner's initial brief filed with the Fifth District Court of Appeal and agrees that Petitioner did not cite to federal law or the United States Constitution when arguing the instant claim (App. III). Moreover, the cases cited to in the initial brief did not rely on federal law. Id. The Court finds that claim one remains unexhausted.
Moreover, the Court is precluded from considering this claim, as the claim wouldbe procedurally defaulted if Petitioner returned to state court. Smith v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009) (). Petition...
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