Jackson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

• Docket Number: 3:19-cv-923-MMH-LLL
• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Parties: TERRENCE JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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TERRENCE JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:19-cv-923-MMH-LLL

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

June 21, 2022

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Status

Petitioner Terrence Jackson, an inmate of the Florida penal system initiated this action on August 8, 2019, by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).0F^[1] In the Petition, Jackson challenges a 2007 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffick in controlled substances. He raises six grounds for relief. See Petition at 8-30. Respondents submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response (Doc. 8). They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 9-1 through 9-5. Jackson filed a brief in reply. See Reply (Doc. 10). He also submitted an exhibit. See Doc. 10-1. This action is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On October 23, 2006, the State of Florida charged Jackson by amended information with trafficking in cocaine (count one) and conspiracy to traffick in controlled substances (count two). Doc. 9-1 at 67-68. On May 16, 2007, a jury found Jackson guilty of counts one and two. Id. at 110-11. On June 21, 2007, the trial court adjudicated Jackson to be a habitual felony offender (HFO) for both counts and sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for count one. Id. at 133-35. On July 5, 2007, Jackson filed a notice of appeal. Id. at 141.

During the pendency of his direct appeal, on November 29, 2007, Jackson, through counsel, filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), in which he argued his life sentences for strict liability offenses violated due process, and his HFO sentences were illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Doc. 9-3 at 286-303. The circuit court denied his Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion on December 12, 2007. Id. at 306.

On November 4, 2008, Jackson, through counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that: the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence (ground one); the trial court fundamentally erred when it instructed the jury on constructive possession (ground two); conspiracy to traffick in cocaine is a nonexistent offense under Florida law (ground three); the trial court's imposition of life sentences for strict liability offenses violated due process (ground four); and the trial court erred when it imposed an HFO sentence (ground five). Id. at 345-98; onlinedocketsdca.flcourts.org, Terrence Jackson v. State of Florida, 1D07-3669 (Fla. 1st DCA). The State filed an answer brief. Docs. 9-3 at 400-29; 9-4 at 1-9. The First DCA affirmed Jackson's convictions and sentences on June 25, 2009, Doc. 9-4 at 11; denied Jackson's motion for rehearing on August 4, 2009, id. at 18; and issued the mandate on August 20, 2009, id. at 20.

On May 19, 2010, Jackson filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 40-65. In his Rule 3.850 Motion, Jackson alleged counsel was ineffective when he: did not sufficiently object to the search warrant affidavit (ground one); failed to object to the State's violation of a motion in limine (ground two); failed to investigate or subpoena a witness (ground three); did not object to an erroneous jury instruction or request a special jury instruction (ground four); did not sufficiently advise Jackson about his right to testify (ground five); failed to renew his objection to the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments (ground seven); and failed to sufficiently move for a judgment of acquittal (ground eight). Id. at 44-56, 58-61. Jackson also alleged the prosecutor's improper comment on his right against self-incrimination resulted in an unfair trial (ground six). Id. at 57. On June 17, 2010, the State filed a written response to Jackson's Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 129-33. On June 30, 2010, the circuit court adopted the State's response and summarily denied Jackson's Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 128. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion on October 13, 2010, id. at 212; denied Jackson's motion for rehearing on January 12, 2011, id. at 219; and issued the mandate on January 28, 2011, id. at 221.

On July 17, 2011, Jackson also filed a pro se state petition for writ of habeas corpus raising five grounds of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. at 246-78. The First DCA denied the petition on the merits on August 31, 2011. Id. at 307.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Jackson's] claim[s] without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed' and ‘highly deferential.'” Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application” clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s “precise relationship”

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