Jackson v. Servello
| Decision Date | 26 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-10615-ADB |
| Parties | PRESTON O. JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SERGIO SERVELLO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
On April 1, 2019, Petitioner Preston O. Jackson ("Petitioner") filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2010 conviction in Suffolk Superior Court in connection with his guilty plea to nine counts of armed robbery, one count of armed assault with intent to commit robbery, and one count of attempt to commit a crime. [ECF No. 1 at 1]. Although allegedly only challenging his 2010 conviction, Petitioner also raised challenges to his 1992 conviction, also on robbery charges, as grounds for relief. [Id. at 5, 12]. Currently before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 25], which Petitioner opposes, [ECF No. 34]. For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 25], is GRANTED.
On February 18, 2009, a Suffolk County grand jury returned an indictment charging Petitioner with eleven counts related to armed robberies, including habitual offender charges. [ECF No. 26 at 20 (Respondent's Addendum ("Add."))]. Petitioner was assigned counsel through the Committee for Public Counsel Services. [Id.]. On January 6, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to nine counts, and the court dismissed the habitual offender portion of each of these counts. [Id. at 22-23]. Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent sentences with a maximum of twenty years' incarceration and a minimum of thirteen years. [Id. at 23].
On August 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for a new trial, [Add. 23], which was denied on May 24, 2016, [id. at 24]. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on October 4, 2016, [id.], and the Massachusetts Appeals Court ("Appeals Court") affirmed the order denying his motion for a new trial on November 28, 2017, Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 16-P-1420, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1031 (Nov. 28, 2017). The Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") denied further appellate review on March 29, 2018. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 102 N.E.3d 975 (Mass. 2018).
On August 29, 1991, Petitioner was charged in ten separate indictments with nine counts of armed robbery and one count of armed assault with intent to rob, including indictment 99113, which is at issue here. See [Add. 4]; Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 10-P-781, 2013 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 548, at *2 (2013). Counsel was appointed to represent him. [Id. at 7]. On May 14, 1992, Petitioner pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration with a maximum sentence of twenty-eight years and a minimum of twenty years. [Id. at 9]. Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or obtain a new trial on May 5, 2001, which the court denied on July 6, 2001, leading Petitioner to appeal the denial on July 27, 2001. [Id. at 10]. On June 27, 2002, the Appeals Court denied his motion, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 770 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), and on September 6, 2002, the SJC denied further appellate review, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 774 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 2002).
Petitioner was released from prison on his 1992 conviction on April 12, 2007. [ECF No. 26 at 3; ECF No. 1 at 6]. On February 4, 2010, while Petitioner was serving his sentence on his 2010 conviction, he filed a second motion for a new trial on his 1992 conviction. [Add. 4-5]. Petitioner seemingly sought to challenge his 1992 conviction with the idea of it being vacated and the time served on that conviction being credited towards his 2010 conviction. See [ECF No. 1 at 17]; Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 18-P-531, 2018 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 865, at *2-3 (Nov. 20, 2018); Jackson, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1031, at *3-4. After the court denied Petitioner's motion on February 10, 2010, [Add. 4-5], Petitioner then filed a third motion for a new trial on February 24, 2011, which the court again denied on March 8, 2012, [id. at 5].
Petitioner timely appealed the denial of this third motion. [Id.]. In its opinion on Petitioner's third motion, the Appeals Court noted that, "for the first time," Petitioner claimed "that his 1992 pleas to three of the ten robbery-related indictments [were] invalid because they [were] not supported by an adequate factual basis." Jackson, 2013 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 548, at *1. The court held that the lower court had not erred in denying Petitioner's motion as to two of the three challenged indictments, but that the lower court had erred with regard to indictment number 99113. Id. at *2. The court remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing on that indictment because a "[c]onviction of armed robbery requires proof that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon . . . . and [Petitioner] did not admit to facts that permit an inference that he was [so] armed . . . ." Id. at *2-3. Despite this, because the facts Petitioner pled to "suffice[d] to support a conviction of unarmed robbery, which carries the same potential punishment as armed robbery," the "appropriate remedy" was to correct the docket and remand for "resentencing on the lesser included offense of unarmed robbery." Id. at *3-4.
Although the Appeals Court issued its decision in 2013, see id., Petitioner was not resentenced until November 2, 2017, when the record was corrected on indictment 99113 to reflect that Petitioner was guilty of unarmed robbery, [Add. 13]. He was sentenced to the same term of incarceration, which was deemed served. [Id.]. On December 1, 2017, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, [id. at 14], claiming that he was "entitled to credit [on his 2010 sentence] for the years he served on indictment 99113 prior to his resentencing" and that he was subjected to double jeopardy when he was resentenced, Jackson, 2018 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 865, at *2-3. On November 20, 2018, the Appeals Court affirmed his resentencing, rejecting his first argument as being directly estopped by the court's decision in connection with his appeal of his 2010 conviction, and rejecting his second argument because Petitioner sought and received a favorable ruling on his motion for a new trial and no additional punishment was imposed at his resentencing. Id. at *2-3; see also Jackson, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1031.
On April 1, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising four grounds for relief: 1) that he was not advised regarding essential elements of armed robbery in connection with two indictments that led to his 1992 conviction; 2) that a habitual offender charge (later dropped) connected to his 2010 conviction created a temporal connection to his 1992 conviction that tolled the exhaustion of finality on his 1992 conviction; 3) that his counsel for his 2010 conviction was ineffective because he did not include Petitioner in several discussions about evidence, a possible plea agreement, and sentencing; and 4) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence him in connection with his 1992 conviction. [ECF No. 1 at 5, 7, 10, 12]. On August 21, 2019,Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 25], which Petitioner opposed on September 23, 2019, [ECF No. 34].
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), when a claim has previously been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a petitioner may only obtain habeas relief if that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if: (1) "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law"; or (2) the state court decides a case differently from a decision of the Supreme Court on a materially indistinguishable set of facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 413 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies federal law when it "correctly identifies the governing legal principles, but (i) applies those principles to the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner; (ii) unreasonably extends clearly established legal principles to a new context where they should not apply; or (iii) unreasonably refuses to extend established principles to a new context where they should apply." Gomes v. Brady, 564 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). An unreasonable application requires "some increment of incorrectness beyond error." Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A petitioner must show that the state court decision applied clearly established law in a way that was "objectively unreasonable." Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 299 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Thus, to obtain habeas relief, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). "The petitioner carries the burden of proof." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]rrors based on violations of state law are not within the reach of federal habeas petitions unless there is a federal constitutional claim raised." Kater v. Maloney, 459 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1991)). "'[T]he gap between erroneous state court decisions and unreasonable ones is narrow,' and 'it will be...
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