Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 July 1948
• Docket Number: 16266.
• Citation: 48 S.E.2d 864,204 Ga. 47
• Parties: JACKSON v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

48 S.E.2d 864

204 Ga. 47

JACKSON v. STATE.

No. 16266.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 15, 1948

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the defendant, while operating an automobile upon a public highway, was guilty of two unlawful acts in their consequences naturally tending to destroy human life, to wit driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and failing to turn his automobile to the right in meeting another vehicle on the highway so as to pass without interference, thereby causing a collision resulting in the death of a passenger in such other vehicle and, further, that these unlawful acts were committed in a manner and under such circumstances that the homicide resulting directly therefrom was murder, rather than involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. The trial court, in the exercise of the discretion with which it is invested, having approved the verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder, and overruled the general grounds of a motion for new trial, and no error appearing, its judgment denying a new trial will be affirmed.

2. Evidence that on an occasion three or four weeks before the homicide the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drove his automobile along a public street of the city of Cairo and had a collision with another automobile was admissible to rebut the defendant's statement to the jury in which he said, 'I ain't never been in trouble before in my life--never had no trouble with nobody and never been in jail but twice. I was not drinking and I was [sic] not drunk anything.'

3. The failure of the court, in the absence of a written request, to limit the application of evidence admissible for any purpose is not error.

The plaintiff, Rudolph Jackson, Jr., complains of the overruling of his motion for new trial following his conviction for murder and his sentence to imprisonment for life as recommended in the verdict finding him guilty. The indictment charged the plaintiff in error with a homicide committed by him while driving an automobile upon a certain described highway. It charged that the homicide was committed 'with malice aforethought,' and further alleged that the plaintiff in error was engaged, at the time of the homicide in the commission of unlawful acts naturally tending to destroy life, one of the acts being the driving of an automobile upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the other being the failure to turn his automobile to the right in meeting another vehicle on the highway (in which the deceased was a passenger), so as to pass such other vehicle without interference. The motion for new trial contains the usual general grounds and two special grounds added by amendment; the first special ground complaining of the admission in evidence of testimony to the effect that the plaintiff in error had previously, three or four weeks before the homicide, been driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and had a collision with another automobile; the second special ground complaining of the failure of the court to properly limit this evidence by instructions to the jury. There was no demurrer to the indictment nor exception to the charge of the court.

Other material facts are reported in the opinion.

L. H. Foster and C. F. Richter, both of Cairo, for plaintiff in error.

Maston O'Neal, Sol. Gen., of Bainbridge, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., and Wright Lipford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

A. M. ANDERSON, Judge.

1. The general grounds of the motion for new trial are insisted upon, at least pro forma. The question as to whether or not the evidence was such as to authorize the jury to convict the plaintiff in error of murder is, we think, the controlling question in the case.

The offense of murder may be committed when there is no actual intent to kill. In this case, no actual intent to kill, and no real motive for a homicide appeared. However, the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter (Code of Georgia 1933, § 26-1009) provides that an involuntary homicide may be murder where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being. In addition to this statutory provision, we have the well-established doctrine that every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his conduct, particularly if that conduct be unlawful and dangerous to the safety and lives of others. We have also another doctrine kindred thereto, and probably arising from the same general consideration of law, which shows itself in many decisions of this court, and of the Court of Appeals of this State, to the effect that, 'There are wanton or reckless states of mind which are sometimes the equivalent of a specific intention to kill, and which may and should be treated by the jury as amounting to such intention, when productive of violence likely to result in the destruction of life, though not so resulting in the given instance.' Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 463, 464(2), 17 S.E. 863, 864. See also, Myrick v. State, 199 Ga. 244(1), 34 S.E.2d 36. The Gallery case is also authority for the proposition that where death does not result from the unlawful act of the person charged with the offense of assault to murder, no presumption of an intent to kill will arise, but that, when murder is charged, and the proof shows that an actual homicide was committed, a presumption of an intent to kill may arise and the prisoner may be convicted of murder, although the presumption of the intent to kill is contrary to the actual facts of the case.

In consequence of these principles, some statutory, as we have indicated, and others derived from the decisions of the courts, many convictions of the offense of assault to murder by the use of an automobile, even when there was no intention to kill, in the popular sense, have been sustained, without the aid of any legal presumption of an intent to kill. Some of these cases are the following:Dennard v. State, 14 Ga.App. 485, 81 S.E. 378; Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga.App. 124, 139 S.E. 80; Easley v. State, 49 Ga.App. 275, 175 S.E. 23; Payne v. State, 74 Ga.App. 646, 40 S.E.2d 759.

In the application of the same principles, this court has, usually by divided opinions, affirmed several convictions of murder in the use of an automobile, where there was no real intent to kill, but where the intent to kill was derived from some of the principles which we have hereinbefore announced. Some of these cases are the following:Butler v. State, 178 Ga. 700, 173 S.E. 856; Jones v. State, 185 Ga. 68, 194 S.E. 216; Meadows v. State, 186 Ga. 592, 199 S.E. 133; Vaughn v. State, 193 Ga. 282, 18 S.E.2d 469; Powell v. State, 193 Ga. 398, 18 S.E.2d 678; Josey v. State, 197 Ga. 82, 28 S.E.2d 290. One very interesting case which was decided upon the pleadings, wherein the lower court was reversed, is that of Wright v. State, 166 Ga. 1, 141 S.E. 903. In that case, Mr. Justice Gilbert wrote a specially concurring opinion, and Mr. Justice Hines wrote a dissenting opinion. Some of the cases in which reversals of convictions of murder by the use of an automobile upon the public highway have occurred are:Ivey v. State, 191 Ga. 461, 12 S.E.2d 879; Huntsinger v. State, 200 Ga. 127, 36 S.E.2d 92, in which Mr. Justice Atkinson wrote a most interesting specially concurring opinion; Smith v. State, 200 Ga. 188, 36 S.E.2d 350. In the Ivey case, supra, the decision of the court was unanimous; in the other two cases, there were dissenting opinions.

In all cases presented to this court, wherein the general grounds of the motion for new trial are insisted upon, the court is bound to approach the question as to whether the evidence supports the verdict, with great consideration of the action of the trial judge in approving the verdict found by the jury. The trial judge is invested with discretion in passing upon the motions for new trial and it is his duty to grant a new trial if he considers the verdict against the weight of evidence, though there be some evidence to support and it is likewise his duty to grant a new trial, particularly in a criminal case where the liberty of citizens is involved, if it appears that the ends of justice so require.

The general rule undoubtedly is that, where there is some evidence to support the verdict found by the jury, and where the verdict found by the jury has been approved by the trial judge, manifested by his overruling of the motion for new trial upon the general grounds, 'we are bound to conclude that * * * the judge exercised the sound discretion which the law wisely placed in his hands,' and this court will be reluctant to interfere. Meadows v. State, 186 Ga. 592(3), 199 S.E. 133, 136; Josey v. State, 197 Ga. 82, 93, 28 S.E.2d 290.

Substantially all of the contentions of the State, save that the defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants, stand undisputed in the record. The defendant made a statement in which he virtually admitted his guilt of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, but denied his guilt of murder and denied that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time.

The fatal collision occurred about 8 o'clock on the morning of August 9, 1947, on a paved highway designated as State Highway No. 38 and U.S. Highway No. 84, being the main and only paved highway between Cairo and Thomasville, Georgia, at a point about two and one-half to three miles east of Cairo. The deceased, Ed Farnell, was riding on the front seat of an automobile driven by Paul E. Vanlandingham. The deceased's wife and Miss Pauline Harrell were in the...