Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 794 |
| Citation | 459 So.2d 963 |
| Parties | Patricia Anne Thomas JACKSON, alias v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Ralph C. Burroughs and Joel L. Sogol of Sogol & Chandler, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Patricia Anne Thomas Jackson was indicted and tried for the capital murder of It is undisputed that on February 28, 1981, shortly after 1:00 p.m., the appellant stabbed Bonnie Walker once through the heart and that Ms. Walker died as a result of this wound. The facts and circumstances surrounding the stabbing incident, however, were, somewhat, in dispute.
Bonnie Walker, whom she stabbed once through the heart. Ms. Jackson, the appellant herein, was indicted, pursuant to § 13A-5-31(a)(13), Code of Alabama 1975, for "murder committed by a defendant who has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree in the 20 years preceding the crime." The trial was conducted in compliance with the standards and procedures outlined in Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980). The jury returned a verdict of "guilty as charged in the indictment," and, after a separate sentencing-phase hearing, fixed appellant's punishment at death. The trial court, after its separate sentencing-phase hearing and in accordance with the jury's verdict, sentenced the appellant to death by electrocution
Charlotte Archibald testified that she was visiting the victim, Bonnie Walker, on the day of the stabbing and witnessed an argument between the appellant and the victim. Ms. Archibald originally heard the appellant talking loudly and cursing in front of Sallie B. Hollifield's house, next door to the duplex in which the victim lived. Ms. Archibald went to the victim's screen door to look outside to see what was "going on" next door. The appellant walked over in front of the victim's residence and began hollering inside to the victim. The appellant and the victim then engaged in a heated argument through the victim's screen door. Ms. Archibald prevented any physical contact at that time by holding the screen door, thereby preventing entry by the appellant and preventing the victim from going outside at appellant's request. The appellant then, apparently, left the premises.
After the appellant had disappeared Ms. Archibald left the victim's duplex, entered her van, which was parked in the victim's front yard, and prepared to leave. She was unable to leave because other automobiles had her "blocked in." As she sat in her van she witnessed a second confrontation between the victim and the appellant. They were on the victim's porch arguing with each other and calling each other names. The appellant dared the victim to insult appellant's mother, and, after the victim refused to do so, the appellant hit the victim in the chest with a closed fist. Ms. Archibald did not realize at that time that the appellant had stabbed the victim. She saw the appellant run away and saw the victim disappear inside her residence. The victim quickly reappeared with a knife in her hand. Ms. Archibald then saw the blood all over the victim's blouse and ran to assist her. The victim exclaimed, "That bitch has cut me."
On cross-examination Ms. Archibald admitted that she could not say for certain when the victim was stabbed, but did see the appellant "whop" the victim in the chest with a closed fist. Ms. Archibald further stated that the victim did not have a knife until after the appellant had disappeared, that the victim did not have a knife when the appellant stabbed her.
Pelma Smith lived in the adjoining residence in the same duplex as the victim. He arrived home during the middle of the argument between the appellant and the victim. He testified that the appellant was the aggressor in the argument while the victim was trying to stop it. He witnessed the appellant reach in her purse as she approached the victim. He saw her "cup" a knife in her hand with the blade concealed on the underside of her arm. When the victim, at appellant's insistence, would not insult appellant's mother, the appellant stepped forward and stabbed her in the chest.
According to Smith, the victim was unarmed when the appellant stabbed her. Immediately after the stabbing, the appellant ran off the porch and stated "I told you I'll [sic] kill you." The victim went inside. Smith heard the victim in the kitchen and saw her return to her porch with a On cross-examination Smith stated that he did not warn the victim about appellant's knife because he was afraid the appellant might have attacked him, too.
butcher knife. He also heard her say that the appellant had stabbed her.
Jimmy Little saw the appellant at Sallie B. Hollifield's house before her argument with the victim. The appellant was upset and mad before she left Hollifield's house. Little saw the appellant walk over to the victim's home and start "bamming" on the door. He heard the appellant "cussing" the victim for being too slow in coming to the door. He witnessed part of the argument, and at one point pulled the appellant off the victim's porch in an attempt to stop it. When his efforts to stop the argument failed, he went back over to, and went inside, Hollifield's house. Little did not witness the stabbing, but he did hear the victim exclaim that the appellant had stabbed her.
Appellant's defense at trial was self-defense. She testified that she went to the victim's residence to purchase some whiskey from the victim. The victim invited her inside, where the victim agreed, initially, to sell her some whiskey. According to the appellant, the victim suddenly changed her mind, began cussing, and told the appellant to leave her home. Before the appellant could leave, Ms. Archibald drew a pistol and began cursing, also. The appellant then told Ms. Archibald that she, the appellant, could "cut" Ms. Archibald before Ms. Archibald could shoot the appellant. At this point, according to the appellant, "Bonnie [the victim] went to go up with her knife ... And that's when I came down with mine." The appellant explained, however, that the knife with which she stabbed the victim was a "steak knife" that she, the appellant, picked up off the victim's night table when Ms. Archibald drew her pistol.
The appellant further explained that, after she stabbed the victim, the victim threatened to kill her, the appellant. Other insulting words were exchanged and the appellant left. The appellant testified that she did not know she had inflicted a fatal wound at that time and did not know that the victim had died until the next afternoon. She stated that when she heard about the victim's death, and that the police were looking for her, she voluntarily went to the police station and "turned herself in."
On cross-examination the state asked the appellant about an incident which occurred prior to trial at a preliminary hearing. The appellant denied that she told Calvin Winn that the victim, Ms. Walker, was the second person she had killed and that she was going to kill Ms. Archibald when she, the appellant, got out of jail.
Calvin Winn, a rebuttal witness for the state and Ms. Archibald's brother-in-law, testified that the appellant did tell him, on the day of her preliminary hearing, that the victim was the second person she had killed and that she intended to kill Ms. Archibald. The appellant then presented, as witnesses, those matrons in charge of the appellant on the day of her preliminary hearing. They testified that, although the appellant was at the courthouse on the day described by Winn, they did not see Winn and did not let the appellant out of their sight. These witnesses doubted that the alleged conversation between Winn and the appellant ever took place.
In support of the capital murder charged, the state presented proof that the appellant had been previously convicted in 1966 of second-degree murder. The state introduced a certified copy of a judgment entry of the conviction and presented testimony of the prior victim's sister, who identified the appellant as the person convicted in 1966 for the murder of her brother, Andrew Hughes.
The appellant objected at trial and argues on appeal that her 1966 conviction was not a valid conviction because she was not informed, at that time, by counsel or the trial court, that she had a right to appeal the conviction. This issue has been decided against the appellant in a recent proceeding on her petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from the 1966 conviction, and has been affirmed by us on The validity of the 1966 conviction was, therefore, upheld by the "coram nobis" trial court. On appeal we affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the 1966 conviction was valid. See, Jackson v. State, supra. The appellant has presented nothing further on this appeal, and we have found no evidence in the record, to convince us otherwise. The prior conviction was properly proven at the trial below, and, in fact, was admitted by the appellant on cross-examination.
appeal. See, Jackson v. State, 446 So.2d 691 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). The trial court's findings at the hearing of the petition for writ of error coram nobis are set out in detail in Jackson v. State, supra. As explained, therein, faced in 1966 with a capital charge of first-degree murder and in order to avoid a possible death sentence, the appellant made an agreement to accept a sentence of twelve years' imprisonment in exchange for what was, in effect, a plea of guilty to second-degree murder. 1 The trial court concluded that all parties, including the appellant, herself, agreed to the negotiated "settlement" reached in the 1966 case. The trial court found that appellant's testimony at the coram nobis hearing, that she did not agree with the "settlement" in 1966 and that no one informed her of her right to appeal, was not credible in light of other evidence. The
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