Jackson v. State

Decision Date13 June 1911
PartiesJACKSON v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; Armstead Brown, Judge.

Dave Jackson was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. E. Andrews, for appellant.

R. C Brickell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

PELHAM J.

The defendant was tried on an indictment charging murder, and was convicted of murder in the second degree. On the trial defendant reserved several exceptions to the oral charge of the court, which are set out in the record. The first exception is in the following language: "We desire to reserve an exception to that portion of your honor's charge where you stated, if the defendant went off and got that pistol for the purpose of coming back and renewing, then he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. The stenographer has it exactly as you said--if he got the pistol and came back for the purpose of renewing the difficulty. And did renew it--your honor left that part out." The court then charged the jury as follows: "And did renew it then he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. Or if he came back for the purpose of renewing it, with the intention in his mind to kill the deceased, then, although the deceased may have made the assault upon him and become the aggressor when he came back there, yet if the defendant did form the design to take the life of the deceased he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense." The defendant thereupon excepted to that portion, and the court further charged the jury: "I believe I took that last point wrong; I left out one word. This is the idea I want to impress upon you The question in this case, one of the questions for you to determine, is whether or not this defendant provoked this difficulty for the purpose, when he came back there, for the purpose of shooting this man. Now if he came back with that purpose, got that pistol for that purpose, then came back and provoked the trouble, although this man may have assaulted him with a paling as he testified, still he should not invoke self-defense, after coming back with the pistol." The defendant then excepted to "the latter part of your honor's charge," and further said, upon being asked what he had to say: "We desire to reserve an exception to that portion of your honor's charge where you stated, if that defendant went off and got that pistol for the purpose of coming back and renewing, then he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. The stenographer has it exactly as you said it--if he got the pistol and come back for the purpose of renewing the difficulty. And did renew it--your honor left that part out." The court thereupon, as shown by the record, further charged the jury, "And did renew it, then he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. Or if he came back for the purpose of renewing it, with the intention in his mind to kill this deceased, then, although the deceased may have made the assault upon him and became the aggressor when he came back there, yet if the defendant did form the design to take the life of the deceased he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense." The record then contains the statement: "To which action of the court the defendant then and there duly and legally excepted," whereupon the jury was recalled and the court still further charged them as follows: "I believe I took that last point wrong; I left out one word. This is the idea I want to impress upon you: The question in this case, one of the questions for you to determine, is whether or not this defendant provoked this difficulty for the purpose, when he came back there, for the purpose of shooting this man. Now if he came back with that purpose, got that pistol with that purpose, then came back and provoked the trouble, although this man may have assaulted him with a paling as he testified, still he could not invoke self-defense, after coming back with that pistol." Some of the charges and exceptions seem to be repetitions; we have set them out just as they appear in the transcript before us. After the last charge of the court, the record contains the following statement: "To which part of the court's charge the defendant then and there duly and legally excepted."

The entire oral charge of the court is set out and must be looked to and construed, together with the portions excepted to, and in connection with the evidence, and, if the charge considered as a whole correctly states the rules of law applicable to the evidence...

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7 cases
  • Allen v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • 15 Febrero 1994
    ...advantage--here, the acquisition of a deadly weapon. See State v. Heath, 237 Mo. 255, 141 S.W. 26, 30 (1911); Jackson v. State, 2 Ala.App. 55, 56 So. 96, 98 (1911). Appellant was able to reach her vehicle; yet when she did, she grabbed a weapon, turned and confronted her attacker instead of......
  • Montgomery v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • 30 Junio 1911
    ... ... Appeal ... from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; D. W. Speake, Judge ... Wess ... Montgomery was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, ... and he appeals. Affirmed ... [56 So. 93] ... [2 ... Ala.App. 27] Wert & Lynne and Jackson & Deloney, for ... appellant ... [2 ... Ala.App. 28] R. C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and T. H. Seay, ... Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State ... [2 ... Ala.App. 29] PELHAM, J ... The ... defendant was indicted for murder, but, having been ... previously tried on the ... ...
  • Mitchell v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • 20 Enero 1916
    ...away, the defendant, when he renewed the conflict, put himself at fault, and cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. Jackson v. State, 2 Ala.App. 59, 56 So. 96. 4, 6, and 7 ignore this phase of the evidence, and the principles of law applicable, and were properly refused. Charge 7 is fa......
  • Arden v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • 19 Diciembre 1912
    ...The oral charge of the court must be construed as a whole. W. U. Telegraph Co. v. Snell, 3 Ala. App. 263, 56 So. 854; Jackson v. State, 2 Ala. App. 55, 56 So. 96. When construed, it states the law correctly as applicable to the evidence. Nor are the facts of the oral charge which seem to be......
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