Jackson v. State

Citation374 A.2d 1
PartiesClinton JACKSON and Gus T. Tramill, Defendants below, Appellants, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.
Decision Date09 May 1977
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Reversed.

Edward C. Pankowski, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Richard W. Pell, Wilmington, for defendant Jackson.

Arlen B. Mekler, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant Tramill.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

Defendants were convicted of robbery in the first degree (11 Del. C. § 832); possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (11 Del.C. § 1447); and conspiracy in the second degree. On appeal, they contend that the Trial Judge's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of alibi was prejudicial error. We agree.

I.

The convictions in this case stem from the robbery of a Wilmington supermarket. At trial, the defendants' sole defense was that of alibi; their claim of not being within the State at the time of the offense was corroborated by the testimony of a friend of one of the defendants.

In charging the jury, the Trial Judge gave no specific instruction on alibi. Objecting to this omission, defense counsel requested that such instruction be given; * that request was denied.

II.

This Court has repeatedly held that alibi is not an affirmative defense; that a charge which places the burden upon the accused to prove an alibi to the jury's satisfaction is improper. See, e. g., Rogers v. State, Del.Supr., 343 A.2d 608 (1975); Miller v. State, Del.Supr., 233 A.2d 164 (1967); Halko v. State, Del.Supr., 4 Storey 180, 175 A.2d 42 (1961).

While the instant case involves an omitted rather than an erroneous instruction on alibi, the evil to be avoided is the same: the jury must not be left free to assume that the defendant bears the burden of proving alibi. There must be an explanation of the context within which evidence of alibi must be evaluated; to that end, the jury must be made aware that:

"(S)ince an alibi is only a denial of any connection with the crime, it must follow that if the proof adduced raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, either by itself or in conjunction with all other facts in the case, the defendant must be acquitted."

Halko v. State, supra, at 49.

There was sufficient evidence in this case to justify a charge on alibi. It was prejudicial error to deny the substance of the request. Accordingly, a reversal is required.

III.

A matter which might have been essential to the disposition of this case, if reversal were not otherwise impelled, was the situation which arose involving the relationship of one of the jurors to a Deputy Attorney General. A motion for a new trial, based upon that relationship, was denied by the Trial Judge. We take the occasion to comment upon the matter.

Prior to the selection of the jury, the juror was aware that he was the uncle of a Deputy Attorney General; yet, despite specific voir dire questioning as to whether any panel member was related to any of the attorneys or their associates, the juror failed to disclose that kinship. Moreover, two additional factors were subsequently discovered: (1) that the juror had seen his nephew at the courthouse often during his jury duty; and (2) that a jury information card, used by the Attorney General's office, contained a notation acknowledging the relationship. In addition to denying the involvement of the related Deputy in any aspect of the defendants' prosecution, the State maintains that the prosecutor in the case had no recollection of the notation or prior knowledge of the uncle-nephew relationship.

The right of a defendant to a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors is basic to our system of justice. Goodyear v. State, Del.Supr., 348 A.2d 174 (1975). Primary among the requisite safeguards for a fair and impartial jury is a defendant's right to challenge prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for cause. That right of challenge is seriously impaired by a juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of a relationship to an attorney in the case, or to a member of his firm or staff. See generally Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215, 224 So.2d 247 (1969); Skiles v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Fla.App., 267 So.2d 379 (1972) cert. denied, Fla.Supr., 275 So.2d 253 (1973); State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 169 S.E.2d 833 (1969); Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 126 (1975). Moreover, the offense to the system is aggravated when, as...

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31 cases
  • Cooke v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 24 Julio 2014
    ...State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Del.1988). 263.U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Del. Const. Art. I, § 7; Flonnory v. State, 778 A.2d 1044, 1052 (Del.2001). 264.Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1, 2 (Del.1977). 265.Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1041 (Del.1985) (citing Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 780 (Del.1......
  • Hughes v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 10 Septiembre 1984
    ...or for cause, is one of the primary safeguards available to a defendant's effort to secure an impartial jury. Jackson v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 1, 2 (1977). Voir dire is essential in permitting the intelligent use of peremptory challenges, and the impairment of the peremptory challenge ......
  • Caldwell v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 13 Septiembre 2001
    ...(denying motion for new trial). 70. Massey v. State, Del.Supr., 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (1988) (citations omitted). 71. Jackson v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 1, 2 (1977) ("Jury prejudice and bias, either actual or apparent, may not be allowed to derogate from society's confidence in its judicia......
  • Dawson v. State
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    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 13 Marzo 1990
    ...challenges are not constitutionally required. Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. at 2278-79 (internal quotation omitted); Jackson v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 1 (1977). Consequently, peremptory challenges exist as a matter of privilege. Hickman v. State, Del.Supr., 431 A.2d 1249, 1250 (1981). The......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Third-party Guilt
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 76, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...defense"); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); Harkness v. State, 590 S.W.2d 277 (Ark. 1979); Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977); People v. Rivera, 390 N.E.2d 1259, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Williams v. State, 671 P.2d 635 (Nev. 1983); Christian v. State, 555 S.W.2......

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