Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 16 April 1903
• Citation: 136 Ala. 22,34 So. 188
• Parties: JACKSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

34 So. 188

136 Ala. 22

JACKSON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 16, 1903

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; Osceola Kyle, Judge.

Horace Jackson was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

The indictment contained two counts. In the first count the defendants were charged with the murder of Alex Herman by hanging him with a rope; and in the second count they were charged with the murder of said Alex Herman by shooting him with a gun. The defendant was alone arrested and placed on trial, was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life.

The facts proven on the trial of the case were substantially as follows: The negro Alex Herman was under arrest, charged with the murder of a negro woman. The constable, another negro fearing that there would be trouble, as there was a large and angry crowd of negroes in town, deputized the defendant Horace Jackson, and another negro, Will Kirby, to assist him in guarding the defendant Herman on the preliminary trial. On this trial, Herman was remanded to jail, and the constable Burt, fearing for the safety of his prisoner, should he attempt to carry him to the county jail, which was 16 miles from the railroad, attempted to take said prisoner to the jail at Tuscumbia. As he was trying to put his prisoner on the train at Courtland, the place of preliminary trial, a mob of negroes overpowered the constable and took Herman away from him, and, carrying the prisoner about a half mile from town, he was hung and shot. There was but one witness who swore that the defendant Jackson had anything to do with taking the prisoner from the officer, and that was the witness George W. Perkins, who testified that he saw the defendant and Horace Jackson go on the train and pull the man Herman off the north side of said train and go off with the mob. This same witness further testified that he was in Courtland on the day of the hanging, and had a conversation with T. M. Crow, the marshal of Courtland, and Dr. J. W Edwards, about the mob, both of whom denied seeing said witness or having any conversation with him; Dr. Edwards going so far as to swear that he had lived in Courtland for a number of years, and had never seen the witness Perkins in his life till the trial of the defendant, Jackson.

There was evidence introduced by the defendant tending to show that he took no part in the lynching of Alex Herman, and was not present at the time the lynching occurred. The bill of exceptions contains the following recital as to the argument of the solicitor for the state: "In his argument to the jury in this case the solicitor who represented the state among other things, used the following language: 'Mob law must be stopped. If a crowd of negroes take a negro out and hang him, and if the jury acquit the defendant where they have evidence to convict him, as they have in this case, then, the first thing you know, they will be taking a white man out and hanging him.' The defendant objected to the above-quoted language of the solicitor, and asked the court to exclude the same from the jury; but the court overruled the defendant's said objection, and allowed said language to go to the jury, to which action of the court the defendant then and there in open court duly excepted."

The bill of exceptions recites that, after charging the jury as to the law of murder in the first degree, the court proceeded to charge them as to the law of murder in the second degree. The defendant objected to the court instructing the jury on the law of murder in the second degree, on the ground that the evidence in the case showed that the defendant was either guilty of murder in the first degree or nothing. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted.

At the request of the defendant, the court gave to the jury the following written charge: "(10) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant's guilt has not been proven to a moral certainty, then your verdict must be 'Not guilty.' " After giving this charge, the court of its own motion instructed the jury, by way of explanation. that said charge meant "that, before the defendant could be convicted, his guilt must first be established beyond a reasonable doubt." The defendant objected to this action of the court in explaining said charge.

Among the other charges given by the court at the request of the defendant was the following: "(1) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that you must find the defendant not guilty, unless the evidence against him is such as to exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt." After giving this charge, the court of its own motion instructed the jury as follows: "Gentlemen, that means that the defendant should not be convicted unless you are convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." The defendant separately excepted to the explaining of the charge given at the request of the defendant.

The court, at the written request of the state, gave to the jury the following written charges: "(20) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, though you also believe it possible that he is not guilty, you must convict him. (21) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the doubt must be, that will justify an acquittal, actual and substantial, not a mere possible doubt. Because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. (22) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if, after considering all of the evidence, you have a fixed conviction of the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is your duty to convict the defendant."

To the giving of each of these charges the defendant separately excepted, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following charges requested by him: "(1) If the guilt of the defendant depends upon the testimony of the witness Perkins, and the jury believe from the evidence that said witness Perkins was willfully and maliciously false as to any material part of his said testimony, then the jury may disregard all of the testimony of said witness Perkins, and find the defendant not guilty. (2) I charge you,...