Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 18 March 2005
• Docket Number: CR-04-0096.
• Citation: 910 So.2d 797
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama. (In re Shonelle Andre JACKSON v. STATE of Alabama).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

910 So.2d 797

Ex parte State of Alabama.

(In re Shonelle Andre JACKSON v. STATE of Alabama).

CR-04-0096.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 18, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Troy King, atty. gen., and James R. Houts and Jeremy W. McIntire, asst. attys. gen., for petitioner.

Angela L. Setzer and Bryan A. Stevenson, Montgomery, for respondent.

Sharon E. Ficquette, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for amicus curiae Alabama Department of Human Resources, in support of the petitioner.

PER CURIAM.

The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Tracy S. McCooey to vacate the discovery orders relating to Shonelle Andre Jackson's petition for postconviction relief in which he attacked his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death. Jackson was convicted of murdering Lefrick Moore during the course of a robbery and was sentenced to death. Jackson's conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Jackson v. State, 836 So.2d 915 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 836 So.2d 979 (Ala.2002).

In July 2003, Jackson filed a Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition attacking his conviction and death sentence. He filed an amended petition in March 2004. Jackson then filed two lengthy discovery motions relating to his Rule 32 petition. The State filed detailed objections to each motion. In October 2004, Judge McCooey held a hearing on the discovery motions; after the hearing, she granted the motions. The State then filed this mandamus petition and a request that we stay all action in the circuit court pending this Court's disposition of this extraordinary petition. By order dated November 30, 2004, we stayed all action in the lower court and allowed the respondents 21 days to answer the allegations contained in the mandamus petition. Jackson has filed an answer in this case and the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") has filed a brief as amicus curiae.

The State asserts that Judge McCooey failed to find good cause before she ordered discovery in this postconviction proceeding, that she erred in ordering discovery on issues that had been held to be procedurally barred, and that she exceeded the limited scope of discovery by ordering discovery of all criminal, mental-health, and correctional records of all witnesses for the State. It cites numerous other grounds in support of the issuance of this writ.¹

Jackson's first discovery motion requested the production of the following records: all records of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") related to Louis Wendell Taylor, Jackson's father; all medical, psychological, psychiatric, or mental-health records related to Jackson and his father; all records of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") related to Jackson and his father; and all DHR records related to Jackson and his father.

The second discovery motion requested that the district attorney turn over its entire case file related to the victim's murder and its case files related to the prosecution of Shonelle Andre Jackson and his three codefendants — Antonio Barnes, Eric Williams, and Christopher Rudolph. The motion also requested "all documents related to all State witnesses who had testified at Jackson's trial," including but not limited to the witnesses' juvenile records, sentencing reports, arrest and conviction records, records of any law-enforcement authority, psychiatric, psychological, and mental-health records, and other records and reports. The motion further stated:

"This request specifically applies to, but is not limited to the following: the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, the City of Montgomery Police Department, the Montgomery County Police Department, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, the Montgomery Fire Department, the Montgomery County Detention Facility, the Montgomery City Jail, the Montgomery Violent Crime Task Force, the Alabama Department of Youth Services, the Alabama Department of Corrections, the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, the Alabama Department of Pardons and Paroles, the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, specifically including Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility and Bryce Hospital and the Montgomery County Juvenile, Family, District and Circuit Courts and the Montgomery Municipal Court."

The State filed detailed objections to each discovery motion. Judge McCooey held a hearing, at which she stated:

"I hear what you're saying, but I mean, we're talking about, you know, someone's life. Okay. So, I mean, the stakes are as high as they can get. You know, we're not talking about someone who is just going to prison for a number of years or whatever. I mean, we're — you know, the stakes are as high as they get. What is wrong with letting them have the discovery? If they are on a fishing expedition, then they're not going to be able to prove it anyway."

(Emphasis added.) Judge McCooey then granted unlimited discovery from all departments and agencies listed in Jackson's discovery motions.

When ascertaining whether discovery is warranted in a Rule 32 proceeding, the court must first determine whether the Rule 32 petitioner has shown good cause for disclosure of the requested materials. As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 847 (Ala.2000):

"We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that `good cause' is the appropriate standard by which to judge postconviction discovery motions. In fact, other courts have adopted a similar `good-cause' or `good-reason' standard for the postconviction discovery process. See [State v.] Marshall, [148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 140, 139 L.Ed.2d 88 (1997)]; State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988). As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the good-cause standard guards against potential abuse of the postconviction discovery process. See Fitzgerald, supra, 123 Ill.2d at 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937[at 941], 526 N.Ed.2d at 135....

"... By adopting this standard, we are only recognizing that a trial court, upon a petitioner's showing of good cause, may exercise its inherent authority to order discovery in a proceeding for postconviction relief. In addition, we caution that postconviction discovery does not provide a petitioner with a right to `fish' through official files and that it `is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means of vindicating actual claims.' People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991). Instead, in order to obtain discovery, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief."

775 So.2d at 852.

Though Alabama has had little opportunity to define what constitutes "good cause," in Ex parte Mack, 894 So.2d 764, 768 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), we quoted with approval an Illinois case the Alabama Supreme Court relied on in Land — People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381, 275 Ill.Dec. 820, 793 N.E.2d 591 (2002):

"`A trial court has inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. See People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988); People v. Rose, 48 Ill.2d 300, 302, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971). A court must exercise this authority with caution, however, because a defendant may attempt to divert attention away from constitutional issues which escaped earlier review by requesting discovery.... Accordingly, the trial court should allow discovery only if the defendant has shown "good cause," considering the issues presented in the petition, the scope of the requested discovery, the length of time between the conviction and the post-conviction proceeding, the burden of discovery on the State and on any witnesses, and the availability of the evidence through other sources. Daley, 123 Ill.2d at 183-84, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131; see People v. Fair, 193 Ill.2d 256, 264-65, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500 (2000). We will reverse a trial court's denial of a post-conviction discovery request only for an abuse of discretion. Fair, 193 Ill.2d at 265, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a discovery request which ranges beyond the limited scope of a post-conviction proceeding and amounts to a "fishing expedition."'"

894 So.2d at 768-69 (quoting Johnson, 205 Ill.2d at 408, 275 Ill.Dec. at 836-37, 793 N.E.2d at 607-08). See also State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994).

The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1 (1997), a case also cited with approval by the Alabama Supreme Court in Land, stated:

"We anticipate that only in the unusual case will a PCR [postconviction relief] court invoke its inherent right to compel discovery. In most cases, a post-conviction petitioner will be fully informed of the documentary source of the errors that he brings to the PCR court's attention. Moreover, we note that PCR `is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims.' People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991). The filing of a petition for PCR is not a license to obtain unlimited information from the State, but a means through which a defendant may demonstrate to a reviewing court that he was convicted or sentenced in violation of his rights....

"Moreover, consistent with our prior discovery jurisprudence, any PCR discovery order should be appropriately narrow and limited. `[T]here is no postconviction right to "fish" through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for collateral relief may exist.' Gonzalez, supra, 275 Cal.Rptr. at 775, 800 P.2d at...