Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. F-95-1429,F-95-1429
• Citation: 1998 OK CR 39,964 P.2d 875
• Parties: 1998 OK CR 39 Larry Kenneth JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 875

964 P.2d 875

1998 OK CR 39

Larry Kenneth JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-95-1429.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

June 30, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 11, 1998.

Barry Albert, Gina Walker, Assistant Public Defenders, Oklahoma City, for Defendant at trial.

Robert H. Macy, District Attorney, Ray Elliott, Stephen Deutsch, Assistant District Attorneys, Oklahoma City, for the State at trail.

Wendell B. Sutton, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, for Jackson on appeal.

Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, William L. Humes, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, for Appellee on appeal.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Appellant, Larry Kenneth Jackson, was charged with first degree malice murder in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-94-6070. The State filed a Bill of Particulars alleging three aggravating circumstances. A jury trial was held before the Honorable Daniel L. Owens, District Judge. The jury found Jackson guilty of first degree murder and found the existence of two aggravating circumstances that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and that Jackson was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. ¹ Jackson was sentenced to death. From this Judgment and Sentence Jackson has perfected his appeal.

I. FACTS

¶2 Jackson and Wendy Cade had an ongoing relationship while Jackson was incarcerated at Joseph Harp Correctional Institution. Jackson believed that they would be married when he was released from prison. Cade was engaged to Victor Dizer and was attempting to change the relationship she had with Jackson.

¶3 Jackson was assigned on a work detail installing furniture for Oklahoma State Industries at the Jim Thorpe building in Oklahoma City. Cade went to the Jim Thorpe building where Jackson was working on September 6, 1994. They left together in Cade's Jeep Cherokee at about 10:00 a.m. According to Jackson, they were arguing about their relationship. Jackson left with the tools he was using, which included a utility knife. ² Shortly thereafter, Jackson was discovered missing and the Department of Corrections placed Jackson on escape status.

¶4 Jackson and Cade first stopped at a convenience store at 23rd and Broadway where Jackson purchased a quart of beer and cigarettes. Jackson said that Cade went across the street to a liquor store and bought a "fifth" of some type of alcoholic beverage. They then drove to Martha Gulley's house (Cade's mother) where Cade dropped off her 4 year old daughter.

¶5 After that, they drove around for some time north of the Oklahoma City metropolitan area. Around noon they stopped and bought chicken at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. They then went to a Motel 6 at N.E. 122nd and I-35.

¶6 At the motel, they checked into a room, ate their chicken and had intercourse. After that, according to Jackson they began fighting and he "blimped" out due to being either intoxicated or angry. Jackson left the motel in Cade's Jeep and got as far as the entrance ramp to the Turner Turnpike, just north of 122nd and I-35, where he had an accident, disabling the Jeep. Later that day, at about 3:30 p.m., the Jeep was found by a highway patrol trooper.

¶7 Jackson next remembered waking up in a field. Jackson hitched a ride to the Ambassador Court apartments at 1634 South Phillips where he believed his sister worked. Arriving there at about 6:00 to 6:30 p.m., he was unable to find his sister, but he did find a woman, Dorothy Leffette, who allowed him to stay at her apartment.

¶8 On September 7, 1994, at around 9:00 a.m. Victor Dizer and Martha Gulley, Cade's fiance and mother, went to the area where the Jeep was found in order to search for Cade. They went to the Motel 6 at N.E. 122 and I-35 and learned that Cade had rented a room. The police were notified and upon checking the room, they found Cade's nude body lying against the bed. Cade's throat had been slashed and the entire bathroom floor was covered with blood; however, very little blood was on Cade's body. Cade had over thirty slash/stab wounds. Cause of death was determined to be the deep incised wound to her throat which severed both jugular veins. The utility knife, wrapped in a wash cloth, was found stuck between the mattress and box springs of the bed.

¶9 Jackson was located by police at Leffette's apartment at about noon on September 7, 1994. He was taken into custody. In the room where Jackson was arrested the police found Cade's jewelry, watch, and keys to the Jeep. Jackson admitted to police that if Cade was dead, he did it, but he did not want to talk about the details of the killing.

II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES

¶10 Jackson contends in proposition one that the trial court erred by prohibiting counsel from conducting voir dire on his defense theory of diminished mental capacity. Jackson also complains that it was error for the trial court to prohibit counsel from inquiring about the juror's perception of a "life sentence."

¶11 Jackson claims, first, that he was denied his right to effective voir dire by being prohibited from inquiring about potential juror's feelings toward a defense of diminished capacity based on drug or alcohol consumption. The manner and extent of voir dire rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Plantz v. State, 1994 OK CR 33, p 24, 876 P.2d 268, 277, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1163, 115 S.Ct. 1130, 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1995).

"The principles governing the sufficiency of voir dire questions derive from the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions." "The purpose of voir dire ... is to ascertain whether there are grounds to challenge for either actual or implied bias [and] to permit the intelligent exercise of preemptory [sic] challenges." As long as the examination of prospective jurors is sufficiently broad to afford a defendant a jury not affected by outside influences, personal interests or bias, a judge's decision to limit questioning will not be ruled an abuse of discretion. Voir dire rulings lay within the trial judge's discretion because the "determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge."

Walker v. State, 1994 OK CR 66, p 12, 887 P.2d 301, 307, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 859, 116 S.Ct. 166, 133 L.Ed.2d 108 (1995)(alterations in original) (citations omitted). We are not interested in whether or not a certain question was allowed to be asked, but rather whether the defendant was allowed sufficient voir dire to determine if there were grounds to challenge a particular juror for cause and to intelligently exercise his preemptory challenges.

¶12 In Nauni v. State, 1983 OK CR 136, p 9, 670 P.2d 126, 130, we held that no abuse of discretion occurred when the judge restricted voir dire questioning regarding legal issues the trial court had to instruct the jury upon. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Jackson's questions regarding his theory of defense. The questions were an effort to test jurors' willingness to accept his theory of defense rather than to test their impartiality. Ultimately, instructions on voluntary intoxication were not given. Therefore, defense counsel's proposed questions would only have confused the jury.

¶13 In answer to Jackson's second allegation, there was no error in not allowing defense counsel to probe jurors regarding their perception of a "life sentence." We have never held that the jury should be told about the inner workings of the parole system, nor have we held that jurors should be informed about the length of life sentences versus sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Johnson v. State, 1996 OK CR 36, pp 45-49, 928 P.2d 309, 319-20, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 99, 139 L.Ed.2d 54 (1997). We hold that the meaning of a life sentence and a sentence of life without parole is not a proper subject for voir dire.

¶14 In proposition two, Jackson claims that his rights were violated by the removal of prospective juror Stempf. Juror Stempf admitted that about twelve years prior to this trial he had been convicted, in a Wyoming federal court, of illegally carrying a firearm on an Air Force base. Stempf agreed that it was a felony conviction and that the sentence had already expired. The trial court excused Mr. Stempf based on his felony conviction over the objection of Jackson.

¶15 Jackson argues that because Stempf had completed his sentence, his civil rights were restored and he was eligible to serve on this jury. Persons who are not qualified to serve as jurors are:

Persons who have been convicted of any felony or who have served a term of imprisonment in any penitentiary, state or federal, for the commission of a felony; provided, any such citizen convicted, who has been fully restored to his or her civil rights, shall be eligible to serve as a juror; ...

38 O.S.Supp.1995, § 28(B)(6) [emphasis added]. This section needs no interpretation. The clear intent of the legislature is to exclude those who have either been convicted of any felony or have served a term of imprisonment in any penitentiary for the commission of a felony unless that person has been fully restored to his or her civil rights.

¶16 Jackson argues that a person's civil rights are fully restored after the term of imprisonment has expired. In support of this argument, Jackson cites 26 O.S.1991, § 4-101, which suspends voting rights only for a period of time equal to the time prescribed in the judgment and sentence. Further, Jackson cites 21 O.S.1991, § 65, which states that "[a] sentence of imprisonment under the Department of Corrections suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, ... during the term of such imprisonment."

¶17 We need not discuss the issue of whether a person's civil rights, including the right to serve on a...