Jackson v. State, 24S00-9306-CR-597

Decision Date16 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 24S00-9306-CR-597,24S00-9306-CR-597
PartiesDonald Lee JACKSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Terrance W. Richmond, Milan, for appellant.

Pamela F. Carter, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Donald Lee Jackson, Jr. appeals the sentence imposed on him for murder. We affirm.

Jackson and Stuart Kennedy kidnapped Michelle Seagraves from her apartment complex in Columbus, Ohio, so that they could use her car in robbing the Peoples National Bank in Moores Hill, Indiana. Seagraves was brutally murdered. She was strangled, bludgeoned on the head with a blunt object, and shot in the back of the neck.

This Court set aside the death penalty imposed on Jackson after his trial for murder. Jackson v. State (1992), Ind., 597 N.E.2d 950. The trial judge subsequently sentenced Jackson to sixty years for murder, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-1-1(2) (West 1986), and ordered that the penalty be served after Jackson finishes the 100 years imposed earlier for kidnapping and robbery resulting in serious bodily injury.

I. Request for Mitigation Specialist

While the case was awaiting resentencing on the murder conviction, Jackson moved the trial court for funds to engage a mitigation specialist and a clinical psychologist. The court denied his request, and Jackson contends this was error.

This Court outlined the principles pertinent to the appointment of experts in Scott v. State (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 198. Among other things, we observed that the argument for providing experts at public expense is strongest in cases involving the most severe penalties. Indeed, on one recent occasion we concluded that refusal to provide an expert in a capital case was reversible error. Castor v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1281 (error to refuse appointment of expert where expert made preliminary determination that statutory mitigator applied to capital defendant). Castor is not compelling authority here, of course, because while the State initiated this murder prosecution as a capital case, by the time of Jackson's resentencing it no longer was a capital case.

Because it had been a death penalty case, however, the original sentencing proceeding was necessarily more extensive than it would have been if the death penalty had never been sought. Jackson asked that the evidence from that original sentencing be admitted for consideration on remand, and it was. The trial court relied on the evidence presented by both sides at the former hearing, including the following. A representative of the Ohio company which employed Jackson testified at length about Jackson's good employment record. Two of Jackson's cousins testified favorably about Jackson's life experiences. Jackson's brother testified about his efforts at building a family. Jackson's aunt testified about acts of kindness she had observed. Jackson's brothers and a co-worker also testified favorably about him. Finally, the Sheriff of Franklin County testified that Jackson had been a "good prisoner" while in jail awaiting trial.

Although the trial court prohibited the State from presenting any evidence during resentencing, it allowed Jackson to provide new testimony and additional reports. Jackson's mother testified that her son was handling himself very well in prison. Asked whether any circumstances had changed in Jackson's life since the last sentencing hearing, she noted that he was now in prison and said: "I don't know how they could change." His brothers testified about their continued relationship with him and his adjustment to prison. The Franklin County Sheriff testified that Jackson had not been any problem during his return to the jail for resentencing.

Jackson also called Stacey Michael, a mitigation specialist, who appeared notwithstanding the trial court's denial of funds to pay her. She presented a psychologist's report on Jackson from the Indiana State Prison. She also offered a favorable letter written by the warden of an Ohio penitentiary in which Jackson had been incarcerated for aggravated robbery shortly before his participation in the Seagraves murder. Finally, Jackson himself testified.

Altogether, then, Jackson was able to present the trial judge with a voluminous record, both from the earlier proceeding and the current one, describing the kind of person Donald Jackson has been. The judge acted within his discretion and the dictates of Scott v. State when he denied the request for funds to hire a mitigation specialist and a psychologist to prepare additional information.

II. A Second Presentence Report

Jackson contends that the trial court erred in not ordering a second presentence investigation when it resentenced him, citing Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-38-1-8 (West Supp.1993), which requires the preparation of a presentence report to assist in sentencing. The trial court, of course, had the benefit of a presentence report when it first sentenced Jackson and that report was still available. As for developments since the original sentencing, counsel for Jackson indicated at the second hearing that he intended to present evidence about Jackson's prison experiences subsequent to the preparation of the first report. This evidence was introduced. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to order a second report.

III. Was This a Proper Sentence?

Jackson alleges three grounds for error relating to the sixty year sentence itself.

First, Jackson contends that sentencing him for both murder and robbery resulting in serious bodily injury violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

Multiple penalties may be imposed for "the same offense" where the will of the legislative body to do so is clear. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693, 100 S.Ct. at 1438. Thus, legislative intent is central to a Double Jeopardy inquiry, and courts have used a "same-elements" test to make this analysis. The classic formulation of this test has been as follows: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Richardson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 1 Octubre 1999
    ...that was the basis of the enhancement was separate and distinct from that which was the basis of a murder conviction); Jackson v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind.1993) (same); Hansford v. State, 490 N.E.2d 1083, 1089 (Ind.1986) (affirming Class A enhancements to burglary and robbery convi......
  • Games v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 22 Julio 1997
    ...secure a conviction." Grady, 495 U.S. at 528, 110 S.Ct. at 2097, 109 L.Ed.2d at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).13 Accord Jackson v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind.1993) (wherein Chief Justice Shepard notes that Dixon may call into question "the distinction drawn in Malott and Mitchell ..."......
  • Wadle v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 18 Agosto 2020
    ...its authority by convicting and punishing a defendant in a single trial beyond what the statutes clearly permit. See Jackson v. State , 625 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. 1993) (holding that multiple punishments may "be imposed for ‘the same offense’ where the will of the legislative body to do so......
  • Wethington v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 31 Agosto 1995
    ...Ind.App., 602 N.E.2d 509, 520, trans. denied. The "identity of offenses" test under Bigler was not violated. See Jackson v. State (1993) Ind., 625 N.E.2d 1219, 1222. ("Certainly our legislature intended to create two crimes by enacting statutes prohibiting robbery and prohibiting murder, an......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT