Jackson v. State , 20A03–1105–CR–222.
| Decision Date | 06 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A03–1105–CR–222.,20A03–1105–CR–222. |
| Citation | 968 N.E.2d 328 |
| Parties | Keith D. JACKSON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Teresa L. Cataldo, Bristol, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ann. L. Goodwin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant–Defendant, Keith Jackson (Jackson), appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Ind.Code § 35–47–4–5(c), and the trial court's revocation of his probation and imposition of the balance of his suspended sentence in a separate, earlier Cause.
We reverse and remand.
Jackson raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing Jackson to community service;
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Jackson to pay public defender fees of $500; and
(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the balance of Jackson's suspended sentence following revocation of his probation in a separate Cause.
On December 23, 2004, the State filed an Information in Cause Number 20C01–0412–FB–00196 (Cause No. 196), charging Jackson with robbery using a deadly weapon, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35–42–5–1. On July 7, 2005, Jackson entered into a guilty plea with the State in which he pled guilty to the charge in exchange for a twelve-year sentence at the Department of Correction (DOC), with four years suspended, and all other conditions left to the trial court's discretion. On August 4, 2005, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Jackson in accordance with its terms. Jackson was released from the DOC on April 12, 2009.
On October 28, 2009, the State filed an Information in Cause Number 20C01–0910–FB–00063 (Cause No. 063), charging Jackson with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35–47–4–5(e). On October 29, 2009, the probation department filed its petition for violation of probation in Cause No. 196. The petition recommended that the trial court revoke Jackson's probation and order him to serve the balance of his four-year suspended sentence at the DOC.
On January 11, 2010, Jackson and the State filed a plea agreement with the trial court in Cause No. 063. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Jackson pled guilty to the charge in Cause No. 063 and admitted the probation violation in Cause No. 196. In exchange, the State agreed to the following:
[T]welve year incarceration with [six] of those [twelve] years suspended in [Cause No. 063]. [Two] years served (as one with good-time credit) in [Cause No. 196.] Discharged from probation in [Cause No. 196.] Case closed [.] Probation to calculate credit time in [Cause No. 063].(Appellant's App. p. 163). At the hearing on the plea agreement, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and agreed to be “bound by the terms of the plea agreement.” (January 11, 2011 Transcript p. 19). The trial court confirmed the terms of the plea agreement as to both Cause numbers and specifically noted the two-year sentence, good time credit, and discharge from probation in Cause No. 196.
On February 3, 2011, the trial court held Jackson's combined sentencing and sanctioning hearing. Jackson's counsel explained to the trial court that the credit time provision of the plea agreement meant that Jackson's 468 days of prior incarceration should be allotted as follows: 365 days to his probation violation in Cause No. 196 and 103 days in Cause No. 063. As a result, Jackson would be discharged from probation in Cause No. 196. The probation department would then be left to calculate the time in Cause No. 063, taking the remaining 103 days into account.
The trial court agreed to allocate the credit time as suggested by Jackson's counsel. The trial court then sentenced Jackson to a twelve-year executed sentence, with six years suspended on probation in Cause No. 063. The trial court imposed a fine of $7,000, which was also suspended. The trial court then questioned Jackson as follows:
(February 3, 2011 Tr. pp. 5–6).
On February 8, 2011, Jackson filed his handwritten motion to correct error with the trial court. Jackson alleged that the trial court had erred by imposing additional sanctions not specified in the plea agreement. On February 24, 2011, Jackson filed a letter with the trial court elaborating on the allegations in his motion to correct error. Jackson disputed that the fifty hours of community service and reimbursement of $500 dollars in public defender fees were conditions of his plea agreement in Cause No. 063. Jackson also contended that he had not been afforded the agreed upon credit time in Cause No. 196.
On February 25, 2011, the probation department submitted its credit time calculation memorandum to the trial court. The memorandum showed Jackson's incarceration time prior to his conviction in Cause No. 063 as 473 days. However, the probation department concluded that Jackson was “entitled to zero (0) days credit against the 4 year sentence imposed” in Cause No. 196 because “[Jackson] was incarceratedin the Elkhart County correctional facility under [Cause No. 196].” (Appellant's App. p 52). On March 24, 2011, the trial court held a hearing. That same day, the trial court issued its order revoking Jackson's probation in Cause No. 196 and ordering him to serve four years, with no days credited. In Cause No. 063, however, the trial court ordered that Jackson receive 473 days credit plus 473 days earned credit time.
On April 15, 2011, Jackson filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence in both Cause No. 063 and Cause No. 196. On April 18, 2011, the trial court denied Jackson's motion to correct erroneous sentence, reasoning as follows:
The [c]ourt notes it has the inherant [ sic ] power to order restitution, whether financial or community service, and the [c]ourt also notes that attorneys were furnished to [Jackson] at public expense and [Jackson] agreed that he could work while on probation and earn $500.00 for reimbursement to the [p]ublic [d]efender for the [public defender's] services.
Jackson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Jackson first challenges the community service condition of his probation in Cause No. 063 following his plea agreement with the State. The trial court has broad discretion to impose conditions of probation. Freije v. State, 709 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Ind.1999). However, “[i]f the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.” I.C. § 35–35–3–3(e). Thus, when the trial court establishes terms of probation following its acceptance of a plea agreement, its discretion is limited. S.S. v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. “A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the State, and the trial court.” Bennett v. State, 802 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ind.2004). Once the trial court accepts the plea agreement, it “is strictly bound by its sentencing provision and is precluded from imposing any sentence other than required by the plea agreement.” Id.
Although the trial court may impose administrative or ministerial conditions as terms of probation, it may not impose probation conditions that constitute “substantial obligations of a punitive nature” if the plea agreement “is silent to such punitive conditions.” Id. Community service “materially add[s] to the punitive obligation” and thus “may not be imposed in the absence of a plea agreement provision giving the trial court discretion to impose conditions of probation.” Freije, 709 N.E.2d at 325.
Jackson argues that the imposition of community service is a material term not addressed in the plea agreement, and therefore the trial court erred by imposing it. The State, although acknowledging the supreme court's decision in Freije, nonetheless argues that Jackson invited the error by agreeing to perform the community service.
Here, Jackson's plea agreement did not specify community service as a condition of probation. Bearing in mind that plea agreements are to be strictly adhered to, we cannot agree that the trial court may properly vary its terms to add a punitive obligation simply by seeking the defendant's verbal assent. See Briscoe v. State, 783 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The trial court could not order Jackson to undertake community service since the plea agreement did not specify that it had the discretion to do so. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.1
Jackson next argues that the trial court's imposition of public defender fees was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Jackson alleges that the trial court erred by imposing a public defender fee of $500 since it was not part of his plea agreement and he had previously been found indigent. We review the trial court's imposition of costs or fees for an abuse of discretion....
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