Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 30 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 20A04-9405-CR-205,20A04-9405-CR-205
• Citation: 657 N.E.2d 131
• Parties: Warner C. JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 131

657 N.E.2d 131

Warner C. JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 20A04-9405-CR-205.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Oct. 30, 1995.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Gregory L. Lewis, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Suzann Weber Lupton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

OPINION

CHEZEM, Judge.

Case Summary

Appellant-Defendant, Warner Jackson ("Jackson") appeals his conviction for Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a class B felony. We affirm.

Issues

Jackson presents three issues for our review which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence;

II. Whether final instructions number 1, number 2, and number 9 violated Article I, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution; and

III. Whether the final instruction defining "reasonable doubt" in terms of "moral certainty" violated Jackson's due process rights.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the conviction indicate that Christine Davis ("Davis") and her fourteen-year-old daughter, Khristine, returned to their home on the evening of August 21, 1993. Khristine entered the kitchen by herself. While she was in the kitchen, a man walked up behind her, held a knife to her side, and told her that he did not intend to harm her, but just wanted money. In response, Khristine led the man through the house and toward the staircase where Davis' purse had been placed.

At that point, Davis noticed the armed man following her daughter, shouted at the man, and reached for the blade of his knife. A struggle ensued, during which Davis' purse was knocked from the stairway to the floor. The man, who had repeated to Davis that he only wanted money, let go of the knife, and reached for the purse. Davis broke free, took the knife, and ran from the house, hoping the man would follow. When she did not see the man exit her house, Davis returned to her home, and discovered both the man and her purse were missing. Her purse contained, among other things, her Sears Department Store credit card.

Five days later, Jackson was apprehended at a Sears store when he attempted to make a purchase using Davis' Sears card. After Jackson's arrest, both Davis and Khristine selected Jackson as the robber from a police-prepared photo-array. On August 28, 1993, Jackson's sister appeared at Davis' house, and stated that she wanted to return Davis' driver's license and several of her credit cards. The sister explained that she had found these items in one of her brother's drawers.

At his jury trial, Jackson admitted he had attempted to use Davis' card, but claimed that he found it in an alley. In contrast to her earlier explanation to Davis, Jackson's sister testified that some children had found Davis' belongings outside her home. The jury found Jackson guilty as charged. He received a twenty-year presumptive sentence for the Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon charge in addition to a thirteen-year sentence due to a Habitual Offender determination.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jackson contends that the evidence presented fails to support his conviction for Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon. He stresses that Davis was outside holding the knife when her purse was physically taken from inside her home. Therefore, he argues, because he did not have the knife in his hand at the exact moment the purse was seized, he cannot be convicted of armed robbery.

Our standard of review on a claim that the evidence was insufficient is well established. Baran v. State (1994), Ind., 639 N.E.2d 642, 646. This court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We consider only the evidence most favorable to supporting the verdict. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the conviction. Id. at 646-47.

The relevant section of the Indiana Code provides A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person:

(1) By using or threatening the use of force on any person; or

(2) By putting any person in fear; commits robbery, a Class C felony. However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon....

Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1.

Jackson makes an argument similar to one which our supreme court addressed in Wilburn v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1109. In Wilburn, the defendant raped the victim at knife-point, put the knife away, grabbed the victim's purse, and ran. The defendant argued that because there was no evidence he was armed at the time the purse was taken, there was insufficient evidence to convict him for Robbery While Armed with a Deadly Weapon. Id. at 1110. In rejecting this argument, our supreme court explained:

The victim's testimony clearly established that appellant was armed with a knife at the time of the rape. The fact that he put the knife away shortly before he grabbed her purse and ran does not gainsay that fact that the robbery was an armed robbery. The jury was justified in determining that a Class B felony, Robbery, had been committed as defined in Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1.

Id.

The evidence most favorable to supporting the verdict shows that Jackson was armed with the knife when he forced Khristine to get some money for him. He was still armed with the knife when he struggled with Davis and informed her he wanted money. The facts that he dropped the knife when he saw Davis' purse get knocked over, and that Davis took the knife outside prior to the exact moment her purse was actually taken, do not preclude a conviction for Armed Robbery. We view the actions Jackson took to commit the robbery as one continuous event. Jackson produced and used the knife as a means of facilitating the commission of the charged offense. That is, his use of the knife was necessary to accomplish the robbery and was thus part of the robbery. Accordingly, Jackson was chargeable for Armed Robbery. Because there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury's determination of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, we decline the invitation to reweigh the evidence.

II. Final Instructions 1, 2, and 9

Jackson next contends that final instructions 1, 2, and 9 violate Article I, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, he argues that these instructions improperly bound the jury to the trial court's interpretation of the word "presence." Having not objected to any of the instructions at trial, Jackson now characterizes them as fundamental errors in an attempt to stave off waiver of the issue. Fundamental error is a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering a trial unfair to the defendant, and which, if not corrected would deny the defendant fundamental due process. Morgan v. State (1995), Ind.App., 648 N.E.2d 1164, 1168.

Jury instructions lie largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Tyson v. State (1993), Ind.App., 619 N.E.2d 276, 293 trans. denied, denial of post conv. relief aff'd in part, rev'd in part (1993), Ind.App., 626 N.E.2d 482, cert. denied by 510 U.S. 1176, 114 S.Ct. 1216, 127 L.Ed.2d 562. Where an appellant presents the issue of whether an instruction has been given erroneously, the standard on review is whether the alleged erroneous instruction so affects the entire charge that the jury was misled as to the law in the case. If so, reversal is required. McCullough v. State (1993), Ind.App., 608 N.E.2d 1009, 1010. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole; if they state the law fully and correctly when read in conjunction, they are not erroneous. Id.

Article I, section 19 of the Indiana Constitution states, "[i]n all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts." Although Article I, § 19 confers upon juries in criminal cases the right to determine the law, that right has some limitations. Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1036, 1040; Mers v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 75, 81.

The court's final instruction number 1 reads in relevant part:

Since this is a criminal case the constitution of the State of Indiana makes you the judges of both the law and the facts. Though this means that you are to determine that law for yourselves, it does not mean that you have the right to make, repeal, disregard or ignore the law as it exists. The instructions of the Court are the best source as to the law applicable to this case.

(R. 41).

Our supreme court has already addressed the validity of the language which appeared in final instruction number 1. Andrews v. State (1989), Ind., 532 N.E.2d 1159, 1166, reh. denied; see also Johnson v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1076. The Court specifically approved of the instruction as a correct statement of the law which adequately explains the role of the jury. We are bound by such precedent, and therefore hold that the trial court judge was well within his discretion in presenting final instruction number 1.

Final instruction number 2 reads:

While the constitution of this state makes the jurors the judges of the law as well as the facts, this does not mean that the jurors may willfully and arbitrarily disregard the law.

It means that jurors under their oaths should honestly, justly and impartially judge the law as it exists. It does not mean that jurors may so judge the law in any case so as to make it null and void and of no force, but that they shall so judge the law as to give it a fair and honest interpretation, to the end that the law in each and every case may be fairly and honestly enforced.

Any other interpretation of the law would weaken the safeguards erected by society for its protection; for by the non-enforcement of the law and its penalties...