Jackson v. State
Decision Date | 25 October 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 4-1181A167,4-1181A167 |
Citation | 441 N.E.2d 29 |
Parties | Billy Rae JACKSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Andrew P. Sheff, Bennett & Sheff, Indianapolis, for appellant-defendant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.
Billie Rae Jackson was charged with theft, IC 35-43-4-2, and conspiracy to commit theft, IC 35-41-5-2. After trial before a jury in Marion Municipal Court, Jackson was convicted of theft and acquitted of conspiracy to commit theft. His motion to correct errors was overruled and Jackson appeals his theft conviction.
Affirmed.
1. Did Jackson knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to representation by counsel?
2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to rebut the defense of entrapment?
3. Did the trial court err in sentencing Jackson?
Billie Rae Jackson was arrested by Indiana State Police after selling a stolen truck to State police operating an undercover "sting" operation. Testimony offered by the State disclosed Jackson had sold several stolen vehicles to the "sting" operators and had been eager to procure other vehicles for sale. As a result of these transactions, Jackson was arrested and prosecuted for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an indigent criminal defendant the right to representation by legal counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and by Art. 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, Moore v. State, (1980) Ind., 401 N.E.2d 676. Correlative to the right of representation is the right of a defendant to waive the assistance of counsel and represent himself if he chooses. Faretta v. California, (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562; Russell v. State, (1978) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 309.
The right to assistance of counsel is one of the most important and inviolable rights protected by our constitutions. Accordingly, waiver of the assistance of counsel must be shown to have been made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Johnson v. Zerbst, (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Morgan v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 417 N.E.2d 1154. Waiver may not be inferred from a silent record. Wallace v. State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 535, 361 N.E.2d 159.
The trial court must advise the defendant of his right to the assistance of counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation in clear and unambiguous language. Mitchell v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 417 N.E.2d 364; McDandal v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 216. The court will engage in a presumption against waiver. Nation v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 436.
Jackson's decision to proceed in propria personna with his defense was made known to the court in the following exchange during a pre-trial hearing:
Jackson was again informed of his right to representation by counsel at the opening of his trial:
Jackson now contends his waiver of assistance of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Specifically, he argues the record does not show a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Shelton v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 1048.
Waiver may be established by the trial court based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. Judge Garrard's comments in Shelton are appropriate to this subject matter:
Under these particular facts and circumstances, considering the background and experience of Shelton, the hearing judge did did not err in concluding that Shelton knew of his right to the assistance of counsel, understood the importance of counsel and the manner in which counsel could have been of assistance to him at this stage of the proceedings against him. While it is better practice for the trial judge to emphasize the importance of the assistance of counsel and that counsel would assist the accused in evaluating the state's case against him, the possible defenses, if any, to the charge and the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative pleas, the failure to so advise is not per se reversible error. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background experience and conduct of the accused. Cooley v. U. S., (9th Cir. 1974), 501 F.2d 1249. The record, in the case at hand, adequately shows that Shelton was aware of the nature and importance of the right to the assistance and that he deliberately and intelligently chose to waive that right.
That Jackson was aware of his right to assistance of counsel is uncontroverted. The court refused to permit Jackson to proceed pro se until the consequences of his decision had been explored. Jackson affirmed his knowledge of the benefits legal counsel could provide. Jackson also had a history of contact with the criminal justice system and recently had been through another criminal trial for the same offense.
To further protect Jackson's rights, the court appointed stand-by counsel to remain with Jackson throughout the trial should Jackson desire assistance or technical advice. Appointment of...
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