Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 9383,9383 |
| Parties | Ralph A. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Allen R. Derr, Boise, for appellant.
Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., and Stephen W. Boller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent.
December 18, 1962, appellant (plaintiff), an inmate of the state penitentiary, filed in the district court, in and for Ada county, a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition he alleged that his imprisonment was illegal in that the judgment of conviction and commitment was void because he had been 'deprived of his right to be represented by counsel,' and that upon his arraignment he had not been advised of his 'right to counsel or of the nature of the charges against him,' and that because of illness, injury and emotional disturbance he was at the time 'wholly incompetent and incapable of representing himself and incapable of intelligently and competently waiving his right to counsel.'
The writ was issued and after hearing upon the return thereto, the court made and entered findings, conclusions and judgment quashing the writ and remanding petitioner to the custody of the warden of the penitentiary.
On the evening of March 16, 1960, appellant was arrested by the sheriff of Idaho county upon a charge of murder, arising out of the slaying of his wife. At 9:15 a. m. on the 17th day of March, 1960, appellant was taken before a magistrate, at Grangeville, the county seat. The order of the magistrate holding the accused to answer the charge in the district court recites:
'That the said Ralph Jackson was accompanied by Bud Taylor in his appearance before me, and having appeared before me and having been informed of his rights, he was then duly arraigned upon the charge stated in the foregoing Complaint, namely, of Murder in the First Degree, and thereupon the said Ralph Jackson waived his right to counsel and his right to a preliminary examination by personally informing and stating to the Court that he did not desire to be represented by counsel as this stage of the proceedings and that he did not desire to have a preliminary examination upon the charge stated in the said Complaint.'
Concerning appellant's condition on the morning of his appearance before the magistrate, the prosecuting attorney testified that there was a bump or swelling on his head, some scratches on his face, and further:
'Q Were there any other noticeable bruises or noticeable contusions of his body?
'A His fists were swollen and there were marks--lacerations which appeared to be teeth marks on the left hand--there was what appeared to be quite obviously an imprint of teeth.
'Q Did the defendant appear to be in shock?
'A No, sir.
'Q Did he appear to be intoxicated?
'A No, let me say this, he did not appear to be intoxicated, he appeared--his eyes were blood shot, he appeared to me to be a man who had done heavy drinking and was recovering from the effects of the same.
'Q You would not say then that he was intoxicated at the time of your appearance?
'A No, I am sure.
'Q Did he seem to be comprehensive?
'A I believe so.
'Q You feel he comprehended what was going on?
'A I think so.'
On both the 17th and 18th of March appellant repeatedly advised the sheriff and prosecuting attorney that he did not wish to consult an attorney; that he wanted to plead guilty forthwith and 'get it over with.' He also told the officers that he did not mean to kill his wife in the encounter with her on the evening of the 16th. The prosecuting attorney, sheriff, deputy sheriff, and coroner went to appellant's house and there examined the scene of the crime and interviewed neighbors.
On the monring of the 18th, the sheriff called the prosecuting attorney and advised him that the appellant wanted to plead guilty and asked when the case could be taken care of. The prosecutor advised that the district judge would not be in Grangeville for at least two weeks, but that if appellant wanted earlier action he would undertake to arrange with the judge for the appellant to appear in chambers at Lewiston, provided that the appellant would make application for that purpose. The sheriff further advised the prosecutor that appellant asserted he did not mean to kill his wife and questioned whether or not he should be charged with first degree murder. The prosecutor responded that from the investigation he and other officers had made at the Jackson home, it appeared that the deceased had been killed in a drunken brawl, and that under such circumstances he might feel it proper to move to reduce the charge to murder of the second degree, for want of the element of premeditation. These facts and circumstances were relayed by the prosecuting attorney to the district judge by phone and the judge informed the prosecutor that he could bring the appellant to his chambers at Lewiston, and that a motion to reduce the charge could be heard at that time. The prosecutor then went to the sheriff's office and, in the presence of the sheriff and others, talked to the appellant. At that time he informed Jackson that he was entitled to an attorney; that he need not go to Lewiston to plead to the charge; but if he wanted to go to Lewiston, he, the prosecutor, would prepare an application for that purpose; otherwise the appellant would wait until the judge came to Grangeville. The appellant again responded that he did not want counsel, but wanted to enter his plea. On this same occasion he inquired of the prosecutor what the penalty might be if the charge were reduced to second degree; to which the prosecutor responded that he could not give him any assurance as to the penalty because he did not know what the judge would do. The prosecutor then prepared, and the appellant signed, application as follows:
'I, the undersigned, hereby make voluntary application to be taken before the Judge of the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Idaho, at his chambers, then and there to enter before said Judge, my plea of GUILTY to the charge of Murder in the Second Degree, and I hereby admit that I did murder my wife, but that I did not do so with any premeditation, and I have requested and asked the Prosecuting Attorney if I may enter a plea of GUILTY to Murder in the Second Degree in the above entitled case and he has informed me that Murder in the Second Degree is an included charge in the Information on file against me and, therefore, I hereby admit that I am GUILTY of Murder in the Second Degree in the above entitled case and request and Judge, upon my entering a plea of GUILTY to said charge of Murder in the Second Degree, pass sentence upon me therefore forthwith.'
The prosecuting attorney also testified that during these discussions Jackson appeared to understand fully the nature of the charge and related subjects being considered.
When the appellant was presented to the district judge at Lewiston, the judge inquired of the prosecutor if he had a motion to present; to which the prosecutor responded that he desired to move the reduction of the charge from first to second degree murder and then stated to the court his reasons for so doing. The court then requested the prosecutor to reduce the motion to writing. The prosecutor then left the courtroom and prepared the motion, which among other things recites the following as reasons for the motion:
The motion was then presented to, and granted by, the court. Thereafter the arraignment, as transcribed by the reporter, took place, to wit:
'(Information read by Wayne C. MacGregor, Prosecuting Attorney).
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