Jackson v. State, A14–2060.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. A14–2060.,A14–2060. |
| Citation | 883 N.W.2d 272 |
| Parties | Prentis Cordell JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O'Neill Moller, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court.
This appeal arises from the denial of appellant Prentis Cordell Jackson's petition for postconviction relief. Jackson's petition raised two primary claims. First, Jackson claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because an eyewitness recanted his trial testimony. Second, Jackson claimed that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release (LWOR) should be reversed based on Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).1 Miller held that mandatory imposition of LWOR sentences is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller, ––– U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2464–69. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Jackson's petition.2 Jackson appealed to our court. After oral argument but before we released a decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), which holds that the Miller rule applies retroactively. In light of Montgomery, we ordered supplemental briefing and held a second oral argument.
We affirm in part the denial of postconviction relief because the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that an eyewitness's out-of-court statements were not admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). But we vacate Jackson's LWOR sentence because the mandatory statutory scheme under which this sentence was imposed is unconstitutional as applied to Jackson under the Eighth Amendment, according to Montgomery. Because it is not possible to remand for a fair and meaningful Miller hearing in retroactive cases, we hold that Minn.Stat. §§ 609.106, subd. 2, 244.05, subds. 4–5 (2014), are severed as applied to Jackson and any other juvenile offenders who received mandatory LWOR sentences that were final before the Miller rule was announced, and that the most recent constitutional versions of those statutes are revived. Under the revived statutes that apply to Jackson's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, we remand to the district court for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years, see Minn.Stat. §§ 609.106, subd. 2, 244.05, subds. 4–5 (2004).
The State charged Jackson with first-degree premeditated murder in connection with the shooting death of 15–year–old Michael Anthony Bluntson, Jr. On February 24, 2006, the date of the murder, Jackson was 17 years old. At trial, eyewitness Alfred Lamar testified as follows. He and Jackson were members of the EMB gang (Emerson Money Boys or Emerson Murder Boys). On the date of the murder, Jackson told Lamar that rival gang members had shot a member of the EMB gang and that if he caught one of them he would “F* * * them up.” Later that day, Jackson and Lamar were in a vehicle with fellow gang members Deshawn Jenkins and Bernard Williams when they saw Bluntson walking on the sidewalk. Someone suggested that Jackson “box” with Bluntson. Jackson responded to the suggestion by stating that he was going to “crush him,” at which point the driver stopped the vehicle. As Jackson left the vehicle, he said, “I got something for this n* *ger.” Jackson then approached Bluntson, and the two of them assumed boxing stances. But instead of throwing a punch, Jackson pulled a gun from his waistband and pointed it at Bluntson. The first time he pulled the trigger, the gun did not fire. When Jackson pulled the trigger a second time, the gun fired, and the bullet hit Bluntson in the face. Bluntson then grasped his face and stumbled.
In addition to Lamar's eyewitness testimony, the State presented the testimony of Jenkins and Williams, which was consistent with Lamar's testimony. The jury found Jackson guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, and the district court sentenced him to LWOR on November 21, 2006. We affirmed Jackson's conviction on April 10, 2008. State v. Jackson, 746 N.W.2d 894, 895–98 (Minn.2008).
On January 11, 2013, Jackson filed a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court first considered Jackson's challenge to his conviction based on an alleged recantation by Lamar. Viewing the facts alleged in the petition in the light most favorable to Jackson, the postconviction court concluded that it was required to hold an evidentiary hearing under Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014).
During the evidentiary hearing, Lamar asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In the absence of testimony by Lamar, Jackson attempted to prove Lamar's alleged recantation through Lamar's out-of-court written statements and through testimony by defense investigator Kim Bossert regarding a telephone call with Lamar. Lamar's written statement declared as follows: During the telephone call with investigator Bossert, Lamar purportedly said that (1) his signed statement was true; (2) he had no direct knowledge of who killed Bluntson; (3) he had not seen Jackson on the day in question until after the shooting had occurred; (4) the police had interviewed him “many” times; and (5) he felt pressured to blame Jackson for the shooting because he was young and the police scared him and threatened him with significant prison time.
Jackson argued that Lamar's out-of-court statements were admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements made against the “declarant's ... interest” may be admitted when there are “corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement.” Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). In an effort to corroborate Lamar's out-of-court statements regarding coaching, pressure, and threats made by police interrogators, Jackson submitted transcripts of the police interviews. Jackson also presented the testimony of investigator Bossert, who described his telephone call with Lamar.
The State presented the testimony of one of the police interrogators, Scott Larson, who testified that the interrogators never threatened Lamar. The State also presented the testimony of an investigator with the Minnesota Department of Corrections, Erin Spruance. As part of her investigation of a witness-tampering scheme, Spruance obtained a 2010 letter that Jackson had sent to Lamonte Martin asking Martin to procure a statement from Lamar.3 Martin was later convicted of perpetrating a fraud on the court through the creation of false affidavits to obtain postconviction relief.
After hearing all of the evidence, the postconviction court concluded that Lamar's out-of-court statements were not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) because Jackson had failed to establish corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of those statements. Having ruled that Lamar's out-of-court statements were not admissible, the postconviction court rejected Jackson's postconviction challenge to his conviction, explaining that “[t]here is no evidence convincing the Court that the alleged recantation is genuine, or that Lamar lied at trial.”
The postconviction court next considered Jackson's challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence. Jackson argued that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release violated the Eighth Amendment according to the rule announced in Miller, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The postconviction court concluded that the alleged violation of the Miller rule did not entitle Jackson to relief because Jackson's conviction was final before the Miller rule was announced. To reach that conclusion, the postconviction court relied on our decisions in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn.2013), which held that the Miller rule did not apply retroactively, and Roman Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193, 198–200 (Minn.2014), which reaffirmed Chambers.
After we held oral argument for this case, but before we issued our decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana, –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). Montgomery holds that the Miller rule applies retroactively, and thereby overruled our retroactivity analysis from Chambers and Roman Nose. In light of Montgomery, we ordered supplemental briefing and held a second oral argument.
We first consider Jackson's challenge to his conviction based on the alleged recantation by Lamar. Jackson argues that the postconviction court erred by concluding that Lamar's out-of-court statements were not admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). “We review a postconviction court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Dobbins v. State, 845 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Minn.2013). A postconviction court “abuse[s] its discretion when the postconviction court's ‘decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.’ ” Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Minn.2013) (quoting Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012) ).
An out-of-court statement made by a nonparty and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c) ; Miles, 840 N.W.2d at...
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