Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 25 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | SD 36953 |
| Parties | Carl Lee JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT – James Egan, Columbia, MO.
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT – Garrick F.D. Aplin, Jefferson City, MO.
Carl Lee Jackson ("Jackson") appeals the motion court's denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.1 In a single point, Jackson argues trial counsel was ineffective. However, we do not reach the merits because Jackson failed to plead and prove that his pro se Rule 29.15 motion ("pro se motion") was timely filed. The motion court's judgment is vacated, and the motion court is directed to dismiss the case.
When an appellate court reviews a motion for postconviction relief, such review "is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous." Eastburn v. State, 400 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Mo. banc 2013) . The motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only "if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id. The filing deadlines for postconviction relief "are mandatory, and cannot be waived." Cox v. State, 445 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Mo. App. 2014) . When a motion for postconviction relief is filed untimely, "the motion court should not reach the merits of the motion." Turner v. State, 935 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. App. 1996) .
Watson v. State , 536 S.W.3d 716, 717 (Mo. banc 2018).
This is a convoluted tale of two cases—a voluntarily dismissed post-conviction case filed too early and an adjudicated post-conviction case filed too late. While Jackson's direct appeal was pending in 2016, Jackson prematurely filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion seeking postconviction relief ("PCR Case 1").2 The motion court in PCR Case 1 appointed counsel, Stephen Harris ("Harris"), to represent Jackson. Harris filed a letter advising the motion court that the pro se motion was premature because a mandate had not been issued in the direct appeal. The letter "suggest[ed] the [c]ourt either stay the proceeding pending the outcome of [Jackson's] direst [sic] appeal or dismiss [it] without prejudice allowing [Jackson] to refile at the appropriate time if necessary." Pursuant to Jackson's request, PCR Case 1 was dismissed without prejudice.
On July 17, 2017, this Court issued its mandate affirming Jackson's convictions in the direct appeal. Jackson's deadline for filing his pro se motion was Monday, October 16, 2017. See Rules 29.15(b) and 44.01(a). On November 17, 2017, Jackson filed his pro se motion ("PCR Case 2).3
On February 11, 2019, over two years after PCR Case 1 was dismissed, Susan Faust ("Faust"), Jackson's appointed attorney in PCR Case 2, filed a "Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal" in PCR Case 1. The motion court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal on February 19, 2019, and consolidated PCR Case 1 with PCR Case 2. On May 7, 2019, Faust filed Jackson's amended Rule 29.15 motion.
On February 18, 2020, the motion court held an evidentiary hearing on Jackson's postconviction claims raised in the amended motion. At the evidentiary hearing, Jackson presented no evidence that a third-party interfered with the timely filing of his pro se motion. The trial court made no factual findings regarding the timeliness of Jackson's pro se motion. Rather, the motion court decided the case on the merits and denied Jackson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson appeals that judgment.
Jackson admits that his pro se motion in PCR Case 2, the case before this Court, was not timely filed and makes no argument that any recognized exception to the late filing of his pro se motion applies. Instead, Jackson argues:
Where a movant appeals the judgment or sentence in his criminal case, the movant has 90 days from the date the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the judgment or sentence to file his pro se motion. Rule 29.15(b). "Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule 29.15 and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a motion filed pursuant to this Rule 29.15." Id.
Because Rule 29.15's filing deadlines are mandatory and cannot be waived, the motion court and our Court each have a duty to enforce those mandatory time limits. Robinson v. State , 592 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). This is true even when the State raises no objection to the late filing. Price v. State , 422 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Mo. banc 2014). While we remain "solicitous of post-conviction claims that present a genuine injustice," that interest must be balanced "against the policy of bringing finality to the criminal process." White v. State , 939 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Mo. banc 1997).
To avoid dismissal, a movant bears the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the pro se motion was timely filed. McNabb v. State , 610 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). Under Rule 29.15(b), a movant can meet this burden by demonstrating that he mailed his motion to the sentencing court by first-class United States Mail addressed correctly with sufficient postage and deposited on or before the last day for filing the motion. If a movant cannot demonstrate that his motion was timely, a pro se motion can be treated as timely if the movant establishes that the untimeliness was caused by the active interference of a third party beyond the inmate's control (the "active interference" exception). Goldberg v. State , 635 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). This exception only applies when (1) an inmate prepares the motion and does all he reasonably can do to ensure that it is timely filed and (2) any tardiness results solely from the active interference of a third party beyond the inmate's control. Id. A second exception to the timeliness requirement of the pro se motion applies when the sentencing court "misinforms a defendant about the appropriate deadlines to file his or her motion during the sentencing colloquy."6 Watson v. State , 520 S.W.3d 423, 429 (Mo. banc 2017).
Jackson's timeliness argument fails as a matter of law. He admits his pro se filing was not timely filed and does not argue that a third party actively interfered with the filing of his pro se motion or that the sentencing court misadvised him of the filing deadlines.7 Rather, he claims the prematurely filed pro se motion of PCR Case 1 that was dismissed at his request, can be reinstated and make the filing in PCR Case 2 timely.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has not carved out an exception to Rule 29.15's mandatory deadlines based on the "reinstatement" of a voluntarily dismissed post-conviction case where the pro se motion was filed prematurely. Nor can a voluntarily dismissed case be reinstated.
While Rule 29.15 governs the procedure for post-conviction cases following trial, the rule is silent on the effect a voluntary dismissal has on the case. "The procedure to be followed for motions filed pursuant to this Rule 29.15 is governed by the rules of civil procedure insofar as applicable." Rule 29.15(a). In determining if a rule of civil procedure is applicable in the context of post-conviction review, the court must decide whether the rule enhances, conflicts with, or is of neutral consequence to the purposes of Rule 29.15. Mercer v. State , 512 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Mo. banc 2017). If the rule conflicts with the purpose of post-conviction rules, the civil procedure rule does not apply. Id. But if the rule enhances or is of neutral consequence to the purpose of post-conviction rules, the civil procedure rule applies. Id. The purpose of postconviction rules are "to process prisoners’ claims promptly, prevent the litigation of stale claims, and to ensure the legality of a sentence." Id. Here, the relevant rule for a voluntary dismissal is Rule 67.02. It provides, in relevant part, that "a civil action may be dismissed by the [movant] without order of the court anytime ... prior to the introduction of evidence at the trial." Rule 67.02(a)(2). Because Rule 67.02 does not conflict with the purpose of the post-conviction relief rules, it applies where a...
To continue reading
Request your trial