Jackson v. State

• Citation: 105 N.E.3d 1081
• Decision Date: 24 August 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-00113
• Parties: Marquell M. JACKSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

105 N.E.3d 1081

Marquell M. JACKSON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-00113

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: March 22, 2018

FILED August 24, 2018

Rehearing Denied November 7, 2018

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Matthew J. McGovern, Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 82A04-1609-CR-02074

Goff, Justice.

A jury found that Defendant Marquell M. Jackson committed several criminal offenses in connection with a criminal gang. As a result, the trial court increased his overall sentence by thirty years according to the criminal gang enhancement statute. Jackson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the enhancement. Jackson and the State now dispute the extent of the trial court's sentencing authority on remand. This appeal requires us to determine what, if any, ability a trial court has to resentence a criminal defendant on the felonies that underlie a criminal gang enhancement when an appellate court has reversed that enhancement and remanded to the trial court. Guided by a general inquiry into the relationship between an enhancement and its underlying offenses, we find that the criminal gang enhancement statute unambiguously increases the punishment for all the felonies that underlie the enhancement, and vacating such an enhancement disturbs the punishment originally imposed. As such, after an appellate court reverses a criminal gang enhancement, the trial court on remand must resentence a defendant on all surviving underlying felonies.

Factual and Procedural History

On October 26, 2015, Jackson and four friends decided to rob a person they thought had marijuana. Armed with two guns, they drove to the person's apartment building. Four members of the group, including Jackson, entered the building, made their way to the apartment, and encountered a group of about ten people smoking marijuana. A gunfight broke out, and the would-be thieves fled. All told, three of the intruders, one of the occupants of the apartment, and a neighbor's brother were injured in the shooting.

The State ultimately charged Jackson with nine offenses: two counts of burglary, as Level 1 felonies (Counts 1 and 2); one count of attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, as a Level 2 felony (Count 3); four counts of attempted armed robbery, as Level 3 felonies (Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7); and two counts of aggravated battery, as Level 3 felonies (Counts 8 and 9). The State also sought to have Jackson's potential sentence enhanced under the criminal gang enhancement statute. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-15 (2014 Repl.).¹ After a bifurcated trial, the jury found Jackson guilty as charged and that the enhancement applied to each count. The trial court merged Count 2 with Count 1 but otherwise entered judgments of conviction on each count and accepted the jury's finding as to the enhancement. The court ordered that Jackson serve concurrent sentences of thirty years for Count 1, seventeen-and-one-half years for Count 3, and nine years each for Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. It then applied the statutory enhancement of thirty years to Jackson's sentence, which resulted in a sixty-year overall sentence.

Jackson appealed and argued, among other things, that the trial court committed fundamental error when it allowed the State to amend the information for the criminal gang enhancement. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the enhancement. Jackson v. State , 84 N.E.3d 706, 711–14 (Ind. Ct. App.) (" Jackson I "), clarified on reh'g , 88 N.E.3d 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (" Jackson II "). It instructed the trial court on remand to "vacate the enhancement and the sentence imposed on it." Id. at 714.

Both Jackson and the State petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing seeking clarification of the remand order. Jackson sought clarification instructing the trial court that it could not resentence him on the offenses underlying the vacated enhancement, and the State, in relevant part, requested that the clarification explicitly allow the trial court to resentence on those underlying offenses. The Court of Appeals granted the petitions and compared the criminal gang enhancement statute with the habitual offender enhancement statute and Coble v. State , 523 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. 1988), a case involving a vacated habitual offender enhancement. Jackson II , 88 N.E.3d at 1108–1110. Based on this comparison, it found that "nothing about the trial court's imposition of the underlying sentence, or the convictions on which the underlying sentence is imposed, required that the trial court consider the criminal gang enhancement." Id. at 1110. Therefore, it concluded, "the underlying sentence imposed by the trial court on Jackson's convictions is not subject to change on remand." Id.

We granted the State's petition to transfer to address the trial court's sentencing authority on remand after vacating the criminal gang enhancement, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinions in part. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on the other issues addressed in Jackson I and Jackson II . See App. R. 58(A)(2).

Standard of Review

Resolution of this case requires us to interpret the criminal gang enhancement statute. "Because this presents a matter of statutory interpretation, it receives de novo review." Day v. State , 57 N.E.3d 809, 811 (Ind. 2016).

Discussion and Decision

Generally, trial courts have broad discretion in formulating appropriate sentences for criminal convictions. Cardwell v. State , 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). But this discretion can be limited when the sentencing occurs on remand. For example, the nuances of a particular sentence enhancement, as shown by the enhancement statute and related case law, can limit a trial court's sentencing discretion on remand. See, e.g. , Coble , 523 N.E.2d at 228–29 (discussing the trial court's sentencing options on remand after a habitual offender enhancement had been vacated); Greer v. State , 680 N.E.2d 526, 527–28 (Ind. 1997) (discussing the trial court's sentencing options on remand after the felony underlying a habitual offender enhancement had been vacated). Because the parties here dispute the extent of the trial court's sentencing discretion on remand, we begin with an overview of the criminal gang enhancement statute.

The criminal gang enhancement statute increases the penal consequences for committing one or more felony offenses in connection with a criminal gang. See generally I.C. § 35-50-2-15. The State must initially show that the defendant has committed at least one underlying felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2-15(b) – (d) (referring to "the offense," "the felony offense," "the underlying felony," and "the underlying felonies"). See also State v. Davis , 898 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind. 2008). If the State carries this burden, the statute provides for "an additional fixed term of imprisonment" based on the underlying felony or felonies. I.C. § 35-50-2-15(b), (d). This enhancement then runs consecutive to the underlying sentence and cannot be suspended. I.C. § 35-50-2-15(e) – (f). With this statutory scheme in mind, we turn to the task at hand: determining the extent of the trial court's sentencing authority on remand after vacating a criminal gang enhancement.

I. The general inquiry illustrated by Coble is instructive in determining a trial court's sentencing authority on remand after a criminal gang enhancement has been reversed.

Both parties direct us to our prior decision in Coble as a means to resolve this matter, and the Court of Appeals below heavily relied on the case.² The State argues that Coble and subsequent cases allow a trial court, on remand from a reversal of a criminal gang enhancement, to resentence a defendant on the felonies related to the enhancement. Jackson argues that Coble plainly prohibits a trial court from resentencing on any felonies underlying a vacated criminal gang enhancement. Both parties' reliance on Coble is partially misplaced. Coble dealt with issues specific to habitual offender enhancements—not criminal gang enhancements—and cannot be mechanically applied to disputes outside that context. However, we find the general inquiry illustrated by Coble instructive here.

Coble was initially convicted of two counts of burglary and found to be a habitual offender. Id. at 228. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of two years on each count. Id. It attached the habitual offender enhancement to count 2, enhancing it by thirty years. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed the habitual offender enhancement. Id. After vacating the enhancement on remand, the trial court sentenced Coble to consecutive terms of six years on count 1 and eight years on count 2. Id. Coble appealed again, and this Court reversed the trial court in part. Id. at 228–29. First, we reversed the change of Coble's sentence on count 1 because it "was not directly affected by the habitual offender status." Id. at 228. Second, we affirmed the change of the sentence on count 2 because the attachment of the enhancement to that count increased the punishment for that burglary offense from two years to thirty-two years. Id. at 229. Vacating the enhancement thus disturbed the punishment, and we found it "proper for the trial court to sentence [Coble] on [count 2], and to impose any sentence permissible under the statute." Id. (citing Flowers v. State , 518 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1988) ). Finally, we affirmed the trial court's change to consecutive sentences finding that the trial court had a duty to reassess its concurrent/consecutive determination after the initial sentence for count 2 was set aside. Id.

Coble provides two takeaways in the context of this appeal. First, Coble 's narrow holding shows an application of the specific law of habitual offender...