Jackson v. Thaler

• Decision Date: 27 February 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-5162
• Parties: CURTIS EARL JACKSON, JR., TDCJ-CID NO. 1648645, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

CURTIS EARL JACKSON, JR., TDCJ-CID NO. 1648645, Petitioner,

v.RICK THALER, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-5162

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

Dated: February 27, 2012

OPINION ON DISMISSAL

Petitioner Curtis Earl Jackson, a state inmate, seeks federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, from his conviction for possession of cocaine on June 3, 2010, in cause number 1262625 from the 178th Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas. (Docket Entry No.1). Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry No.9). Petitioner has filed numerous pleadings in a response to the motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entries No.11, No.12, No.13, No.14, No.15, No.18). After considering the pleadings and the entire record, the Court will grant respondent's summary judgment motion and deny petitioner federal habeas relief.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the Notice of Seizure dated July 13, 2009, Officer D.G. Davis attested as follows, in pertinent part:

Officers stopped Curtis Earl Jackson in the 10000 block of Kleckley for an observed traffic violation. As officers approached the vehicle, Jackson appeared to be nervous. Officers further observed a large bulge in Jackson's left front pants pocket. Officers obtained verbal consent from Jackson to search his left front pants pocket and recovered approximately 10 grams of crack cocaine along with $3,214.00 in U.S. currency. Jackson was then charged with PCSWID. Jackson's criminal history includes a previous narcotics arrest. A narcotics K-9 check of the currency resultedin a positive alert for the odor of narcotics. Officers believe the currency seized during this investigation to be contraband.

Ex parte Jackson, Application No.WR-73,068-02, page 86.¹ On July 27, 2009, petitioner was charged by indictment with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Harris County District Clerk website.² Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner. Id. On September 3, 2009, petitioner's motion to substitute counsel was granted and petitioner retained Attorney Woodrow W. Dixon, III ("Dixon") as his defense counsel. Id.

On November 20, 2009, a subpoena issued commanding the Houston Police Department Custodian of Records to produce all audio and video recordings from the arrest/traffic stop on June 18, 2009. Ex parte Jackson, Application No.WR-73,068-02, page 15.³ A second subpoena issued on December 11, 2009, commanding the custodian to produce all written reports filed by the officers involved in the traffic stop and all audio and video recordings of the same. Id. at 18.⁴ No video or audio recording from the police car dashboard camera was produced. In a letter dated March 12, 2010, from Sgt. P.G. Manzo of the Central Intake Office/Internal Affairs Division, petitioner was advised that the documents requested would be forwarded to the Houston Police Department's legal department and would remain on file. Id. at 14.⁵ The record does not show that a video or audio recording of the traffic stop was among those documents.

On May 11, 2010, petitioner was re-indicted on a charge of first degree possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, enhanced by three prior convictions. Ex parte Jackson, Application No.WR-73,068-2 at 1.⁶ On June 3, 2010, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the new indictment and executed Admonishments, Statements and Waiver. Id. at 2-7.⁷ The prosecutor moved to abandon the enhancement paragraphs and the state district judge accepted the guilty plea and sentenced petitioner to five years confinement in the TDCJ-CID. Id., pages 12-13.⁸ The charge in the first indictment was dismissed.

Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal. (Docket Entry No.1, page3). Petitioner filed a state habeas application on June 23, 2010, seeking relief on the following grounds:

1. The Houston Police Department failed to respond to applications for subpoenas requesting various pieces of evidence;

2. The State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence by disregarding his requests for various pieces of evidence;

3. Petitioner has filed a complaint with the Houston Police Department's Internal Affairs Division;

4. Petitioner was arrested pursuant to an illegal search and seizure; and,

5. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel who failed to mail petitioner's property to his mother, to file a motion for contempt of court; and to prepare for trial.

Ex parte Jackson, Application No.WR-73,068-02, pages 2-11.⁹ The state district court, sitting as a habeas court, recommended that relief be denied in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lawand Order. Id., pages 110-112.¹⁰ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application on September 22, 2010, without written order on the trial court's findings without a hearing. Id. at Action Taken Page.¹¹

Petitioner filed a second state habeas application on August 26, 2010, seeking relief on the following grounds:

1. He was denied a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause because the state district court refused to (a) grant a continuance, (b) hold the Houston Police Department and the prosecutor in contempt of court, and (c) allow him to impeach the police incident report with the police dashboard camera recording;

2. Petitioner was stopped, arrested and searched by police officers without probable cause;

3. The Houston Police Department failed to respond to applications for subpoenas that petitioner filed, in which he sought various pieces of evidence; and,

4. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel who failed to (a) file certain motions, (b) adopt petitioner's previously denied writ of mandamus, (c) investigate witnesses, and (d) investigate or prepare for trial, which resulted in an involuntary plea.

Ex parte Jackson, Application No.WR-73,068-03, pages 7-11.¹² The state district court, sitting as a habeas court, recommended that relief be denied in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Id., pages 84-86.¹³ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application onDecember 1, 2010, without written order on the trial court's findings without a hearing. Id. at Action Taken Page.¹⁴

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief in the present action on grounds that the prosecutor suppressed evidence and that his guilty plea was involuntary. (Docket Entry No.1). Respondent moves for summary judgment on grounds that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and his other claims waived. (Docket Entry No.9).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To be entitled to summary judgment, the pleadings and summary judgment evidence must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of initially pointing out to the court the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue for trial. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Thereafter, "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show with 'significant probative evidence' that there exists a genuine issue of material fact." Hamilton v. Seque Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). The Court may grant summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if the ground is not raised by the movant. United States v. Houston Pipeline Co., 37 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1994).

The writ of habeas corpus provides an important, but limited, examination of an inmate's conviction and sentence. See Harrington v. Richter, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (noting that "state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions"). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act("AEDPA"), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt"; it also codifies the traditional principles of finality, comity, and federalism that underlie the limited scope of federal habeas review. Renico v. Lett, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (quotations omitted).

The AEDPA "bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in [28 U.S.C.] §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)."¹⁵ Richter, - U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 784. As previously mentioned, the Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated petitioner's claims on habeas review.¹⁶ This Court, therefore, can only grant relief if "the state court's adjudication of the merits was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.'" Berghuis v. Thompkins, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). The focus of this well-developed standard "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v.Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). Thus, the AEDPA serves as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," not as a vehicle for error correction. Richter, - U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citation omitted); see also Wilson v. Cain, 641 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2011). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Richter, - U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 786.

"Review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did." Cullen v. Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Reasoning that "[i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court," Pinholste...