Jackson v. The Members of the N.Y. State Legislature

• Decision Date: 21 February 2022
• Docket Number: 21-CV-5318 (RPK) (SIL)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
• Parties: ERWIN JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE and the NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Defendants.

ERWIN JACKSON, Plaintiff,
v.
THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE and the NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-5318 (RPK) (SIL)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

February 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Erwin Jackson attacks the constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 70.08, which establishes the criteria for sentencing persistent violent felony offenders. See Compl. 1 (Dkt. #1).^[*] He seeks a writ of mandamus and declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials. He also moves to proceed in forma pauperis. Mot. for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. #5). The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, but for the reasons that follow, Mr. Jackson's complaint is dismissed in full under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B).

BACKGROUND

Section 70.08 is New York's provision for sentencing persistent violent felony offenders. It defines “persistent violent offender” as “a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 . . . after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.” N.Y. Penal Law § 70.08(1).

1

The statute provides that “[w]hen the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a persistent violent felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life imprisonment.” Id. § 70.08(2).

Mr. Jackson was sentenced pursuant to Section 70.08. See Compl. 2. He argues that Section 70.08 violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it requires the judge, not a jury, to determine whether a defendant has previously been convicted of a “violent felony offense.” Id. at 1 (citing, inter alia, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).

Mr. Jackson seeks a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to prevent New York's legislators and the Nassau County District Attorney from enforcing the act. In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he also seeks a declaratory judgment against the statute and an injunction preventing its enforcement. Compl. 2-3. Finally, Mr. Jackson moves to certify the question of Section 70.08's constitutionality to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 8.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a litigant files a lawsuit in forma pauperis, the district court must dismiss the case if it determines that the complaint “is frivolous or malicious, ” that it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or that it “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must similarly dismiss any civil suit filed by an incarcerated person seeking redress from a governmental entity or from government officers or employees “if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

2

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the plaintiff's complaint must be “liberally construed, and . . . however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, if a “liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated, ” the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the complaint. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)); see Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, if the problems with the complaint are “substantive” ones that cannot be cured with “better pleading, ” dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112; see Ashmore v. Prus, 510 Fed.Appx. 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Jackson's complaint is dismissed. The mandamus petition and claims against the state legislators are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Jackson's Section 1983 claims against the Nassau County District Attorney are dismissed for failure to state a claim. And since district courts lack the authority to certify questions to the New York Court of Appeals,

3

the Court does not address his request for certification. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27 (2021).

I. The Court Lacks Mandamus Jurisdiction Over Defendants

Plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus is denied because the Court does not have mandamus jurisdiction. Under the provision Mr. Jackson invokes, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, federal courts have the...