Jackson v. the People

• Decision Date: 31 March 1886
• Citation: 18 Ill.App. 508,18 Bradw. 508
• Parties: HENRY JACKSONv.THE PEOPLE, ETC.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

18 Ill.App. 508

18 Bradw. 508

HENRY JACKSON

v.THE PEOPLE, ETC.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.

March Term, 1886.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. ELLIOTT ANTHONY, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed April 28, 1886.

Plaintiff was tried in the Criminal Court of Cook county, on an indictment for obtaining money under false pretenses. The false pretenses were alleged to have been made in the sale of a certain horse to the prosecuting witnesses. On the trial in his opening statement to the jury, the assistant state's attorney, among other things, said:

“This case is important, not so much because of the amount involved, but because it will appear in the proof of this case, that there are certain prescribed methods of men who conduct business in the manner of Mr. Jackson.” Exception.

“I said you would find this charge and this case a case of some importance, not so much for the penalty or the amount, but important because of the methods used and the manner of the defendant; and not only the manner of the defendant in this case, and not only the methods in this case, but I expect to prove the method of this man in obtaining money and property by false pretenses. It will become important to you to know who the defendant is in this case. It not only becomes important on account of whom the defendant is, but on account of the methods used in this community to perpetrate the offense as charged.” Exception.

“One of the expectations of proof in this case, is who the defendant on trial is, and it will become necessary in this to show who the defendant is, in order to show, as you will see before we get through, the guilty intent and knowledge of this defendant, the guilty intent and knowledge of this defendant being the very gist of the crime, and who the man is becomes an important factor in the case.” Exception.

“I state that we expect to prove, in the line of guilty intent and under the law, the knowledge of this man by other cases.” Exception.

Detective Shea was called by the prosecution, and among other things the following colloquy occured in the presence of the jury: Q. “How many times, Mr. Shea, have you known of Henry Jackson being implicated and arrested for obtaining money under false pretenses upon the sales of horses? How many times do you know of his having been charged with that?” Objected to.

The Court, to assistant state's attorney: “If there is any authority upon that, I will hear you.”

Mr. Thompson, for plaintiff in error: “If there is to be any argument on this, I ask that the jury be withdrawn.”

The Court: “I will not order that the jury withdraw.”

3. The assistant state's attorney then cited section 53, Whart. Cr. Ev., and proceeding, said: “The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, upon this very proposition, in a case entitled Tarbox v. The State, and also in the case entitled Henry Jackson v. The State, decides this very proposition. It is laid down in the 38th Ohio as follows: The plaintiff in error, the court says, who seeks to file his petition in error in this court, was convicted in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga county, upon an indictment charging that he, jointly with Henry Jackson, Thomas Allen and Charles Smith-- and we propose to prove that this is the same Henry Jackson who is the defendant in this case.” Exception.

The Court: “It is competent in a case of false pretenses to show that about the same time a party made representations of a similar character. Now, if this party has made false representations of a similar character in the sale of a horse, similar to these and similar to what he made in this case, as you claim, then it would be competent.”

Questions were then put to the witness, seeking to draw out evidence that Jackson had admitted to witness that he had made false representations in the sale of certain other horses to persons other than the prosecuting witness Cohn, some time prior to the Cohn sale. The court said to the witness: “If he made a statement in regard to a given transaction, I will allow you now to state what was said.”

Witness: “Do you mean to say when there was a warrant?”

The Court: “No. Were you present on any such occasion, when there was a conversation between yourself, a third party and Mr. Jackson, in regard to a horse?”

A. “Yes.”

Q. “What took place?” Exception.

A. “Well, these people had made a complaint to me; they were outsiders. I can't remember, now, where they were from. There were two or three of them.”

Q. “From outside of the city?”

A. “Yes; and it was about a very bad horse they had bought from a man that looked very much like Jackson, and I asked them where he lived. They told me in the neighborhood. I sent for Mr. Jackson, and had a talk with him, and he says, ‘By God! I will sell a horse to any man I can sell him to.’ And I said, ““If you come back here and sell bad horses again, Mr. Jackson, we will make it very hot for you. These people do not live in Chicago, and we have had too many of these kind of cases, and the best thing you can do--' Objection.

The Court. “I shall have to exclude that unless he made a direct admission himself in regard to that.”

A. “He admitted he had sold these people a particular horse they were talking about, but said its qualities were a great deal better than the other people thought.”

The Court. “That will hardly do; I shall have to exclude all this testimony of Shea's.”

Detective James Morgan was permitted against the objection of defendant to testify that he knew defendant dealt in “dummies” and “bulls,” that is, as he explained, wind-broken, sunstruck and crazy horses.

The evidence of prosecuting witness and others tended to show that Jackson advertised the horse for sale; that Cohn, seeing the advertisement, went to see the horse; that Jackson made representations as to the horse that turned out to be false and were known by Jackson to be false when he made them. A written warranty was given by Jackson to Cohn at the time of the sale.

Plaintiff in error did not take the witness stand at the trial, and the special counsel who aided in the prosecution said: “Gentlemen, the law prohibits our commenting upon the fact that the defendant did not take the stand.” Objection being made, he went on: “I say the law forbids our commenting upon the fact that the defendant did not take the stand in this case. I say, I have no right to say anything about that.” There was a verdict of guilty, judgment, and the case comes here on error.

Messrs. THOMSON & FELSENTHAL, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. JULIUS S. GRINNELL and F. W. WALKER, for defendant in error; that evidence of the previous sales was admissible to prove guilty knowledge, cited Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio, 581; Jackson v. State, 38 Ohio, 585; Wharton on Criminal Ev. §§ 44, 45; Hall v. Naylor, 18 N. Y. 588.MORAN, J.

If false pretenses are made with intent to cheat and defraud in the sale of a horse and they are an inducing cause of the purchase, the fact that there is a warranty, on which a civil remedy may be based, will not screen the person making them from the consequences attaching to the act of obtaining money or property by false pretenses.

The promise in the written warranty, to take back the horse and refund the money, may, it is true, have an influence and operate on the mind of the purchaser, but, if the false representation of matters of fact contained in the writing or in the colloquy, which precedes the execution of the writing, in fact constitute the main inducement to the purchase, there may be a conviction, notwithstanding the fact that the promise of the warranty operated upon the purchaser.

The fact that a promise is combined with a false pretense does not take away the criminal character of the act. “If the pretense and promise blend together and jointly act upon the defrauded person, whereby he is induced to give faith to the pretense, the case is within the statute. State v. Dowe, 27 Iowa, 273.

It is no defense to a false pretense that it is backed up by a written warranty as to the future. Watson v. The People, 87 N. Y. 561.

All cases where false statements are made in the sale of property, and a warranty given, are not, however, within the statute against false pretenses. When reliance is placed upon the promise or warranty, and not upon the representations, the case is clearly not within the statute, else every case of breach of warranty would be the basis of a criminal prosecution. Rex v. Codington, 1 Car. & P. 661.

It is always a question of fact for the jury in each case, to ascertain from the proper evidence, whether the representation made was in its nature calculated to deceive; whether the prosecutor relied upon the representation as the main inducing clause of the purchase; whether the representation was false and known to be so to the person making it, and whether the prosecutor was deceived by the representation and induced to part thereby with his money or property.

This inquiry, as the question of guilt or innocence in all trials, must be answered by the jury from a consideration of legally competent evidence only.

This brings us to determine whether the rulings of the court, at the trial, were such as to exclude from the jury improper and irrelevant testimony injurious to plaintiff in error, and whether the statements made in the presence of the jury by the assistant prosecutor and special counsel, were calculated to deprive plaintiff in error of the fair trial which the law secures to every person charged with a criminal offense.

It is perfectly apparent from the record, that the jury learned from the testimony of Shea, that Jackson had been charged with making false representations in the sale of other horses; that he had been arrested on other charges of false pretenses, and that the police were after him. From the statement of the assistant prosecutor, made while reading the Ohio report, the jury learned that the man then on trial was the same Henry Jackson who had...