Jackson v. The State
| Decision Date | 02 June 1903 |
| Docket Number | 20,126 |
| Citation | 67 N.E. 690,161 Ind. 36 |
| Parties | Jackson v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Vanderburgh Circuit Court; L. O. Rasch, Judge.
William Jackson was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
W. W Ireland and William Reister, for appellant.
C. W Miller, Attorney-General, C. C. Hadley, L. G. Rothschild and W. C. Geake, for State.
The appellant was regularly indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree. To the indictment he pleaded guilty. Whereupon the court called the jury to assess his punishment. After hearing evidence, the argument of counsel, and under a proper charge by the court, the jury returned their verdict that appellant suffer death. Over appellant's motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment upon the verdict. The overruling of the motion for a new trial is the only assignment in this court, and the grounds are that the verdict is contrary to law, and contrary to the evidence, and because of newly discovered evidence.
At the very threshold we are met by the suggestion of the Attorney-General that no question has been properly reserved for the decision of this court. It is well settled in this State that a motion for a new trial is ineffectual in a case where judgment has been rendered upon a plea of guilty. The reasons are twofold: (1) Because there can be no new trial of a case where there has been no trial at all; and (2) a judgment upon a plea of guilty rests upon the same foundation as judgments in civil cases by default or confession. In either case the judgment must follow the confession or plea of guilty, and is conclusive until vacated by a withdrawal, or a setting aside of the plea of guilty or confession. Meyers v. State, 156 Ind. 388, 59 N.E. 1052, and cases cited.
Assuming, however, that the motion for a new trial properly presents the question of newly discovered evidence, we should be compelled to hold that there were no affidavits in support of the motion, as required by many decisions of this court (Barnett v. State, 141 Ind. 149, 40 N.E. 666, and cases cited), for the reason that what purports to be affidavits taken in the state of Tennessee are not authenticated in accordance with the requirements of §§ 483 and 1865 Burns 1901, and can not therefore be received and used as such in the courts of this State.
Authority to take and certify affidavits does not belong to the office of notary public at common law, but whether it does or not is immaterial, since a legislative enactment is paramount to the common law, and the above statute specifically prescribes how an affidavit taken in a foreign state must come authenticated to receive faith and credit in our courts. It is provided that an affidavit shall be subscribed and certified by the officer, or justice of the peace, under his hand and seal of office, if he have one, and attested by the clerk, who shall also certify that such officer, or justice of the peace, is by the laws of said state empowered to administer oaths and take affidavits. The fixing of the specific mode of authentication must be held to exclude all other modes, and hence the courts have no authority to heed an affidavit that is not vouched in the manner provided by law. Teutonia Loan, etc., Co. v. Turrell, 19 Ind.App. 469, 65 Am. St. 419, 49 N.E. 852. In this case certain statements of fact appear in the transcript which purport to have been executed in Davidson county, state of Tennessee, and subscribed by certain named persons, to which was appended the following: No seal accompanies what is claimed to be the official signature. Neither is it attested, nor is the power of the officer, under the laws of Tennessee, to take affidavits, certified by the clerk. They were therefore ineffectual as affidavits, and entitled to no greater consideration than unsworn statements. The newly discovered evidence, therefore, was not brought before the court in such a way as warranted its consideration.
We are, however, induced, by the gravity of the judgment, to pass by the infirmities of the record, and consider the merits of the case on the contention that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law and the evidence. It appearing that appellant had no means with which to procure the services of a legal adviser, the court assigned him competent and experienced counsel, and after his plea of guilty--to enable his attorney fully to acquaint himself with the facts--continued the cause for one week before submitting the question of punishment to the jury. Upon the submission to the jury, appellant appeared by attorney, testified in his own behalf, and cross-examined divers witnesses introduced by the State. It is shown that between 1 and 2 o'clock a. m. of Sunday, January 25, 1903, Allen Blankenship was found dead in the engine room of Melrose mill, in the city of Evansville. Blankenship had been employed as night-watchman of the mill. The body was still warm and bleeding from the nose. The top and back part of the head had been crushed and fractured into many pieces by some blunt instrument. Appellant Jackson was arrested on the following day for the homicide. On the second day after his arrest he made to the chief and other police officers what purports to be a full and detailed confession, which in many important particulars was fully corroborated by other witnesses.
The facts as related by appellant to the officers, and while testifying as a witness in his own behalf, are as follows Appellant, fifty-one years of age, came to Evansville from the state of Tennessee in July, 1902. He was steadily employed by a street contractor in Evansville from the time of his arrival to the last of September, 1902. On the 1st day of October he accepted employment in the Melrose mill, where he continuously worked until one week before the assault. He was well acquainted and on friendly terms with Blankenship, and knew that the...
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