Jackson v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 24 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 95-10146-GAO.,CIV.A. 95-10146-GAO. |
| Citation | 983 F.Supp. 273 |
| Parties | Barbara A. JACKSON, M.D., Administratrix of the Estate of Cephas W. Jackson, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
This matter was tried to the Court sitting without a jury. Upon consideration of the evidence and the briefs and arguments of the parties, the Court makes the following findings of fact and rulings of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On March 27, 1992, Cephas W. Jackson, Jr., M.D., flew his own private airplane from Little Rock Arkansas, to Charleston, West Virginia. On his approach to Charleston's Yeager Airport, the plane crashed, and both he and his passenger were killed. His widow, Barbara A. Jackson, M.D., brought this wrongful death action against the United States, claiming that negligence by personnel of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") had caused the crash. Specifically, she alleges that FAA employees negligently failed to warn Jackson of dangerous icing conditions in the Charleston area, leading Jackson to fly unaware into conditions where ice accumulated on the outside surfaces of the plane, causing it to lose altitude and crash.
Jackson was a well-trained and experienced pilot, having first received his pilot's license in 1986. He was "instrument-rated," which meant that he was trained and competent to fly under Instrument Flight Rules ("IFR"). That is, he was trained to fly in weather conditions where he could not visually observe his flying environment but would need to rely on the aircraft's instrumentation along with the assistance of air traffic controllers.1 In order to be certified to operate under IFR, a pilot must undergo extra training and possess a current instrument rating. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.65.
At the time of the crash, Jackson had logged approximately 500 hours of flight experience as a pilot. A surgeon by profession, he was a recreational pilot who flew almost every week. He had previously piloted long distance trips similar to the one he was on when he died.
Jackson's aircraft was a single-engine Mooney M-20M that was not equipped for flight in icing conditions. See Mooney Flight Manual, Ex. 101 at 3-16, 3-17. In fact, both the aircraft's operating manual and a placard inside the cockpit warned that it was not safe to fly the plane in icing conditions. The manual said:
WARNING
DO NOT OPERATE IN KNOWN ICING CONDITIONS.
The Model M20M is NOT APPROVED for flight into known icing conditions and operation in that environment is prohibited.
Mooney Flight Manual, Ex. 101 at 3-16.
As part of his original training as a pilot, Jackson attended a twelve-day course taught by John Murray, a certified flight instrument instructor. Murray recommended to Jackson that he read "Weather Flying" by Robert Buck, a book which gives detailed information about the dangers of icing. Murray told Jackson about the "warning signs for icing," i.e., freezing temperatures, moisture in the air, and a descent through clouds, and advised him to look for these conditions when departing and to obtain weather updates en route and before landing. Murray also told Jackson of his own personal experiences with icing. Specifically, he warned Jackson about an "ice belt" in the Appalachian region of the United States (including West Virginia) in which severe icing occurs.
Jackson had an extensive library of books and other materials relating to aviation, including books about various weather conditions that a pilot might encounter. Many of the books in his aviation collection contained warnings about flight in icing conditions.
The day before the accident, Jackson was in Little Rock, planning a trip back to his home in Norton, Massachusetts. Following customary procedures, he contacted the FAA's Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and requested weather information concerning his proposed flight from Little Rock, Arkansas, to Mansfield, Massachusetts, with a stop en route at Charleston, West Virginia. An AFSS is an FAA facility which, among other services, provides weather briefings to pilots both prior to flight and while en route.
Jackson requested an "outlook briefing" for an expected departure the following morning.2 The briefer told him that it appeared that conditions would be satisfactory until he reached Charleston, West Virginia, where there was a "chance of some light snow showers," but that from West Virginia to Massachusetts there was a chance of light rain or snow showers across the entire route, with possible fog and severe easterly winds. Air Traffic Control Transcripts, Ex. 70, § A at 2-3. Jackson responded, "OK, well listen I'll uh I'll probably check again tomorrow ... and if it sounds the same [I] think I'll roll over and go back to bed...." Id. at 3.
The following day at about 8:30 a.m., Jackson again called the Jonesboro AFSS and spoke with Flight Services Specialist Robert Eldridge. Jackson gave Eldridge his flight plan, his IFR status, and the type of plane he would be flying. He told Eldridge he proposed to leave Little Rock at about 11:00 a.m. and expected to arrive at Charleston at about 2:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. Eldridge informed Jackson about weather conditions that could be expected along the planned route to Charleston. Of particular significance to this action, Eldridge told Jackson the following:
[A]t the present time you're looking at uh flight precautions uh in the oh let's see here from uh roughly Memphis to Charleston, West Virginia for moderate turbulence below ten thousand feet and over eastern Kentucky into West Virginia for uh occasionally moderate uh light to moderate rime icing3 below twelve thousand feet in the clouds or in precipitation there's really not a lot of precipitation out there right now probably just be in the cloud layers uh other than that uh from here to Charleston West Virginia I don't see too much in the way of flight precautions....
....
... By the time you reach Lexington [Kentucky] they're starting to catch up with to the back side of that system and you begin to pick up scattered to broken cloud layers uh two to three thousand feet from Lexington on into Charleston now Charleston had some precipitation it's a little difficult to tell where the precipitation actually starts the latest national radar summary indicates uh just about the Charleston area you start to pick up some patchy precipitation they were reporting twenty seven hundred broken four thousand overcast seven miles and light snow-showers temperature thirty four degrees dewpoint of twenty four.
Their surface winds were two sixty at nine gusting to twenty one so it's a little blustery over there sounds like its snowing sideways.
Uh your forecast for uh that portion of your route doesn't sound too bad you're looking basically at those conditions uh continuing enroute now Charleston's terminal forecast uh from ... ten am til four pm this morning it'll be central ceilings four thousand broken winds two ninety at ten gusting to twenty with occasional deterioration to ceilings two thousand overcast three miles and light snowshowers to light rain showers but improvement after four pm twenty two Z.4
Air Traffic Control Transcripts, Ex. 70. § B at 3-4.
Eldridge also briefed Jackson about weather conditions for a flight from Charleston to the Boston area. He summed up:
[T]aken all in all it doesn't look like you've got a real serious weather problem across that route you do have the flight precautions for turbulence and possibility of some icing.
But as long as you stay on top of that I don't believe you have too much problem getting in making the entire trip today.
Eldridge did not specifically inform Jackson of some advisories that had been issued by the National Weather Service. These advisories, called AIRMETs and SIGMETs,5 reported (among other things) that there might be icing and turbulence in the West Virginia vicinity. After he had received the weather briefing, Jackson filed an IFR flight plan for just the Charleston leg of his trip, expressing his intention to "get an updating in Charleston." Id. at 6-7.
At about 11:10 a.m., Central Standard Time, Jackson's aircraft, N9136J, received clearance to leave Little Rock. He traveled over Tennessee and Kentucky toward West Virginia. En route, he had radio communications with several FAA air traffic control facilities: Little Rock Tower, Memphis Center, Memphis Tower, Nashville Tower, Indianapolis Center, and Charleston Approach and the Charleston Tower.6 At 2:38 p.m Eastern Standard Time, Jackson, in contact with the Indianapolis Center, requested and was granted permission to ascend to 9,000 feet in order to rise above the cloud deck.
Shortly thereafter, Jackson contacted Indianapolis Hazard Sector.7 At 2:47 p.m., the air traffic controller on duty received a Pilot Report (a "PIREP") that reported moderate rime icing had been encountered by a plane while traveling out of Charleston. A PIREP is "[a] report of meteorological phenomena encountered by aircraft in flight." Flight Services Manual, Ex. 41 at A-46. The controller relayed this PIREP information to the Charleston ATCT but she did not broadcast it to pilots generally nor communicate it specifically to pilots, like Jackson, who might be headed toward that weather. However, at about the same time, in response to an inquiry by another aircraft, the controller gave the following report:
Charleston Approach advises their uh one thousand three hundred overcast solid IFR moderate mixed icing inbound to Charleston it's clear to...
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