Jackson v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 August 2021
• Docket Number: Crim. CR16-2057-LTS,C19-2017-LTS
• Parties: DANIEL LOUIS JACKSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

DANIEL LOUIS JACKSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. C19-2017-LTS

Crim. No. CR16-2057-LTS

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division

August 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before me on Daniel Jackson's motion (Civ. Doc 1) to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 due to ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Jackson's trial counsel has filed a court-directed response (Civ. Doc. 12) and the Government has filed a resistance (Civ. Doc. 15). Jackson then filed a response (Civ. Doc. 17) and two motions (Civ. Docs. 19, 23) to amend his § 2255 motion, the first of which the Government resisted (Civ. Doc. 21). For the reasons discussed herein, I find that an evidentiary hearing is not required.

II. BACKGROUND

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the events leading to the case as follows:

On October 17, 2016, Daniel Jackson and his co-defendant Jason Centeno traveled from Muscatine, Iowa, to the Citizens State Bank of Hopkinton, Iowa. While Jackson waited in the car, Centeno entered the bank and took video of its interior. Three days later, Jackson (in the company of Centeno and their roommate Edgar Pauley) went to the Muscatine Wal-Mart and purchased black pantyhose, ski hats, and zip ties.

On the morning of October 21, 2016, Jackson and Centeno donned the disguises they purchased at Wal-Mart and entered the bank. Once inside, the two men leapt over the counter, whereupon Jackson displayed a knife, used a zip tie to secure a teller's hands behind her back, and took money from the drawer. Meanwhile Centeno brandished a .38 special revolver and demanded that a second teller give him the money from her drawer. Having accomplished his task with the first teller, Jackson approached the second teller and ordered her to the ground.

While this was going on, the bank's manager entered the bank, having just re-parked his car, to find the robbery in progress. Jackson accosted him, ordered him to the ground, and secured his hands with a zip tie, inadvertently dropping a zip tie on the floor. Jackson's DNA was later found on both zip ties.

Jackson and Centeno made their getaway with approximately $8, 225 of purloined cash in their possession. The pair then fled the state with Pauley, leaving the .38 revolver with Centeno's mother in New York and eventually making their way to Daytona Beach, Florida, where they were arrested.

United States v. Jackson, 913 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2019).

On December 14, 2016, Jackson was charged in an indictment with several counts related to bank robbery. Crim. Doc. 1. On September 28, 2017, he was charged with additional counts in a superseding indictment. Crim. Doc. 102. Specifically, he was charged with: count 1, armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2; count 2, aiding and abetting the use, carrying, and brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 2; count 3, conspiracy to commit armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and count 4, conspiracy to use, carry, and brandish a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). Crim. Doc. 102.

On October 13, 2017, a jury convicted Jackson of counts 1s-4s. Crim. Doc. 133. On February 22, 2018, I sentenced Jackson to 180 months' incarceration. Crim. Doc. 176. The sentence included 96 months on each of counts 1s, 3s, and 4s, to be served concurrently, and 84 months on count 2s to be served consecutively to the concurrent terms. Crim. Doc. 176. The Eighth Circuit denied Jackson's appeal on January 22, 2019. Jackson, 913 F.3d at 789.

Jackson filed the present motion on March 20, 2019, raising six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Civ. Doc. 1. On initial review (Civ. Doc. 7), I directed Jackson's trial attorney, Jill Johnston, to file an affidavit and I directed the Government to respond.^[1] Jackson then filed two motions to amend (Civ. Docs. 19, 23). The first, filed February 25, 2021, asserted a claim of eligibility for resentencing based on newly discovered evidence. Civ. Doc. 19. The second, filed April 12, 2021, asserted an additional claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Civ. Doc. 23.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain relief, a federal prisoner must establish:

[T]hat the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [that the judgment or sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack.

Id.; see also Rule 1 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings (specifying scope of § 2255). If any of the four grounds are established, the court is required to “vacate and set the judgment aside and [to] discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

When enacting § 2255, Congress “intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.” Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Section 2255 does not provide a remedy for “all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather:

Relief under [§ 2255] is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.

United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 (“[T]he permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack . . . is severely limited[.]”). A collateral challenge under § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (“[W]e have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.”). Consequently, “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Evidentiary hearings on [§ 2255] motions are preferred, and the general rule is that a hearing is necessary prior to the motion's disposition if a factual dispute exists.” Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). “The district court is not permitted to make a credibility determination on the affidavits alone.” Id. at 1206; see also United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[The] district court abused its discretion when it credited the attorney's affidavit over the petitioners without first holding an evidentiary hearing.”). However, no hearing is required “where the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.” See New v. United States, 652 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

Between his original motion (Civ. Doc. 1) and his motions to amend (Civ. Docs. 19, 23), Jackson raises seven claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, one claim of prosecutorial misconduct and one claim relating to a post-judgment expungement of a prior criminal conviction.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jackson argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) argue Jackson's arrest warrant lacked probable cause and therefore resulted in an unlawful arrest, (2) argue Jackson's Facebook messages and cell phone location data were obtained without a warrant, constituting an unconstitutional search, (3) argue Jackson's right to counsel had been violated during his initial appearance in the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, (4) argue Jackson's right to a speedy trial was violated, (5) argue Jackson's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated, (6) preserve Jackson's rights to appeal jury instructions used during trial and (7) file a motion to exclude DNA evidence from Jackson's trial.

1. Standards

To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must prove that his attorney's representation “was ‘deficient' and that the ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'” Walking Eagle v. United States, 742 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Deficient” performance is performance that falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness, ” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 158, 163 (2012) (citation omitted), that is conduct that fails to conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Matters of trial strategy are generally entrusted to the professional discretion of counsel and they are “virtually unchallengeable” in § 2255 proceedings. Loefer v. United States, 604 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2010). Counsel is not constitutionally ineffective because of the failure to raise a “relatively sophisticated” and “counter-intuitive argument.” Donnell v. United States, 765 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2014). However, “[s]trategy resulting from lack of diligence in preparation and investigation is not protected by the presumption in favor of counsel.” Holder v. United States, 721 F.3d 979, 994 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

To establish “prejudice, ” a movant must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have...