Jackson v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 February 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 23034.,23034. |
| Citation | 408 F.2d 306 |
| Parties | Ronald JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Robert J. Hirsh (argued), and William Messing, Tucson, Ariz., for appellant.
Jo Ann Diamos (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Edward E. Davis, U. S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz., for appellee.
Before HAMLEY and BROWNING, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON, District Judge.*
Ronald Jackson was convicted by a jury of the offense of receiving, concealing, and facilitating the transportation and concealment of heroin near Nogales, Arizona, on December 29, 1967, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). He appeals. We affirm.
Jackson argues first that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.
Two of the essential elements of a section 174 offense are that the drugs in question shall have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law, and that the defendant knew this at the time of his participation in the transaction. There was here no direct evidence tending to establish these elements.
Section 174, however, provides that where it is shown that the defendant had knowing possession of the drug, "such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Possession means such dominion and control as to give power of disposal of the drug. Arellanes v. United States, 9 Cir., 302 F.2d 603, 606. Such possession can be joint as well as several and constructive as well as actual. Delgado v. United States, 9 Cir., 327 F.2d 641, 642.
Jackson contends, in effect, that the evidence is insufficient to show that he had actual sole or joint possession, or constructive possession, of the heroin in question.
While the evidence is insufficient to show that Jackson had actual sole possession of the heroin, we think it was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that he had constructive possession of the drugs at the time in question. We need not decide whether, in the alternative, the evidence entitled the jury to find Jackson and his wife had actual joint possession.
The evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to the Government (see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680), warranted the jury in finding as follows: Jackson and his wife entered Mexico the evening of December 28, 1967, after parking their automobile on this side of the border and after registering as narcotic violators pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964). Upon their return early in the afternoon of the next day, they both underwent strip searches at the border. No contraband was found.
However, customs agents drove Jackson and his wife to a doctor's office for cavity searches. Again no contraband was found. When the searches had been completed, Jackson asked the agents to give him and his wife a ride to the bus depot so they could catch a bus back to their home in Phoenix, Arizona. About three blocks before reaching the bus depot, Jackson had the agents let them out of the car. They alighted, but instead of taking a bus, they got into their car, which was parked nearby, and drove away.
Customs agent Dennis saw the Jacksons get into their car, make a U-turn, and drive north on Grand Avenue. He followed them for several blocks and then turned off at the main road. The Jacksons were then free of surveillance for ten or fifteen minutes until customs agents Rollin B. Klink and Richard Swindler saw the Jackson car being driven north. They followed the car as it turned east onto the Patagonia Highway, a roundabout route to Phoenix. At approximately milepost 2.5 on the Patagonia Highway, Swindler turned on his siren and red light in order to stop the Jackson car. Jackson's car appeared to speed up and Mrs. Jackson was seen to bend over and an arm was seen to come out on her side of the car and a silver colored package dropped.
Swindler immediately stopped, let Klink out of the car, and sped after Jackson, who stopped only after Swindler pulled in front of him and forced him to the side of the road, three or four hundred yards from the point where the siren and red light had been turned on. Klink, meanwhile, retrieved the silver colored package that had been thrown out of the car. It contained the heroin in question.
Needless to say, the Jacksons' testimony presented an entirely different version of the events described above.
The way in which Jackson handled the car after the agents turned on the...
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