Jackson v. United States

Decision Date01 August 2011
Docket Number1:10-cv-4\1:00-cr-23
PartiesJONATHAN LEE JACKSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Chief Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Jonathan Lee Jackson ("Jackson") filed a tardy notice of appeal which the Court treated as a motion pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment entered on January 18, 2011 (Criminal Court File No. 92). Jackson did not receive the Court's memorandum and judgment order until February 18, 2011, but because he did not explain why it took him from February 18, 2011, until March 23, 2011, to file his notice of appeal, the Court ordered Jackson to show good cause or excusable neglect for failing to file a timely notice of appeal (Court File No. 94). For the reasons explained below, Jackson's motion for extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal is DENIED (Criminal Court File No. 92).

I. Procedural History

Jonathan Lee Jackson ("Jackson") filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Criminal Court File No. 84). On January 18, 2011, the Court denied Jackson's § 2255 motion (Criminal Court File Nos. 89 & 90). In addition, the Court concluded that if a timely notice of appeal was filed, it would be treated as an application for a certificate of appealability, which the Court granted, because, due to the split of authority on the retroactive applicability of Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), reasonable jurists would at least find the resolution of the matter debatable. The Court further certified that any appeal from this action would be taken in good faith and granted any application to proceed in forma pauperis onappeal (Criminal Court File No. 90). On January 18, 2011, the Court's Memorandum and Judgment Order denying Jackson's § 2255 motion were mailed to him at his last known addressed. Unfortunately, Jackson failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

Although Jackson's notice of appeal was untimely, the Court treated it as a motion to file a delayed appeal because it was filed more than sixty days after entry of the Memorandum and Judgment Order entered in this case. In it Jackson claimed he had shown good cause for his tardiness. See generally Bradford v. Gardner, 786 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1986), available in 1986 WL 16545, *3 ("A late notice of appeal which fails to allege excusable neglect or good cause can no longer serve as a substitute[]" for a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file an appeal) (Criminal Court File No. 92). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Presently before the Court is Jackson's response to the Court's Order directing him to show good cause or excusable neglect for failing to file a timely notice of appeal; thus the matter is ripe for review.

II. Analysis

Jackson explains that he was flown to the Federal Transfer Center at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on January 19, 2011, and remained there until February 15, 2011, when he was flown to FCI Beckley, WV.1 Therefore, Jackson's copies of the Court's memorandum and judgment order were mailed to the only address Jackson submitted to the Court i.e., the Yazoo City, Mississippi address. Apparently, the memorandum and judgment were forwarded to Jackson, as he received a copy on February 18, 2011.

A. Applicable Law

Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that in a civil case the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within thirty (30) days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. When the United States is a party, however, as it is in this case, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within sixty (60) days after the judgment or order appealed from has entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). The date of entry of judgment dismissing Jackson's § 2255 motion was January 18, 2011. The sixty-day deadline for Jackson to file his notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) expired on March 21, 2011. The instant motion, according to the institutional mail room facility stamp, was filed on March 23, 2011. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) (filing is effective on date deposited in the institution's internal mail system). Jackson did not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) because he did not file his notice of appeal within 60 days after entry of the memorandum and judgment dismissing his § 2255 motion.

Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if the motion requesting the extension of time is filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the original appeal time and the party shows excusable neglect or good cause. See Fed. R. App.P 4(a)(5); Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763 n. 2 (2001). The Sixth Circuit has instructed that an extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5) is to be granted "only in unique or extraordinary circumstance" and that the excusable neglect standard is strict. Marsh v. Richardson, 873 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1989). "Good cause will be found where forces beyond the control of the appellant prevented [him] from filing a timely notice of appeal." Nicholson v. City of Warren, 467 F.3d 525, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

B. Discussion

The Court recognizes that Jackson is a pro se litigant, who probably is not familiar with all of the procedural rules governing litigation and appeals in the federal court system. Nevertheless, "pro se litigants must comply with court rules and directives." Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 865 (2006). Pro se litigants are required to inform themselves of the rules and abide by them. See In re Amer Metrocom Corp., 196 Fed. Appx. 86, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the Third Circuit has never held a court's obligations to liberally interpret pro se pleadings justifies ignoring deadlines for filing an appeal); Phillips v. 7912 Merchants Ins. Group, 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding district court abused its discretion in granting an extension of time to file an appeal on the ground the pro se prisoner was confused, as they are required to inform themselves of the rules and comply with them despite being afforded greater latitude).

Thus, Jackson is required to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect to obtain an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit has instructed, "[g]ood cause will be found where forces beyond the control of the appellant prevented her from filing a timely notice of appeal." Nicholson v. City of Warren, 467 F.3d 525, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 630 (1st Cir. 2000). "Excusable neglect" applies in situations where there is fault on the part of the party, occasioned by something within their control. Although Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure does not define the excusable neglect standard, the Sixth Circuit has instructed the standard is "'strict,' and can be met only in extraordinary cases." Marsh v. Richardson, 873 F.2d at 130.

Jackson argues he has demonstrated good cause and excusable neglect. In support of this argument, Jackson alleges he was unable to file a timely notice of appeal because he did not receive his personal legal documents until March 7, 2011, and he was unable to locate anyone to assist him in notifying the Court of his change of address and filing his notice of appeal. Although Jackson intertwines his "good cause" and "excusable neglect" arguments, it appears the "excusable neglect" standard is more appropriate in the circumstances of this case, as Jackson does not indicate he was denied access to the law library or the items necessary to file the appeal, or that he was physically incapacitated or hospitalized during which time he could have filed a timely appeal. The fact that a notice of appeal is a simple document that does not require the collection of supporting documentation or preparation of briefs supports this conclusion. Therefore, because Jackson has not demonstrated his failure to file a timely notice of appeal was the result of forces outside of his control, the excusable neglect standard appears to be the applicable standard in this case.

The excusable neglect standard was somewhat relaxed by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). "Neglect exists where the failure to do something occurred because of a simple, faultless omission to act, or because of a party's carelessness." Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 651 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Pioneer, 507 at at 388). In Pioneer the Supreme Court, addressing a bankruptcy rule which allows a bankruptcy court to permit late filing of a proof of claim if the delay was the result of excusable neglect, identified certain circumstances that should be considered by a court when making an excusable neglect finding. "The determination of whether a case of neglect was excusable is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. These include . . . the danger of prejudice to the [nonmoving party], the length of the delay and its potentialimpact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 395. Courts have applied the Pioneer standards when analyzing a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal. E.g., Nicholson v. City of Warren, 467 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006); Perez v. Birkett, 2006 WL 3751166 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2006).

In this case, the government has not objected to Jackson's request and since his request was filed only two days after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal, it does not appear there is any danger of prejudice to the government. The length of delay is minimal in this case....

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