Jackson v. United States
Decision Date | 22 March 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 259-76.,259-76. |
Citation | 573 F.2d 1189 |
Parties | Allen Aaron JACKSON v. The UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
James M. Garlock, San Francisco, Cal., attorney of record for plaintiff, Belli & Choulos, Melvin M. Belli, and Morris Beatus, San Francisco, Cal., of counsel.
Sandra P. Spooner, with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Barbara Allen Babcock, Washington, D.C., for defendant, Levator Norsworthy, Jr., Washington, D.C., of counsel.
Before SKELTON, Senior Judge, and KUNZIG and BENNETT, Judges.
ON DEFENDANT's MOTION TO DISMISS
This is the second time this case has been before this court. Our prior opinion, which denied any recovery to plaintiff and which dismissed his petition, is found in Jackson v. United States, 551 F.2d 282, 213 Ct.Cl. 354, vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 471, 54 L.Ed.2d 307 (1977).
The facts show that the plaintiff enlisted in the United States Army Reserve on January 24, 1974, for a period of 6 years. At that time he signed the following enlistment documents:
(1) Department of Defense Form 4 (DD4), Enlistment Contract — Armed Forces of the United States. This form showed his enlistment as a private in the USAR (Delayed Entry) for a period of 6 years, and contained the oath of enlistment which he signed.
(2) Department of the Army Form 3286 (DA3286), Statement for Enlistment, Parts I through V, in which the plaintiff changed his 6-year enlistment in the Army Reserve to a 3-year enlistment in the Regular Army in order that he might receive on-the-job training (OJT) in mechanical maintenance. This form contained the following acknowledgments:
(3) Statement For Enlistment, Delayed Entry Program, Form 3286-32-R. This form contained the following acknowledgments and provisions:
TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL APPLICANTS ENLISTING FOR THIS OPTION.
The plaintiff competed basic combat training (BCT) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, Ft. Riley, Kansas, where he reported for duty on May 11, 1974, for on-the-job training (OJT) in mechanical maintenance in accordance with the provisions of his enlistment documents. He was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division as he had requested, and on May 20, 1974, while engaged in combat maneuvers with his unit, he was run over by a tank, resulting in the amputation of the lower half of his body from the navel down. He is totally and permanently disabled and has been drawing total disability compensation as provided by law in Grade PV2 since May 29, 1974.
The plaintiff filed this suit seeking damages in the sum of $5,000,000 for his injuries. He alleges that the recruiting officer represented to him that he would be allowed to attend an automotive mechanical maintenance school of the 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kansas, and that he would not be required to participate in any dangerous combat-type military maneuvers or activities. He alleges further that such representations formed a part of his enlistment contract and that the Army breached the contract when plaintiff was required to participate in the tank combat-type maneuvers of the 1st Infantry Division and that because of such breach he was injured and is entitled to damages.
The case is before us on defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's petition. The defendant says that although the plaintiff has couched his suit in terms of a contract action, his claim sounds in tort over which this court has no jurisdiction. The defendant denies that the recruiting officer made the representations claimed by the plaintiff that the plaintiff would not be required to participate in any dangerous-combat-type maneuvers or activities, and that, if any such representations were made by the recruiting officer, they were made orally and without authority; and that such representations, if they were made, contradicted the written enlistment documents which contained no such provisions, and conflicted with Army Regulations, and, for all of such reasons, were null and void.
In our prior opinion, we held that the plaintiff's case sounds in tort and not in contract and that we have no jurisdiction of his case because of 28 U.S.C. § 1491. We granted defendant's motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed plaintiff's petition. At the time we entered our judgment of dismissal we were unaware that the plaintiff had finished his basic combat training and were of the opinion he was engaged in basic combat training at the time of his injuries, and we so stated in our opinion. The plaintiff applied to the Supreme Court for a...
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