Jackson v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 April 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 4:16-cv-03219-RBH
• Parties: Kimberly L. Jackson, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry D. Jackson, Jr., Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Kimberly L. Jackson,Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry D. Jackson, Jr., Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 4:16-cv-03219-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

April 12, 2018

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kimberly L. Jackson ("Plaintiff"), who represents the estate of her deceased husband Jerry D. Jackson, Jr. ("Mr. Jackson"), brings this negligence and wrongful death action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680. The Court held a bench trial on February 20-23, 2018, and now issues this order summarizing its evidentiary rulings and setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Introduction

This case arises from the tragic death of Plaintiff's husband, Jerry D. Jackson, Jr., who passed away in a motorcycle accident on September 12, 2015. As Mr. Jackson and nine other motorcyclists were traveling home to North Carolina on U.S. Highway 701 North in Horry County, South Carolina, a rural mail carrier employed by the United States Postal Service entered the northbound lane from a private drive. As a result, two motorcyclists in front of Mr. Jackson collided with the postal employee's vehicle, and Mr. Jackson, who did not come into contact with the postal employee's vehicle, was ultimately ejected from his motorcycle and died at the scene.

Evidence Presented

At trial, Plaintiff offered testimony from seven of the nine motorcyclists who were riding with Mr. Jackson at the time of the accident and are listed in the order they testified: Woody Hodges (who testified by written deposition), Ron McLeod, Patrick Burgess, Paul Godwin, William Strickland, Roy (Joe) Joffrion, and Harry Halstead. Plaintiff also called the following witnesses: Tony Howard, an independent unbiased witness who was riding behind the ten motorcyclists in his SUV at the time of the accident and had been following them for several miles; Cpl. Christopher Costa, a trooper with the South Carolina Highway Patrol who responded to the scene and investigated the accident; Jessica Williams, a family friend of the Jacksons who testified regarding wrongful death damages of the family; Dr. Jesse Raley, an expert in forensic psychiatry who evaluated two of the statutory beneficiaries; Michelle McSpadden, the Horry County Deputy Coroner who responded to the scene and investigated Mr. Jackson's death; Alan Campbell, an expert in civil engineering and human factors; Jerri McLamb, Plaintiff's sister-in-law; Kimberly Jackson, Mr. Jackson's surviving wife and the plaintiff in this case; Cacey Jackson, Mr. Jackson's surviving elder son; Hunter Jackson, Mr. Jackson's surviving younger son; Dewayne Stancil, a family friend of the Jacksons; Dr. Oliver Wood, Jr., an economic loss expert; and Carolyn Cole, the rural mail carrier employee involved in the accident.

Defendant offered testimony from Erin Higinbotham, an expert in mechanical engineering with qualifications in accident reconstruction and motorcycle operations; Dr. Marc Glaser, the former Emergency Services Medical Director for Harnett County, North Carolina; and Kendrick Richardson, an expert in mechanical engineering with qualifications in accident reconstruction and vehicle dynamics.

In addition to the testimony, the Court has carefully reviewed the numerous exhibits submitted by the parties.

Evidentiary Issues

I. Admissibility of Motorcyclist Literature

Plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to limit and/or exclude the testimony of Defendant's experts regarding the North Carolina Motorcyclists' Handbook, the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Operator Manual, and the related Motorcycle Safety Foundation Riding Tips document. See ECF No. 50; see also Def. Exs. 56, 57, & 58. Plaintiff objected to these materials being admitted into evidence and to any testimony (expert or otherwise) about them, asserting the accident at issue occurred in South Carolina and thus is subject only to South Carolina motor vehicle law. See ECF No. 50-1. Defendant filed a response in opposition arguing these publications were relevant and were properly relied upon by its two expert engineer witnesses, Erin Higinbotham and Kendrick Richardson, to establish the industry standard for safe motorcycle group riding. See ECF No. 52.

The Court addressed the motion before trial began, noting the case was a nonjury/bench trial and ruling it would permit Defendant's experts to testify about their reliance on the publications and to give their opinion as to whether or not Mr. Jackson was operating his motorcycle in a safe manner. However, the Court noted it would reserve the right to disregard such expert opinions.

Having fully considered this issue and heard the disputed testimony, the Court reaffirms its prior ruling regarding those portions of the publications relied upon by Defendant's experts. First, those particular portions are admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. Second, Higinbotham's and Richardson's expert opinions relying on these publications are admissible under Rule 703.¹ Initially, the Court notes the typical concerns contemplated by Rule 703 were not at playin this bench trial. See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 69 (2012) (discussing Rule 703 and explaining that "[w]hen the judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that the judge will understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible information and will not rely on that information for any improper purpose").

Furthermore, the publications were reasonably relied upon by Higinbotham and Richardson in forming their opinions about Mr. Jackson's following distance and whether it was a cause of his fatal injuries. As Defendant correctly points out, see ECF No. 52 at p. 3, all ten riders were residents of North Carolina with motorcycle endorsements on their driver's licenses, and this case requires an understanding of the industry standard for safe motorcycle group riding, a matter outside the layman's common knowledge or experience.² See Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 481 (S.C. 2013) (explaining that in the context of negligence and causation, "[t]he general rule in South Carolina is that where a subject is beyond the common knowledge of the [factfinder], expert testimony is required"); Green v. Bradley Co., No. 3:15-CV-02581-JMC, 2017 WL 4012298, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2017) (quoting Babb in a diversity case). Moreover, these publications aid Defendant's experts in establishing the standard of care that Mr. Jackson—a North Carolina motorcyclist— should have been using and whether he deviated from that standard of care because, as explained below, this case involves comparative negligence. See generally Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 711 S.E.2d 908, 912 (S.C. 2011) ("Once a duty has been established, it is the further function of the court todetermine and formulate the standard of conduct to which the duty requires the defendant to conform. The factfinder may consider relevant standards of care from various sources in determining whether a defendant breached a duty owed to an injured person in a negligence case. The standard of care in a given case may be established and defined by . . . industry standards . . . ." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)).

Finally, the Court notes those relevant portions of the three publications—the North Carolina Motorcyclists' Handbook, the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Operator Manual, and the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Riding Tips document—can be read harmoniously with South Carolina law and the South Carolina Driver's Manual that was also relied upon by Defendant's experts. See Def. Ex. 55. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion in limine.

II. Testimony of Dr. Oliver Wood, Jr.

At the end of trial, Defendant renewed its Daubert³ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Oliver Wood, Jr., Plaintiff's economic loss expert. The Court had previously denied the motion in a text order on October 26, 2017. See ECF No. 35 ("[T]he [C]ourt respectfully denies Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Wood. Because this case will be tried non-jury, the Court would prefer to hear the disputed testimony before it makes a decision whether to exclude or disregard any part or all of the testimony."). Having now heard Dr. Wood's testimony, the Court finds it proper to disregard his conclusions and opinions only to the extent they are based on an assumed earning capacity of $48,000 per year because, as explained later in this Order, this figure is too speculative to be considered as reliable information consistent with Daubert principles and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Court will, however, consider Dr. Wood's testimony concerning the projected loss of Mr.Jackson's household/family services. The Court's relevant findings are set forth in detail below.

Legal Standard for a Nonjury Civil Trial

"In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . . , the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).

Although Plaintiff and Defendant both moved for "directed verdicts,"⁴ there is no such motion in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Benjamin v. Shaw, No. 4:15-cv-05110-RBH, 2017 WL 3205798, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017). The Court construes the parties' motions as ones for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.⁵ Rule 52(c) provides:

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or

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