Jackson v. United States
Decision Date | 07 January 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 16580.,16580. |
Parties | Katherine Idell JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Vincent F. Kilborn and Willes C. Darby, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for appellant.
Ralph Kennamer, U. S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., for appellee.
Before RIVES, JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
The appellant was indicted, convicted and placed on three years probation for presenting to the Veterans Administration a claim for Servicemen's Indemnity as the widow of Frederick Rodgers when, in fact, she knew she was not his widow, in violation of 18 U.S.C. A. § 287. From her conviction she has appealed.
The United States Attorney inquired, "Is the objection from the wife that her husband is testifying, and, if so, I will withdraw him." The witness stated that he had no objection to testifying. The court permitted him to testify that he was married to the defendant and so far as he knew they had never been divorced. The appellant claims this was error. We agree.
Rule 26 Fed.Rules Crim.Proc., 18 U.S. C.A. provides:
"The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except where an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
At common law neither husband nor wife is competent to testify in a criminal suit for or against the other. 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed. p. 100, § 764. The Supreme Court has held:
Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 69 S.Ct. 814, 819, 93 L.Ed. 993, rehearing denied 337 U.S. 921, 69 S. Ct. 1152, 93 L.Ed. 1730.
That which was presumably still the "federal rule" when the Griffin case was decided in 1948 was recognized in Ford v. United States, 5 Cir., 1954, 210 F.2d 313. We are not here concerned with a case where the offense charged is one against the spouse such as Levine v. United States, 5 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 992, or where the marriage was sham as in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593. No consent was given by the defendant Katherine Idell Jackson to the testimony of Anderson. A specific objection was not required. 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. p. 263, § 2241. See Olender v. United States, 9 Cir., 1954, 210 F.2d 795, 42 A. L.R.2d 736. It was enough that the absence of the defendant's consent be suggested to the court. The admission of the testimony of Anderson was error.
In appellant's specifications of error it is asserted that the court denied her counsel's request to examine a document to which Government witness Faulkner, an F. B. I. Agent, referred while testifying. The Government says the record does not show that the witness had any document in his possession while on the stand. The appellant has filed a motion to supplement the record and have a hearing on the issue as to whether the witness took a document to the stand and referred to it on the trial. The Government does not question the rule that where a witness uses any paper to refresh his memory while he is on the stand, the opposing side, on proper demand, may examine the paper and use it on cross-examination. See Montgomery v. United States, 5 Cir., 1953, 203 F. 2d 887, and cases there cited. Since the case must be reversed for a new trial we see no need for us to consider whether the record should be supplemented so as to permit us to pass upon the question which the appellant has sought to raise.
The witness Faulkner testified as to statements made by the appellant. She says she was told that Faulkner represented that he was trying to find out who was entitled to the proceeds of the Servicemen's Indemnity, and that such was an inducement which deprived her statements of their voluntary character. Faulkner testified that he warned her that whatever she said might be used against her. This was neither threat, duress nor promise. It was not the offer, direct or indirect of any inducement nor was any deception employed. Nothing appears to show that the statements or confessions of the appellant were in any sense involuntary. See 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., p. 96 et seq., §§ 372-385.
Faulkner also testified that the appellant did not tell him that she had divorced Anderson. The question was asked by the United States Attorney and counsel for the appellant objected. The objection was overruled. It was not shown that the appellant was asked by Faulkner whether or not she had divorced Anderson. The failure to make voluntary exculpatory declarations cannot be admitted as admissions to prove the contrary. The court's ruling was error. Although the rules of evidence provide for the admissibility of confessions and admissions against interest we do not know of any doctrine which would justify the consideration by a jury in a criminal case of the failure, by a person who had been warned about self-incrimination, to deny an incriminating fact about which no question had been asked. Silence, in the absence of a duty to speak, is not an admission.
The witness Faulkner testified that he had searched the public records in Mobile County, Alabama, and found no record that appellant and Anderson had been divorced. The appellant contends that the absence of a record of the divorce could be proved only by the custodian of the records. The Federal Rules, Rule 27, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 44(b) Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S. C.A. provide that the certificate of a custodian of an official record is admissible to prove the lack of a particular reccord. Such provision does not exclude other evidence. 2 Barron & Holtzoff Federal Practice & Procedure, p. 702, § 991. To establish the fact that there is no record as to a particular matter or thing parol evidence may be given. The proof may be made by any qualified person who has examined the record as well as by the custodian. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 807d, p. 736; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., p. 295, § 152. We doubt that there was enough shown to establish the fact of a thorough search by the witness but we think such testimony was not subject to the objection that only the custodian of records can testify as to the absence of a record. Whitman v. Whitman, 253 Ala. 643, 46 So.2d 422, is not, we think, contrary to the conclusion we have reached.
When the Government rested the appellant's counsel requested that the jury be excluded for the purpose of a motion for acquittal. The court...
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