Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth., No. 17369.
| Decision Date | 27 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 17369. |
| Citation | 900 A.2d 498,278 Conn. 692 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Nathan JACKSON v. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, et al. |
Thomas J. Weihing, with whom, on the brief, were John T. Bochanis, Bridgeport, and Benjamin Aponte, for the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff).
John P. Bohannon, Jr., Fairfield, for the appellee-cross appellant (named defendant).
BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
The plaintiff, Nathan Jackson, brought this action against the named defendant, the water pollution control authority of the city of Bridgeport,1 to recover damages for discrimination on the basis of race and physical disability in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.2 Following a jury trial, the plaintiff-appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) precluded the jury from awarding him damages after it found that the defendant had discriminated against him; and (2) precluded him from introducing evidence regarding the value of his lost right to "bump" more junior employees. The defendant cross appeals, contending that the trial court improperly denied its motion to set aside the jury's findings that the defendant: (1) discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of physical disability; and (2) executed a settlement agreement with the plaintiff as a pretext for unlawful discrimination.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff began his employment for the city of Bridgeport (city) in 1985 as an attendant at the Beardsley Park Zoo, where he worked for approximately two years. Thereafter, the plaintiff transferred to the city's department of public works, which later became the defendant. The defendant and its predecessor employed the plaintiff as a street sweeper and sewer well cleaner,4 in which capacity he suffered injuries to his knee, back and ankle. The plaintiff received workers' compensation for his injuries.
In December, 1993, the plaintiff became involved in a labor dispute with the defendant, which ultimately resulted in the termination of his employment. The plaintiff, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the defendant and the plaintiff's labor union, appealed from his termination to the state board of mediation and arbitration, which, in November, 1994, reduced the termination to a fifteen day suspension and ordered that the plaintiff be reinstated. The defendant failed, however, to return the plaintiff to work and he filed complaints with the state board of labor relations (labor board) and the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), alleging that he had not been returned to work because of the defendant's discrimination against him on the basis of his race and physical disabilities.
On January 29, 1997, the plaintiff and the defendant met, along with an agent of the labor board, to resolve the plaintiff's complaints. At that time, the parties entered into a settlement agreement (agreement), pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to withdraw his pending claims of discrimination and the defendant agreed to rehire the plaintiff as a sewage plant attendant. The agreement also provided that the parties would negotiate the amount of back pay that was owed to the plaintiff and, in the event that they could not agree, that the issue would be resolved by the commission.5 The plaintiff repeatedly professed during negotiations that, despite his injuries, he was capable of performing the significant physical labor required of a sewage plant attendant.6
The plaintiff worked for the defendant as a sewage plant attendant until March 19, 1997, at which time the defendant suspended his employment, citing the plaintiff's "physical limitations in connection with certain job [functions]...." The defendant informed the plaintiff of his suspension in a letter entitled "[r]elease [f]rom [d]uties [w]ithout [p]ay," citing its concern for his physical welfare and claiming that it wished to have a physician assess his medical condition.7 The defendant made no effort, however, to evaluate the plaintiff's physical condition since that time, and the plaintiff has been employed as a furniture mover since his 1997 suspension.
The defendant contracted with Professional Services Group, Inc. (Professional); see footnote 1 of this opinion; to privatize its operations on March 27, 1997. At that time, the defendant laid off nearly all of its employees, who were then immediately hired by Professional. Unlike other employees of the defendant, however, the plaintiff did not learn of the privatization until approximately two years after it had occurred because notice was mailed to the plaintiff at the defendant's offices, where he was not working because of his suspension, rather than to his home.
After receiving the statutorily required release from the commission; see General Statutes §§ 46a-100 and 46a-101; the plaintiff brought the present action for damages, claiming that the defendant's discharge and suspension of the plaintiff: (1) constituted discrimination on the basis of race and physical disability in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1); (2)constituted discrimination on the basis of physical disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (3) were committed in retaliation for his filing a complaint with the commission in violation of § 46a-60(a)(4); and (4) violated the privatization agreement between the city and Professional.
At trial, the court precluded the plaintiff from presenting evidence of discrimination predating the agreement, including evidence regarding the 1993 termination. The trial court reasoned that, in the event that the agreement was enforceable and not, as the plaintiff contended, a pretext for unlawful discrimination designed to procure withdrawal of his complaint with the commission, the agreement should be enforced according to its terms.8 The plaintiff has not challenged that ruling on appeal.
At the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit on the plaintiff's federal discrimination claim pursuant to General Statutes § 52-210,9 and the plaintiff has not challenged that ruling. The plaintiff's remaining state law claims were presented to the jury, which, according to the submitted interrogatories, found that the defendant neither discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race, nor retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the commission. The jury did find, however, that the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of physical disability in violation of § 46a60 (a)(1). The jury further found that the defendant had entered into the agreement as a pretext for discriminating against the plaintiff. The jury awarded the plaintiff economic damages of $2100 from the defendant.
Despite the jury's finding that the agreement was a pretext for unlawful discrimination, the trial court declined to allow the jury to award damages for back pay. Instead, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) prevented the jury from awarding the plaintiff back pay; (2) excluded evidence regarding the plaintiff's 1994 termination; (3) excluded certain evidence from the plaintiff's workers' compensation agreement; (4) precluded the plaintiff from discussing his "`bumping rights'" at final argument; (5) allowed the defendant to introduce evidence regarding formation of the agreement; and (6) granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the plaintiff's third party beneficiary claim. The court denied his motions. The defendant also moved to set aside the verdict, claiming that the plaintiff adduced insufficient evidence to prove that: (1) he was discriminated against in violation of the act; and (2) the agreement was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment accordingly.
This appeal and cross appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly precluded the jury from awarding damages arising from the agreement, and also that it improperly prevented him from introducing evidence regarding the value of his lost "`bumping rights,'" that is, his right to remain at work in place of less senior employees in the event of a layoff. The defendant cross appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly declined to set aside the jury's findings that it had discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of physical disability and in executing the agreement. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
CROSS APPEAL: THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
We first address the defendant's contentions, on cross appeal, that the trial court improperly denied its motion to set aside the jury's findings that it had discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of physical disability and that the agreement was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. We begin with the cross appeal because, if the defendant prevails, the plaintiff's appeal will be rendered moot.
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