Jackson v. Whitesell

• Decision Date: 21 May 1925
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 197
• Citation: Jackson v. Whitesell, 213 Ala. 369, 104 So. 662 (Ala. 1925)
• Parties: JACKSON, Superintendent of Banks, v. WHITESELL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

104 So. 662

213 Ala. 369

JACKSON, Superintendent of Banks, v. WHITESELL.

4 Div. 197

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 21, 1925

Rehearing Denied June 18, 1925

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County; J.S. Williams, Judge.

Petition in equity by V.M. Whitesell against A.E. Jackson, as Superintendent of Banks, in charge of the Bank of Eufaula. Decree for petitioner, and respondent appeals. Affirmed.

W.H Merrill, of Eufaula, and Steiner, Crum & Weil, of Montgomery for appellant.

Guy W Winn and G.E. Jones, both of Clayton, and Rushton, Crenshaw &amp Rushton, of Montgomery, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

After the superintendent of banks had taken over the affairs of the Bank of Eufaula, appellee filed his petition, representing to the circuit court, sitting in equity, that the bank had prior to that event taken possession of certain described personal property on which appellee had a mortgage lien, and had disposed of the same in such wise as to destroy his lien, that he had presented his claim within the time prescribed by law, and that said claim had been rejected by the superintendent of banks. After a hearing on decree pro confesso and the depositions of witnesses examined by appellee, the court entered a decree allowing appellee's claim, and ordering its satisfaction out of any funds or assets coming into the hands of defendant as the liquidating agent of the Bank of Eufaula under the statute.

The single question presented is whether the court was clothed with jurisdiction to hear, and determine in favor of its validity, appellee's claim against the assets of the Bank of Eufaula.

Article 1 of the chapter on Banks and Banking of the Code of 1923 requires (section 6310) that all persons who have claims against the bank in liquidation--not, however, including deposits shown by the books--shall make proof thereof within a time to be designated by the superintendent under the statute, and (section 6311), if the superintendent rejects the claim, he must serve notice of such rejection upon the claimant, and (section 6312) "an action upon a claim so rejected must be brought by petition to the court having jurisdiction of the affairs of the bank by the claimant within six months after such service or the same shall be barred." Appellee has followed the statute, and if his claim against the bank is a claim within the meaning of the statute, the jurisdiction of the court to determine its validity as a charge against the assets of the bank cannot be attacked, and its decree must be affirmed.

Appellant refers to appellee's petition as a complaint in tort. Whether in the nature of a complaint in tort or not, we look upon it as a claim of compensation for property of appellee converted by the bank to its own use. The statute discriminates between deposits and other claims. Other claims must be presented as provided by the statute, or they are shortly barred. "Claim" is used in the statute in the sense of "cause of action," and any reasonable definition will include the claim asserted by appellee. There is no insuperable obstacle in the way of an adjudication of claims for damages in a court of equity which has obtained jurisdiction of the cause on other distinctly equitable grounds. Here the statute creates the equitable jurisdiction for the settlement of claims in general, and, as we view it, the record discloses no reason, moral or legal, why appellee's claim should not be treated as within the provision...