Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Bowden

• Decision Date: 13 January 1908
• Citation: 54 Fla. 461,45 So. 755
• Parties: JACKSONVILLE ELECTRIC CO. v. BOWDEN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

45 So. 755

54 Fla. 461

JACKSONVILLE ELECTRIC CO. v. BOWDEN.

Florida Supreme Court

January 13, 1908

In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Rhydon M. Call Judge.

Action by Wallace G. Bowden, administrator of Reuben Bowden, against the Jacksonville Electric Company. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Taylor and Hocker, JJ., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The statute making a corporation liable for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default of the corporation or its agent, and providing that if there be no widow or husband, or minor child or dependents, 'then the action may be maintained by the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of the person so killed, and in every such action the jury shall give such damages as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the party killed,' should be given some effect consistent with its legal meaning and the purposes designed to be accomplished by its enactment, to wit: Compensation for the death of the person killed. When an administrator brings an action under the statute, his rights and duties, when not expressed in the statute, are to be determined by the law regulating the rights and duties of an administrator.

When an administrator has a right of action under the statute imposing a liability for the wrongful death of a person, he may recover the value at the decedent's death of the prospective earnings and savings that, from the evidence could reasonably have been expected, but for the death of the decedent.

In the nature of things, an exact and uniform rule for measuring the value of the life of a deceased person to designated beneficiaries or to his estate is not practicable if possible. The elements which enter into the value of a life to the estate of a deceased person are so various and contingent that they must be left, under proper instructions from the court, to the determination of the jury, based on proper testimony applicable to the particular case. The jury have no arbitrary discretion; but among other proper elements they may consider evidence as to the age, probable duration of life, habits of industry, means, business, earnings health, and skill of the deceased, and his reasonable future expectations.

COUNSEL John E. Hartridge and Kay, Doggett & Smith, for plaintiff in error.

Bryan & Bryan, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

Wallace G. Bowden, as administrator of the estate of Reuben Bowden, deceased, brought an action against the Jacksonville Electric Company in the circuit court of Duval county to recover damages for the alleged wrongful killing of plaintiff's intestate by the negligent operation of the defendant's electric street cars. The declaration contained five counts, alleging different phases of negligence; each count alleging that the deceased left surviving him neither widow, nor minor child, nor any one dependent on him for a support.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, and that the death of the plaintiff's intestate was caused solely by his own negligence.

A demurrer to the evidence interposed by the defendant was overruled. The jury returned a verdict for $1,000, for which judgment was entered; and from this judgment the defendant seeks relief here by writ of error.

At the trial the court gave the following charge, which was duly excepted to by the defendant electric company and is assigned as error: 'If you find for the plaintiff it is your duty, in assessing the damages, to award plaintiff such sum as you find from the evidence the deceased, Reuben Bowden, would have accumulated during his natural life, taking into account his age, habits, health, mental and physical capacity and ability, his probable life expectancy, his probable net earnings, after he would have reached the age of 21 years; the sum total of all these elements to be reduced to a money value and its present worth be given as damages.'

Counsel for the plaintiff in error state in their brief that the question presented on this writ of error is: 'What is the measure of damages under the statutes of this state in a suit by an administrator to recover damages for the death of his intestate?' And in arguing that the charge above quoted is erroneous it is asserted in the brief that, 'if the charge states correctly the measure of damages in a suit of this character, this judgment should be affirmed.'

It is contended that the charge is erroneous because, under the peculiar provisions of the statute of this state, the recovery by an administrator for the death of his decedent by the wrongful act of another should be limited to the debts of the decedent at the time of his death, funeral expenses, and costs of taking out letters of administration by the administrator.

The right of the administrator of the deceased minor to maintain this action has been adjudicated in Bowden v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 51 Fla. 152, 41 So. 400; and such adjudication is the law of this case on that point. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Jones, 50 Fla. 225, 39 South 485; Hoodless v. Jernigan, 51 Fla. 211, 41 So. 194.

The matters to be determined on this writ of error are the nature, beneficiaries, and value of the right given by the statute to an administrator to recover damages sustained by such administrator in his representative capacity by reason of the death of his decedent by the wrongful act or default of the defendant corporation.

The common law afforded no right of action to any one for damages resulting from the death of a person by the wrongful act or default of another, and statutes giving such rights should not be extended beyond the meaning of the terms used. Yet such statutes are remedial in their nature, and they should, when sufficient for the purpose, be so construed as to afford the remedy clearly designed. See 12 Cyc. 312, and authorities cited; Gottlieb v. North Jersey St. R. Co., 72 N. J. Law, 480, 63 A. 339; Perham v. Portland Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 53 P. 14, 24, 40 L. R. A. 799, 72 Am. St. Rep. 730; Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237; Kearney Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390, 63 N.W. 941; Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352; Stewart v. B. & O. Ry., 168 U.S. 445, 448, 18 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed. 537; Merkle v. Bennington Tp., 58 Mich. 156, 24 N.W. 776, 55 Am. Rep. 666; Bolinger v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 36 Minn. 418, 31 N.W. 856, 1 Am. St. Rep. 680; Haggerty v. Central R. Co., 31 N. J. Law, 349; Soule v. New York & New Haven R. R. Co., 24 Conn. 575.

Every law should be construed with reference to its subject-matter and the purpose designed to be accomplished by it, and with reference to other laws in pari materia, though they contain no reference either to the other. Morrison v. McKinnon, 12 Fla. 552; Heirs of Bryan v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, text 453; State v. Commissioners of Volusia County, 28 Fla. 793, 10 So. 14; Ferrari v. Board of Health of Escambia County, 24 Fla. 390, 5 So. 1; Spencer v. McBride, 14 Fla. 403.

The statute provides that whenever the death of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default of another person, or a corporation, or its agent, and the act, negligence, carelessness, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action for damages in respect thereof, then the person or corporation that would have been liable in damages, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, though the act be a felony. Every such action shall be brought in the name of the widow or husband, and if there be no widow or husband then in the name of the minor child or children of the deceased, and if there be neither widow or husband nor minor children then in the name of any person or persons dependent on the person killed for a support; and where there are none of these classes 'then the action may be maintained by the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of the person so killed, and in every such action the jury shall give such damages as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the party killed.' Sections 2342, 2343, Rev. St. 1892; sections 3145, 3146, Gen. St. 1906.

Where a person is killed by the wrongful act or default of an agent of a corporation while acting as such agent, and the person killed could have maintained an action against the corporation for damages resulting from such wrongful act or default, if death had not ensued, the statute imposes upon the corporation a liability for the death. If the person so killed leaves no widow or husband, or minor children or dependent, the administrator of such person may, under the statute, maintain an action for such damages as the administrator as such may have sustained by reason of the death of the decedent.

The widow or husband or minor children or dependents, as mentioned by the statute, do not represent the decedent, or the estate of the decedent, as to rights of faction of this character; and the right of action given to the widow or husband, minor children, or dependents is not a survival of the decedent's right of action to recover for the personal injury, nor is it an asset of the decedent's estate; but it is a primary individual asset or right of action and of recovery, belonging to the party to whom it is given, to recover for individual uses the damages such party may have sustained by reason of the death of the decedent.

The evident purpose of the statute is to make the right of recovery it gives in the name of and for the benefit of the widow or husband, minor children, and dependents no part of the assets of the decedent's estate. Unless...