Jackway v. Woods

• Decision Date: 26 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-cv-11491
• Parties: RALPH JACKWAY, #252862, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

RALPH JACKWAY, #252862, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-11491

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

January 26, 2016

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING AND DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner, Ralph Jackway, confined at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Lapeer County Circuit Court of second-degree home invasion, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(3); and unlawfully driving away an automobile (U.D.A.A.), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.413. Petitioner was sentenced as a fourth-felony habitual offender under Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12 to nine to thirty years in prison on the second-degree home invasion charge and nine to fifteen years in prison on the U.D.A.A. conviction. Petitioner contends: (1) that his speedy trial rights were violated when he was not brought to trial within 180 days of the prosecutor receiving notice that he was incarcerated on another offense; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to convict; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective; (4) that Petitioner was forced to go to trial in jail clothing and while wearing other visible restraints; (5) that the prosecution witness committed perjury; (6) and that habeas relief should be granted because Petitioner is innocent. The respondent has filed an answer to the petition, asserting that the claims lack merit. Petitioner's claims are indeed without merit, therefore the petition will be denied.

I.

The facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). They are recited here verbatim.

This case arises out of the break-in of Mark and Mary Becker's home and the theft of Herbert Cornette's pickup truck. The truck was found stuck in a snow bank near the Beckers' home, and police later found defendant in possession of the Beckers' jewelry and camcorder.

. . .

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. Christine Roberts, defendant's then girlfriend, testified that defendant admitted to her that he broke into a home and stole property. She also saw him possess this property. Police officers found some of the stolen property in defendant's home. And defendant admitted at trial that he possessed the stolen property. He also admitted to Roberts that he had Cornette's truck and footprints in the snow led from the truck to the Beckers' home.

. . .

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence showing that he took the truck without the owner's permission because Cornette did not hold legal title to the truck. However, MCL 257.37(a) provides that an individual who has exclusive use of a motor vehicle for more than 30 days is considered an "owner" of that vehicle. The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, were sufficient for a rational juror to find that Cornette exclusively used the truck for more than 30 days. That is, Cornette's actions of purchasing the truck, installing a new motor in it, keeping it on his property for six months, deciding to sell it after the crime, and then receiving the proceeds of its sale, permitted the jury to reasonably infer that he exclusively used the truck for more than 30 days.

Further, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the other elements of UDAA were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that Cornette never granted defendant permission to use the truck on the night at issue. Roberts testified that defendant admitted to her that he had Cornette's truck. Testimony established that defendant called an acquaintance on the night of the crime and asked for help because he was "stuck." The area where the truck wasfound, and the truck itself, visibly showed that it was stuck. Moreover, the evidence connecting defendant to the home invasion supported that he drove the truck. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to convict defendant of UDAA.

People v. Jackway, No. 313703, 2014 WL 1510120, at * 1-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2014).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal, although the case was remanded to correct Petitioner's sentencing guidelines score. Id., lv. den. 853 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 2014); reconsideration den., 858 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2015).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. The state appellate courts failed to make good faith efforts to consider 180 day rule was violated where prosecutor had been notified of [Jackway's] location about 469 days before trial. (190 days before arraignment.)

II. Truthful evidence was insufficient to convict [Jackway] on home invasion and UDAA charges, requiring dismissal of conviction(s) for constitutional violations.

III. [Jackway was] denied effective assistance of counsel during the preliminary process and trial proceedings.

IV. Miscarriage of justice and actual innocence of [Jackway] relies firmly on enclosed motion and brief for new trial, dated 10-21-12.

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), governs all habeas applications filed after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). In this case, Jackway's habeas application was filed in April 2015; therefore, his petition is governed by AEDPA.

AEDPA created new standards for review of state court decisions under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Paragraph (d), as amended, reads as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d).

Under §2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus under two different clauses, both of which provide the basis for relief: (1) the "contrary to" clause or (2) the "unreasonable application" clause. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant habeas relief in two different ways. First, if the state court arrives at a conclusion that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. Id. Second, if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Id. As the Supreme Court explains, the words "contrary to" should be construed to mean "diametrically different, opposite in character, or mutually opposed." Id. at 405. Accordingly, "the state court's decision must be substantially different from . . . [relevant Supreme Court precedent]." Id.

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the "unreasonable application" clause in two different ways as well. First, "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Id. at 413. Second, if the state court decision either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2005). The proper inquiry for the "unreasonable application" analysis is whether the state court's decision was "objectively unreasonable" and not simply erroneous or incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11. The Supreme Court explains that the writ of habeas corpus "is a 'guard againstextreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). Thus, "[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

When analyzing whether a state court's decision is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, a federal court may only look to the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. However, the standard set forth in § 2254(d) "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003). In addition, a court may not look to lower federal court decisions to formulate the relevant rule of law; but, it may look to lower federal courts decisions to assess the reasonableness of the state court's resolution of an issue. Smith v. Stegall, 385 F.3d 993, 998 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, "[u]nder AEDPA, if there is no 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,' that supports a...