Jacob v. Hokanson, 9840

• Decision Date: 19 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 9840,9840
• Citation: 300 N.W.2d 852
• Parties: Frederick H. JACOB and William Jacob, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Adolph K. HOKANSON, Blanche Hokanson, Darrell R. Hokanson and Judy J. Hokanson, Defendants and Appellees. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 852

300 N.W.2d 852

Frederick H. JACOB and William Jacob, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Adolph K. HOKANSON, Blanche Hokanson, Darrell R. Hokanson and Judy J. Hokanson, Defendants and Appellees.

Civ. No. 9840.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 19, 1980.

Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson & Marcil, Fargo, for plaintiffs and appellants; argued by Roger J. Minch, Fargo.

McIntee & Whisenand, Williston, for defendants and appellees; argued by Frederick E. Whisenand, Williston.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Frederick H. Jacob and William Jacob ("the Jacobs"), from the summary judgment of the Williams County District Court, dated June 5, 1980, dismissing with prejudice the Jacobs' action against the defendants, Adolph K. Hokanson, Blanche Hokanson, Darrell R. Hokanson, and Judy J. Hokanson ("the Hokansons").

Prior to August 19, 1966, Aranda Meincke and Lorraine G. Meyer were joint owners of an undivided one-half interest in and to:

"The Northeast Quarter (NE 1/4) of Section Seventeen (17), in Township One Hundred Fifty-eight (158), North of Range Ninety-nine (99), West of the Fifth Principal Meridian, in Williams County, North Dakota." ("the property").

Clara Jacob was the sole owner of the other undivided one-half interest in the property.

On August 19, 1966, the three owners executed a contract with Adolph and Blanche Hokanson under which Adolph and Blanche were given an option to purchase the property. Within the option contract the three owners expressly reserved seventy-five percent of the mineral rights owned by them in the property. The contract also provided that the offer to sell was to remain irrevocable for a period of six months.

On September 11, 1967, Aranda Meincke and Lorraine G. Meyer deeded their undivided one-half interest in the property to Adolph and Blanche Hokanson, and the deed expressly reserved an undivided one-half interest in 75% of the mineral rights in the property.

On October 11, 1966, Clara Jacob died intestate in Minnesota. Ancillary probate proceedings were commenced in North Dakota to dispose of her undivided one-half interest in the property.

The Jacobs, administrators for the Clara Jacob Estate, filed a Petition for Sale of Real Estate, published Notice of Private Sale of Real Estate, and sold the property to Adolph and Blanche Hokanson, who were the highest bidders for the property. The Williams County Court filed an Order Confirming Sale, dated July 14, 1967. The administrators' deed conveying the Clara Jacob estate's one-half undivided interest in the property to Adolph and Blanche Hokanson did not contain an express reservation of any mineral rights in the property, nor did the Petition for Sale, Notice of Private Sale, or Order Confirming Sale contain any mention of a reservation of mineral rights in the property.

On September 20, 1973, Adolph and Blanche Hokanson deeded their interest in the property to their son, Darrell R. Hokanson, and their daughter-in-law, Judy J. Hokanson.

On November 13, 1979, the Jacobs filed an action in the Williams County District Court seeking a reformation of the administrators' deed to include a reservation by the estate of a one-half undivided interest in 75% of the mineral rights in the property. The Jacobs assert that they are entitled to a reformation of the deed on the ground that the parties actually intended that the estate reserve such an interest in the mineral rights and that by a mutual mistake the deed failed to include the reservation of mineral rights. On April 16, 1980, the Jacobs filed an amended complaint to include a request that the Williams County court's Order Confirming Sale be set aside.

On February 14, 1980, the Hokansons made a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the district court to dismiss the Jacobs' action. The motion for summary judgment was granted by the district court on June 5, 1980, and the Jacobs filed a notice of appeal with this court from the summary judgment on July 23, 1980.

On appeal, this court will uphold the district court's grant of a summary judgment only if, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted, it appears that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), NDRCivP; Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 252 N.W.2d 302 (N.D.1977). In the instant case two specific questions have been raised with regard to whether or not the district court erred when it granted a summary judgment dismissing the Jacobs' action:

(1) Whether or not the Jacobs' action is barred by the statute of limitations; and

(2) Whether or not the Jacobs raised a material issue of fact with respect to their request for a reformation of the administrators' deed based upon a theory of mutual mistake.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Jacobs and the Hokansons both assert that Section 30-24-13, NDCC, is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in the instant case; however, they each assert a different provision of that statute as controlling the period of time within which the Jacobs were required to commence their action. ¹ Section 30-24-13, NDCC, provides:

"30-24-13. Action to recover estate or set aside decree When begun Limitation three years Exception Minors. No action for the recovery of any estate sold by an executor or administrator or otherwise disposed of under the provisions of chapter 30-19 can be maintained by any heir or other person claiming under the decedent unless it is commenced within three years next after the sale. An action to aside a decree directing or confirming a sale or otherwise disposing of such property may be instituted and maintained at any time within three years from the discovery of the fraud or other ground upon which the action is based. This provision shall not apply to minors or others under any legal disability to sue at the time when the right of action first accrues, but all such persons may commence an action at any time within three years after the removal of the disability."

The Hokansons assert that the first sentence of Section 30-24-13, NDCC, is applicable in the instant case and that the Jacobs' action is barred because they failed to commence their action within three years from the date of the sale of the property. The Jacobs assert that the second sentence of Section 30-24-13, NDCC, is applicable to the instant case and that their action is not barred because it was commenced within three years from the date that they discovered the mutual mistake upon which they are attempting to set aside the court's Order Confirming Sale in order...