Jacob v. State

• Decision Date: 31 December 1842
• Citation: Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 493 (Tenn. 1842)
• Parties: JACOB v. THE STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

22 Tenn. 493

JACOB

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December, 1842.

Jacob, a slave, was indicted in the circuit court of Davidson county for the murder of his master, R. Bradford. After the organization of the criminal court, the cause was transferred to that court for trial. It was submitted to a jury on the plea of not guilty at the June term, 1842, Maney, judge, presiding.

It appeared that on Tuesday, the 11th day of August, 1840, the slaves of Bradford, deceased, with the defendant, Jacob, were engaged in pulling fodder and that Bradford went into the field and found that Jacob with another boy had been at play and had fallen behind in his work. That Bradford had thereupon reproached Jacob for his idleness, and threatened to whip and sell him. Jacob then told his master that he was as tired of him (Bradford) as he (Bradford) was of him. Bradford then got a switch and attempted to whip Jacob. Jacob snatched the switch out of his hands, broke it up, and ran off. In a day or so Jacob came home. Bradford ordered Jacob to get a rope, informing him that he must be tied and whipped. This Jacob refused to do, and Bradford then ordered him to go off until he was willing to be tied and whipped. On Sunday 16th, in the morning, Jacob came home. Bradford asked him if he was willing to be tied and whipped. He replied that he was not. He (Bradford) then told him to go to the smoke-house and take out as much provision as would do him until he was willing to be tied and whipped, and clear out; he did not wish him to be pillaging his neighbors. Jacob then left the plantation of his master. On the same evening Bradford went to the house of his brother, Frederick Bradford, and requested him to come over in the morning and help him to tie and whip Jacob. Jacob was not in the habit of carrying deadly weapons of any description, but had prepared a large butcher-knife, and ground it, and concealed it under his clothes. On Monday morning Jacob passed by Frederick Bradford's, on his way home. F. Bradford started after him in a short time. On his way he borrowed a stick of one of his negroes about the size of a common walking stick. On his arrival at the house of his brother he asked him where Jacob was. His brother told him he was down at the barn where the negroes were working, loading a wagon. Frederick Bradford then told Robert Bradford to get his gun to prevent Jacob from running. Robert replied that his gun was not loaded. Frederick insisted that he should get it, saying that Jacob would think it was loaded, which would answer as good a purpose as if it were loaded. Robert concluded, however, not to get it, and did not get it. Frederick Bradford was sitting on his horse, with both legs on one side, about one hundred and fifty yards from the barn. He called Jacob, telling him to come to him. Jacob came up, but halted when he got within about fifteen paces of him. He then told him to come up closer, pointing to a place with the stick which he held in his hand. Jacob was up closer. Frederick Bradford asked Robert what he was going to do. Robert said “I am going to whip him,” and at the same moment of time seized him. Jacob attempted to make his escape. Frederick Bradford came to the assistance of Robert, and seized Jacob by the collar of his coat; Jacob with both his hands endeavored to disengage himself. Frederick then said, “You must not fool with me or I'll strike you.” Jacob then replied, “Beat me then, and kill me if you please.” Frederick thereupon struck him two blows on the head with the stick which he had. He did not knock him down or draw blood. The two Bradfords threw Jacob, and Jacob turning his face down rose with them on his back. Jacob was thrown again on his back. He had, however, succeeded in getting possession of F. Bradford's stick. They threw Jacob again on his face, and Jacob got up with them the second time, and F. Bradford had succeeded in taking the stick away from him. Jacob thereupon drew the knife from his bosom, the lower part of the hand being next to the blade, and, raising it up at arm's length, struck Robert Bradford on the left side, exclaiming, “Damn it, clear the way.”

Robert Bradford fell and died in about five minutes. Jacob made his escape and was arrested in an adjoining State some months afterwards.

The character of the deceased, as proved by his neighbors and by his slaves, was that of an indulgent and kind master.

The judge charged the jury as follows:

“Murder at common law, as described by Lord Coke, is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the peace of the State, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. There must be a killing; the killing must be unlawful, that is, without warrant or excuse, and with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Malice is not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as an evil design in general, the dictate of wicked, depraved and malignant heart. Express malice is, where one with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design, kills another; which formed design is evidenced by external circumstances, such as discover that inward intention, as by lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, or concerted schemes to do bodily harm. Also, if upon a sudden provocation, one beats another, in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did not intend his death. Implied malice is found in a variety of cases, as when one suddenly kills another without any, or without a considerable provocation. So if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man. So the killing of an officer of justice, in the discharge of his public duty. And it is a general rule that all homicide is malicious, and amounts to murder, unless when justified by the command or permission of law, excused on account of accident or self-preservation, or alleviated into manslaughter by being either the involuntary consequence of some act not strictly lawful, or, if voluntary, occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation. And these circumstances of justification, excuse, and alleviation, it is incumbent upon the prisoner to make out. Now it is a general rule that an act of violence offered by the deceased to the prisoner, immediately before the mortal blow, will at least alleviate the homicide to manslaughter, and it is insisted in this case, on the part of the prisoner, that such violence was offered to him by the deceased as to bring the case within that rule of the common law, and that he is of course entitled to its benefits; and it is not denied, on the part of the State, that said violence was used as would in ordinary cases reduce homicide to manslaughter. But the attorney general insists that this is not one of the ordinary cases; that the prisoner stood in the relation of slave to the deceased, and that the rule does not apply but is taken away by our law from prisoners standing in that relation. This is denied on the part of the prisoner, and it of course brings us directly to the decision of a question which must be of great importance in the cause. In the first place, you will enquire whether in point of fact the relationship of master and slave, or other equivalent relationship did exist between the deceased and the prisoner. This of course is to be decided by the evidence in the cause, and only by the evidence.

If you should be fully satisfied from the evidence, that the prisoner was at the time of the homicide, and before, the slave of the deceased, then the question would present itself, whether the relation of master and slave be such as to deprive the latter of the benefit of this rule of the common law, of which we have been speaking, that personal violence by the deceased will generally reduce homicide to at least the degree of manslaughter. That slavery exists in Tennessee, needs no proof. It is a matter of every-day observation. The Constitution of the State clearly recognizes it, and expressly provides that the general assembly shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owners. It is recognized in various ways by different statutes, passed at different times through a long series of years, from the early legislation of Carolina down to the last session of our own legislature. But what is slavery in Tennessee? Is it absolute dominion over the life and limb of the slave? I think not; the killing of a slave with malice is murder by statute, and would be so at common law. But the legal right of the master in Tennessee can not be less than a legal right to the services of the slave, and his authority over the person of the slave can not be less than that which is necessary to compel the slave to perform those services; a ready obedience to the lawful commands of the master is the duty of the slave; a failure in it justifies the master in the infliction of such reasonable chastisement as may prevent a repetition of the offence.

Slavery is unknown to the common law; the rule of which we have been speaking is inconsistent, as I think, with the relation of master and slave. But the statutes of Tennessee have legalized slavery within her territory; therefore I conclude, that Tennessee has by her Constitution and various statutes repealed the common law, so far as it is inconsistent with slavery, such as exists in Tennessee. If one citizen receive a violent blow from another citzen, and the former immediately kill his assailant, the law, in its tenderness to the frailty of human nature, will not punish the offence as murder, although it may seem that it was not necessary to the preservation of the slayer's life that he should kill the assailant, but it would be manslaughter. So if one citizen should lay hold on another, and attempt to tie him, with the intention of inflicting ignominious punishment, and the other should kill him in that attempt, the...