Jacobs v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 03 March 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:15-cv-02457-YK-GBC
• Parties: ANDREA LAURA JACOBS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

ANDREA LAURA JACOBS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-02457-YK-GBC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 3, 2017

(JUDGE KANE)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE COHN

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

Doc. 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying the application of Plaintiff for supplemental security income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§401-433, 1382-1383 (the "Act"), and Social Security Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§404 et seq., 416 et seq. (the "Regulations").

Plaintiff was developmentally delayed, and began receiving child disability benefits when she was two years old. Doc. 16. By eighth grade, she functioned "commensurate with her chronological age" and her IQ tested in the average range. (Tr. 303, 310). The Bureau of Disability Determination terminated Plaintiff's benefits when it redetermined her eligibility under adult rules after she turned eighteen years old. Doc. 16. The relevant period runs from June 20, 2012 through May 15, 2014, the date of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") decision, when she was twenty years old. Doc. 16.

Plaintiff carried diagnoses of asthma and kidney stones, but received no treatment for asthma or kidney stones and made no complaints to medical providers about asthma or kidney stones during the relevant period. Doc. 16. The ALJ reasonably found that neither asthma nor kidney stones disabled Plaintiff between June of 2012 and May of 2014. Doc. 16. Plaintiff treated with a psychiatrist for medication management on a declining dose of medications through May of 2013 for attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), obsessive-compulsive disorder ("OCD"), and learning disorder by history. Doc. 16. She reported few symptoms, exhibited normal mental findings, and stopped treating entirely for a year. Doc. 16. She stopped taking Adderall for ADHD at the beginning of the relevant period and denied obsessions and compulsions at every visit. Doc. 16. She reported stable moods, denied anxiety and depression, and indicated that she got along well with friends, family, and her long-term boyfriend. Doc. 16. Her psychiatrist typically assessed a global assessment of functioning ("GAF") of 60, which indicates only mild symptoms or functional impairment, and two expert psychiatrists who reviewed Plaintiff's file indicated that she could perform simple, unskilled work. Doc. 16. Plaintiff reported in support of her claims for benefits that she had severe symptoms and additional diagnoses, like bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, but these reports were contradicted by the diagnoses in her medical records, her reports in the medical records,normal observations on mental status examination, conservative treatment with no hospitalizations throughout and no treatment whatsoever for one year of the relevant period, and the two medical experts who opined she could do light work. Doc. 16. No medical opinion supports Plaintiff's claims. Doc. 16.

The statements Plaintiff made in support of her application for benefits support her claim, but the Regulations do not require the ALJ to accept those statements. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1529. If the ALJ identifies factors that contradict those statements, then the ALJ may reject them. Id. The Regulations allow the ALJ to find that conservative treatment, an absence of complaints in medical records, normal mental status findings and average IQ, and multiple medical expert opinions contradict Plaintiff's statements to the agency and to the Court. Id. Plaintiff had diagnosed medical impairments, but those impairments do not mean she is disabled. See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991) (There is no "presumption that a mere diagnosis...renders an applicant eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act"). Plaintiff bears the burden to produce evidence that demonstrates she is disabled, and the only evidence that she was disabled are statements made to the agency and the Court, which the ALJ properly discounted. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i). Plaintiff failed to produce credible evidence of disability.

The Court is not unsympathetic. Plaintiff suffers from medical conditions which limit her and make it more difficult for her to find a job. Townsend v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 325 F. Supp. 982, 986 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (despite "sympathy for claimants whohave worked as laborers for many years and who have physical ailments which cause them discomfort," claimants bear the "burden, however, of proving their entitlement to benefits under the Act"). However, the Act does not award disability benefits to individuals who cannot get hired for a job. Reed v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-2072, 2009 WL 1106576, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-CV-2072, 2009 WL 1106577 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2009) ("one can sympathize with Plaintiff's difficulties with finding a job," but if "jobs exist which a claimant could perform, he will not be entitled to disability benefits") (internal citations omitted); Fields v. Celebrezze, 218 F. Supp. 334, 337 (E.D. Ky. 1963) ("impairments and injuries of great severity have been held insufficient to establish entitlement to the benefits of the Act. The definition of disability for the present purpose is a narrow one and this court is constantly mindful of its obligation to apply the statute as it is drawn, not according as its natural sympathies may lie"). The Act only awards benefits to individuals who cannot perform a job, even the easiest, least demanding job in the economy. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). There may not be any job openings in the easiest, least demanding position, but that is an issue for unemployment programs, not disability. Schmiedigen v. Celebrezze, 245 F. Supp. 825, 827 (D.D.C 1965) (Social Security benefits "are not gratuities or matters of grace; they are not public assistance; they are not welfare payments"); Evans v. Celebrezze, 237 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (E.D. Ky. 1965) ("Despite our natural sympathy for the plight of the plaintiff, we have no power or authority to awardunemployment compensation under the guise of disability insurance under the provisions of the Social Security Act here involved"); Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Although we sympathize with individuals like Flaten who earnestly believe that their disability prevented their return to work, we cannot disregard the Social Security Act's eligibility requirements"). Unless Plaintiff's medical conditions would make her incapable of performing the easiest, least demanding job in the economy, if she was offered the job, she is not entitled to benefits.

More specifically, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits. See Reed v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) ("As is not infrequently the case, an appeal of a Social Security case in which the district court has upheld the Secretary's denial of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits wends its way to us heavily laden with sympathetic considerations in favor of the Social Security petitioner. Fortunately or unfortunately, it is not our function to decide appeals as we would have preferred to see them decided if we had been the finder of fact. The fact-finder is the Secretary; if substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the Secretary, the decision should be affirmed") (internal citation omitted); Bowman v. Heckler, 706 F.2d 564, 566-67 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Like many of the social security disability benefit cases that come before us, Ms. Bowman's case evokes our sympathy... But our role in reviewing disability determinations by the Secretary is circumscribed by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981)...While we need not be hard hearted, wemust be cool tempered: if the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive") (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is a low standard. Id. Even if the Court would have decided differently, the Court must uphold the decision unless it was so unreasonable that the Court would direct a verdict in Plaintiff's favor if the issue were before a jury. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the Court would not direct a verdict in Plaintiff's favor if the issue before a jury. Id. The Court recommends that Plaintiff's appeal be denied, the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and the case closed.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits in 1996, when she was two years old. (Tr. 61-68). Her benefits were redetermined under adult rules in June of 2012, and a new application was consolidated with the redetermination. (Tr. 61-68). On June 20, 2012, her benefits ceased. (Tr. 61-68). Plaintiff requested reconsideration, which was denied on June 3, 2013. (Tr. 77-84). Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Tr. 85-87). On November 26, 2013, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff—who was not represented by an attorney—appeared. (Tr. 55-60). The ALJ continued the hearing to January 30, 2014 so that Plaintiff could obtain counsel. (Tr. 55-60, 166). Plaintiff obtained counsel, who was unable to attend the January 30, 2014 hearing, so the hearing was continued. (Tr. 166). On April 2, 2014, the state agency notified Plaintiff of a hearing scheduled for April 22, 2014, and Plaintiff acknowledged receiving the notice on April 14, 2014. (Tr. 53, 167-86). On April 22, 2014, Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing, although counsel was present, and the ALJ obtained testimony from a vocational expert. (Tr. 47-52). The ALJ issued a Notice to Show Cause for Failure to Appear, and Plaintiff responded on April 24, 2014 indicating that her mother had...