Jacobs v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17380.,17380.
• Citation: 275 Conn. 395,880 A.2d 151
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephen M. JACOBS v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.

880 A.2d 151

275 Conn. 395

Stephen M. JACOBS v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.

No. 17380.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 17, 2005.

Decided September 13, 2005.

Jacques J. Parenteau, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Todd D. Steigman, legal intern, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard Voight, with whom was Robert J. Gallo, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and MACK, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

This appeal arises out of an employment discrimination action brought by the plaintiff, Stephen M. Jacobs, against the defendant, General Electric Company, alleging age discrimination in a decision to lay off the plaintiff as part of a reduction in the defendant's workforce. The dispositive issues in this appeal are whether the trial court properly charged the jury regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to discrimination, and whether the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony regarding the reason for the plaintiff's termination. We agree with the plaintiff that the trial court's instruction to the jury was improper and that the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony regarding the reasons for the plaintiff's termination, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In July, 1996, six months before his fiftieth birthday, the plaintiff commenced employment at the defendant's Bridgeport plant as manager of fabrication and sourcing. The plaintiff did not hold an engineering degree, which was one of the minimum qualifications for the position, but he did have significant relevant employment experience in the plastics industry. The plaintiff received favorable performance evaluations in February, 1997, June, 1999, and July, 2000. As part of each evaluation, however, the plaintiff was told that he needed to develop greater knowledge of materials management at the Bridgeport facility.

The plaintiff continued to work for the defendant until March, 2001, at which point the defendant laid off the plaintiff as part of a reduction in the defendant's workforce. At the time of his layoff, the plaintiff was fifty-four years of age. Following the plaintiff's layoff, the defendant continued to employ four salaried, manufacturing-related employees in positions similar to the one that the plaintiff had held. All of the four remaining employees had degrees in either mechanical or electrical engineering, which the plaintiff did not possess. Following the plaintiff's layoff, three of the remaining four manufacturing-related employees assumed the responsibilities of the plaintiff's former position. Two of those three employees were younger than the plaintiff, and one of those two employees held less job seniority than the plaintiff.

The jury reasonably could have believed the testimony of Edward Belanger, the defendant's manager of human resources, and Brian Hill, the defendant's manager of manufacturing and acting plant manager, regarding the defendant's reason for laying off the plaintiff. Both managers testified that their decision to include the plaintiff in a workforce reduction was based on the plaintiff's lack of relevant experience and skills, which made him the most expendable member of the defendant's manufacturing operation. Belanger further testified that the defendant's decision to lay off the plaintiff was made easier by the fact that the plaintiff had stated his intention to leave employment with the defendant and take a different job. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Following the plaintiff's layoff, he filed a complaint with the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), alleging age discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60, a provision of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. See General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff subsequently received a release of jurisdiction from the commission,¹ after which he filed this complaint in the trial court. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we thereafter transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the plaintiff makes three claims. First, he contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that, in order to prevail, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant's explanation for laying off the plaintiff was false and that age was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision. The plaintiff further claims that the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony regarding the defendant's reason for laying off the plaintiff from individuals who were not involved in the layoff decision, in violation of § 7-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.² The plaintiff's final claim is that the trial court improperly permitted the defendant to disclose that a witness' recollection was refreshed outside the presence of the jury with the use of a certain tape recording that the plaintiff had surreptitiously made of his conversation with the witness.³ We agree with the plaintiff's first two claims and need not reach the final claim.

I JURY CHARGE

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court's charge to the jury improperly instructed that, in order to prevail in his case, the plaintiff was required to prove both that the defendant's proffered reason for the layoff was false and that the plaintiff's age was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision. More specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court misled the jury by instructing it, contrary to prevailing authority, that in order to establish discrimination, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant's stated reason for the layoff was pretextual. The plaintiff further contends that the trial court improperly failed to separate pretext as a method of proof from the alternative of proving by direct evidence that the defendant had a discriminatory motive for the layoff, and in doing so, the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving both in order to prevail in his case.

The defendant counters that the trial court's instruction to the jury, when taken as a whole, properly focused the jury's attention on the ultimate question in the case, that is, whether age was a motivating factor in the defendant's layoff decision. The defendant further claims that the jury instruction must be considered together with the verdict form provided to the jury, and that, when the two are considered together, the trial court properly instructed the jury that, even if the jury determined that the defendant's stated reason for the layoff were true, but that the defendant was in part motivated by age discrimination, the jury could decide in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant also claims that the jury had ample evidence before it to justify its verdict in favor of the defendant, and accordingly, the jury instruction did not affect the jury's verdict. We agree with the plaintiff.

"Our analysis begins with a well established standard of review. When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction. . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ancheff v. Hartford Hospital, 260 Conn. 785, 811, 799 A.2d 1067 (2002).

The framework for the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion in an employment discrimination case is well established. "[McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)] and subsequent decisions have established an allocation of the burden of production and an order of presentation of proof . . . in discriminatory-treatment cases. . . . First, the [complainant] must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that: (1) he is in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. . . . Once the complainant establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action. . . . This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 505-506, 832 A.2d 660 (2003).

After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and the defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, "[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. [The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the [defendant's] proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination. [The plaintiff] may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the...