Jacobs v. Hobson
| Decision Date | 11 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | 33866,33867. |
| Citation | 148 Kan. 107,79 P.2d 861 |
| Parties | JACOBS v. HOBSON et al. (two cases). |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where petitions charged that motorist was negligent in driving on wrong side of road, jury's answer to special question that motorist was negligent because he did not stop and wait behind truck until other automobile had passed was within negligence alleged.
The Supreme Court is obliged to consider all findings together with a view of harmonizing them with each other and with the general verdict, where that is reasonably possible.
Jury's special finding that motorist was negligent because he did not wait behind truck until automobile approaching from opposite direction had passed was not necessarily inconsistent with special findings which showed that motorist's automobile was on wrong side of road at time of collision.
To render owner of automobile operated by a minor under 16 years of age liable for damages for collision it is insufficient to show that owner caused or knowingly permitted minor to operate the automobile on the highways, but it must also appear that damages were caused by minor's negligent operation of the automobile. Gen.St. 1935, 8-222.
An instruction that it is negligence per se for the owner of a motor vehicle to permit a minor under the age of 16 years to drive that vehicle on a highway, though technically erroneous, was not ground for reversal, where other instructions stated the law in conformity with the statute and advised jury that owners of automobiles would be liable only, unless negligence of minor was proximate cause of injury. Gen.St. 1935, 8-222.
Technical errors which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the parties are not grounds for reversal. Gen.St.1935, 60-3317.
In action against owners of automobile, who permitted minor under the age of 16 years to drive the automobile at time of collision, for injuries sustained in collision, admission of evidence relating to conversation between plaintiff and one of the owners of the automobile, to the effect that the minor had no license, did not affect the substantial rights of the defendants, where minor had previously testified, without objection, that he was 14 at time of collision and had no driver's license. Gen.St.1935, 8-222.
In action against owners of automobile, who had permitted minor under the age of 16 years who had no driver's license to drive automobile at time of collision, court's refusal to give requested instruction that failure of minor to have driver's license was immaterial, and that jury should not discuss or permit that fact to enter into their deliberations, was not reversible error, where want of license was not pleaded or relied on as constituting negligence.
1. In order to render the owner of an automobile, operated by a minor under sixteen years of age, liable for damages caused in an automobile collision, it is not enough to show the owner caused or knowingly permitted such minor to operate the automobile upon the highways, but it must appear the damages were caused by the minor's negligent operation thereof. G.S. 1935, 8-222.
2. Technical errors which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of parties are not grounds for reversal. G.S.1935, 60-3317.
3. The record in an action for damages resulting from an automobile collision examined and held: (1) the special findings when considered together, as they must be, were not necessarily inconsistent with each other; (2) the material special findings were consistent with each other and the general verdict; (3) the material special findings disclosed the existence of negligence pleaded which constituted the proximate cause of the collision; (4) while an instruction involving G.S. 1935, 8-222, did not constitute an accurate interpretation of the effect of that law on the owners of an automobile, it did not constitute such error as will require a reversal of the judgment; (5) in view of the instructions given and other circumstances narrated in the opinion, the refusal of the trial court to strike certain testimony concerning the want of the minor's license to operate the automobile, and the refusal to give a special instruction concerning the want of the minor's license, did not constitute reversible error.
Appeal from District Court, Kingman County; Geo. L. Hay, Judge.
Actions by Mrs. A. R. Jacobs and by A. R. Jacobs against Lawrence Hobson and another to recover damages resulting from an automobile collision. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.
Clark A. Wallace and Paul R. Wunsch, both of Kingman, for appellants.
Wm Barrett, George Barrett, and Robert G. Miller, all of Pratt for appellees.
Separate actions were brought by a husband and his wife to recover damages resulting from an automobile collision. Plaintiffs recovered judgments against each of three defendants, and they have appealed. The actions were consolidated before trial and are so presented on appeal. The petitions were identical except as to personal injuries sustained by the wife and as to damages to the husband's car and expenses which he incurred for his wife's medical attention.
The defendant, Lawrence Hobson, the driver of the car, was a minor fourteen years of age. The defendants, Millard E Hobson, the minor's father, and N. E. Hobson, the minor's grandfather, were partners in the automobile business and had either furnished or knowingly permitted the boy to drive the car.
The accident occurred at about nine o'clock p. m. one mile west of Kingman, Kansas, on U.S. Highway No. 54, and on a strip of dirt road which had been left unpaved and was being prepared for a hard surface. Plaintiffs were traveling west and defendants' car was traveling east. The accident occurred approximately six inches north of the center of the traveled portion of the highway. Defendants' car had passed a truck which was on the south side of the center of the highway. In addition to the general verdicts the jury made the following special findings:
Defendants first urge that finding No. 6 absolves them of all negligence other than that specifically found therein and requires judgment in their favor. The contention is grounded on the theory, first, that this finding does not pertain to any act of negligence pleaded, and second, that under plaintiffs' own evidence such finding could not have been the proximate cause of the injury for the reason that plaintiffs' evidence disclosed defendants' car had gotten back to the right or south side of the center of the highway after passing the truck and prior to the collision.
Touching first the contention as to negligence pleaded we find the petition charged three specific acts of negligence, towit, excessive speed, lack of control and driving on the wrong side of the road. True, the petition did not charge the negligence consisted in the failure "to stop and wait behind the truck until the plaintiff had passed the said defendant", which is a part of finding No. 6. It did, however, charge the operator of the car with negligence in driving on the wrong side of the road. We can therefore not say finding No. 6 was unrelated to the negligence charged. For an opinion involving a somewhat similar pleading and finding, see, Moorhouse v. Robbins, 145 Kan. 157, 159, 64 P.2d 5.
Defendants however, insist the act of passing around the truck did not constitute the proximate cause of the collision as their car had gotten back to its proper or south side of the highway before the collision occurred. That their car did return to the proper side of the road in ample time to avoid a collision while passing the truck is true. It is also true, however, that after the car had returned to the south side of the road it took a northeasterly direction...
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Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co.
...For decisions supporting the conclusions just announced see Moorhouse v. Robbins, 145 Kan. 157, 159, 64 P.2d 5, and Jacobs v. Hobson, 148 Kan. 107, 109, 79 P.2d 861. Appellant's second question is based on the premise that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that an award......
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...K. Eby Construction Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350, 350 P.2d 18, 22. See, also, Moorhouse v. Robins, 145 Kan. 157, 64 P.2d 5, and Jacobs v. Hobson, 148 Kan. 107, 79 P.2d 861.) The appellant claims error because of misconduct of the jury. It appears that one of the jurors referred to a dictionary wh......
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...affected the substantial rights of parties are not grounds for reversal of a judgment. See G.S.1935, 60-3317; Jacobs v. Hobson, 148 Kan. 107, 79 P.2d 861; Morrison v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 168 Kan. 303, 309, 212 P.2d 633, and the authorities therein We find nothing in the record or in the c......
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