Jacobs v. Jacobs

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MARC W. BROWN, Justice.
• Citation: Jacobs v. Jacobs, 448 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 02 October 2014
• Docket Number: 14–13–00462–CV.,Nos. 14–13–00442–CV,s. 14–13–00442–CV
• Parties: Paul Steven JACOBS, Appellant v. Melissa Ellen Fields JACOBS, Appellee.

448 S.W.3d 626

Paul Steven JACOBS, Appellant

v.Melissa Ellen Fields JACOBS, Appellee.

Nos. 14–13–00442–CV

14–13–00462–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Oct. 2, 2014.

Robert D. Clements Jr., Alvin, Mike Deguerin, Paul S. Jacobs, Houston, for Appellant.

Dennis B. Kelly, Bradley A. Jackson, Houston, Sallee S. Smyth, Richmond, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices CHRISTOPHER, McCALLY, and BROWN.

OPINION

MARC W. BROWN, Justice.

In these consolidated appeals, appellant Paul Steven Jacobs (Paul) challenges the trial court's orders granting final summary judgment to appellee Melissa Ellen Fields Jacobs (Melissa) with regard to garnishment of nonexempt funds and assets within Paul's accounts held by Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC and IberiaBank Corporation, respectively, in her action to enforce a mediated settlement agreement incident to the parties' divorce. Paul also challenges the trial court's orders denying Paul's motions to vacate or dissolve the prejudgment writs of garnishment and orders of issuance of writ of garnishment. Finally, Paul challenges the trial court's denial of his motions to compel arbitration and for a stay. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This court previously discussed background relevant to this appeal in a prior interlocutory appeal brought by Paul, which we briefly discuss and supplement as necessary. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, No. 14–12–00755–CV, 2013 WL 3968462 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Jacobs I ”). In November 2011, Paul and Melissa entered into a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) relating to the division of property upon their divorce. After disputes arose in finalizing the divorce documents, Melissa moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the MSA, which provides:

Arbitration. The parties shall submit all (a) drafting disputes, (b) issues regarding the interpretation (but not enforcement) of this [MSA], and (c) issues regarding the intent of the parties as reflected in this [MSA] to Thomas O. Stansbury as an arbitrator, whose decision shall be binding on the parties, including decisions on the payment of attorneys' fees and arbitration costs incurred as a result of the arbitration.

The trial court so ordered arbitration. After the arbitration, on January 18, 2012, the trial court signed an agreed final decree of divorce, approved by both parties as to both form and substance. Neither party appealed.

When Paul allegedly refused to transfer certain assets within his control to Melissa, Melissa sued Paul in a new action to enforce the property division the parties agreed to in the MSA. The trial court granted injunctive relief to Melissa in temporary orders signed August 1 and 21, 2012. This court affirmed those orders. Id. at *3, *4. In doing so, we concluded that because the claims Melissa asserts in her enforcement action are expressly excluded from the scope of the MSA's arbitration provision, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction or authority to issue those temporary orders, and did not err or abuse its discretion in failing to order arbitration of Melissa's claims. Id. at *3.

The trial court moved forward with Melissa's enforcement claims while Paul's interlocutory appeal was pending. On November 13, 2012,¹ Melissa filed applications for prejudgment writs of garnishment against Paul's nonexempt funds and assets held by garnishees Morgan Stanley and IberiaBank, respectively. Prejudgment writs of garnishment were issued that same day.

Both Morgan Stanley and IberiaBank were served with the garnishment proceedings and filed answers. Melissa unsuccessfully attempted personal service of the garnishment proceedings upon Paul at both his business and residential addresses. Melissa simultaneously pursued service upon Paul by certified mail. See Tex. Rs. Civ. P. 21a, 663a. These mailings were returned unsigned, and marked “unclaimed” and “refused.”² Paul did not answer. On March 7, 2013, Melissa filed motions for final summary judgment on her prejudgment garnishment claims. On April 8, 2013, two days before a hearing on Melissa's motions, Paul filed motions to vacate or dissolve the prejudgment writs of garnishment and orders of issuance of writ of garnishment.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on both Melissa's and Paul's motions on April 10, 2013. That same day, the trial court signed orders denying Paul's motions to vacate or dissolve and granting Melissa's motions for final summary judgment in each of the garnishment proceedings. This court granted Paul's motions extending time to file his notices of appeal, and ordered his appeals consolidated.

Paul, representing himself, argues four issues in this appeal: (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction, or abused its authority or discretion, in issuing its April 10, 2013 final summary judgments; (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction, or abused its authority or discretion, in issuing its April 10, 2013 orders denying Paul's motions to vacate or dissolve; (3) this court must review de novo the trial court's denial of Paul's motion to compel arbitration; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Paul's motion to stay.

II. Analysis

A. Law of the case

To begin, Melissa argues the law of the case as established by this court in Jacobs I mandates that all of Paul's issues be overruled. We conclude that the law of the case precludes Paul from challenging this court's earlier holdings.

The “law of the case” doctrine is defined as that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986) ; City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). The doctrine is based on public policy and is intended to achieve uniformity of decision, as well as judicial economy and efficiency. Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630. The doctrine, which is aimed at putting an end to litigation, applies to questions of law but not fact. Id. “Application of this doctrine is flexible and must be left to the discretion of the court and determined according to the particular circumstances of the case.” Precast Structures, 60 S.W.3d at 337. The doctrine does not necessarily apply where the issues or facts presented on successive appeal have substantially changed. See Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630.

Melissa contends that this court's prior decision³ governs any jurisdictional and arbitration-related questions in this appeal. We agree. We previously determined that Melissa's claims and factual assertions were made for the purpose of enforcing terms of the MSA. Jacobs I, 2013 WL 3968462, at *2. We interpreted the arbitration provision in the MSA, compared it to Melissa's affirmative pleading, and concluded that her asserted claims were expressly excluded. Id. at *2–3. We have already answered these legal questions—whether the parties' agreement imposed a duty to arbitrate their particular dispute⁴ and whether the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over Melissa's claims⁵ —against Paul. Paul asserts virtually the same arguments in this current appeal.

That Melissa continues to seek enforcement and collect on the final breach of contract judgment through the underlying garnishment proceedings does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction. See Henry v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 879 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (garnishment is “separate suit brought to enforce the judgment”); Baca v. Hoover, Bax & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (ancillary garnishment suit “takes its jurisdiction from the main suit”).

We conclude that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction or authority to enter its final summary judgments or its orders denying Paul's motions to vacate or dissolve in the garnishment proceedings. Nor, to the extent at issue,⁶ did the court err or abuse its discretion in failing to order arbitration and stay Melissa's claims.

We overrule Paul's first, second, third, and fourth issues.

B. Proper service under rules 663a and 21a

Next, although not expressly identified as an issue, Paul challenges the trial court's rulings on the basis that, as he asserted below in his motions to vacate or dissolve, he was not “properly served or noticed” with the garnishment writs.⁷ In response to Paul's motions to vacate or dissolve, Melissa asserted, and presented evidence in support of, proper service through Paul's constructive notice.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dissolve a writ of garnishment for abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. ICO, Inc., 230 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985). An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character supports the trial court's decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex.2002). Where, as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed, we proceed to determine whether some evidence supports the trial court's implied findings of fact as to Melissa's compliance with the service rules. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990) (per curiam). We will affirm the judgment if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Id.

A garnishment application “shall comply with all statutory requirements and shall state the grounds for issuing the writ and the specific facts relied upon by the plaintiff to warrant the required findings by the court.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 658. For the prejudgment garnishment at issue here, the statutory requirements are that the plaintiff sues for a debt and provides an affidavit stating the...