Jacobs v. United States
| Decision Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No. 15-3661 (RMB) |
| Parties | BRYAN JACOBS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION (REDACTED)
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Bryan Jacobs' ("Jacobs") Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. ("2255 Mot.," ECF No. 1.) Jacobs alleged six grounds for relief from his conviction and sentence. The Government filed an opposition brief. (Brief of the United States in Opposition to Bryan Jacobs' Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, "Gov't Brief", ECF No. 19.) Jacobs filed a reply. (Response of Bryan Jacobs to the United States Brief In Opposition to Bryan Jacobs' Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ("Reply Brief," ECF No. 32.) For the reasons discussed below, the § 2255 motion is denied.
On April 24, 2013, Jacobs was charged in a ten-count Superseding Indictment with the following: (a) five counts of sexual exploitation of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); (b) four counts of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1); and (c) one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). United States v. Jacobs, 10cr801(RMB) (D.N.J.) (Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 41.) After jury selection began, Jacobs pled guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Id. (Minute Entry, ECF Nos. 74, 75; Plea Agreement, ECF No. 76.) In exchange for his plea, the United States dismissed nine additional charges including: five counts of manufacturing child pornography, three counts of receipt of child pornography, and one count of possession. Id. (Plea Agreement, ECF No. 76.)
Jacobs' plea came about in the following manner. During trial preparation in September 2013, the Government requested that the Court conduct an inquiry under Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), to ensure that Jacobs' counsel had fully informed him of the many plea offers. Id. () Jacobs responded that he had always been willing and remained willing to accept the plea offer of October 12, 2011. United States v. Jacobs,10cr801(RMB) (D.N.J.) (Def. Opp. to Govt's Motions in Limine, ECF No. 66 at 8.)
The factual stipulations included in the October 12, 2011 Plea Agreement were included verbatim in the October 1, 2013 Plea Agreement. (Gov't Brief Exhibits, October 12, 2011 Plea Agreement, ECF No. 28-3; October 1, 2013 Plea Agreement, ECF No. 28-4.)
The Probation Department prepared a Presentence Report ("PSR") and determined Jacobs had an offense level of 41, and criminal history category of I, with an advisory guidelines range of 324 to 405 months imprisonment, capped at a statutory maximum of 240 months. (Gov't Brief, ECF No. 19 at 10.) At first, Jacobs objected to five upward sentencing adjustments, including three he stipulated to in the Plea Agreement. (Id. at 11.) In his sentencing memorandum, however, Jacobs withdrew all but two factual objections to the PSR and stated he had no legal objections. (Id.)
The sentencing hearing was held on May 28, 2014, and the Court adopted the PSR and found a Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months, subject to a 240-month statutory maximum. United States v. Jacobs, 10cr801(RMB) (D.N.J.) (Sentencing Tr., ECF Nos. 91, 92.) Jacobs requested a downward variance and the Government requested the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months. (Id.)
This Court considered the factors under U.S.C. § 3553(a) and declined to grant Jacobs a variance. (Id.) The Court imposed a Guidelines range sentence of a 240-month period of imprisonment inlight of the very serious nature of the offense and immeasurable emotional trauma imposed on the victims, with a fifteen-year term of supervised release. United States v. Jacobs, 10cr801(RMB) (D.N.J.) (Sentencing Tr., ECF No. 92 at 180-198.) After a hearing on August 7, 2014, the Court also imposed restitution of $75,000. Id. (Opinion and Order, ECF Nos. 99, 100.)
On appeal, Jacobs argued that his sentence and the amount of restitution were unreasonable. U.S. v. Jacobs, 609 F. App'x 83, 85 (3d Cir. 2015). Jacobs contended the Court made two procedural sentencing errors: (1) miscalculating the Guidelines range by including inapplicable enhancements; and (2) failing to consider his arguments in favor of a lesser sentence under the § 3553(a) factors. (Id. at 85-86.) The Third Circuit held that Jacobs waived his Guidelines calculation challenges to the following: (1) a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2), for images involving a prepubescent minor or a minor less than 12 years old; (2) a six-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(D), for distributing images to a minor to induce the minor to engage in illegal activity; and (3) a four-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4), for images that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct. Id. at 86. Although Jacobs initially objected to the enhancements in the PSR, he dropped the objections in his sentencing memorandum. Id.
The Third Circuit explained:
Jacobs suggests that he did not pursue these objections because the United States "threat[ened]" that Jacobs would lose credit for acceptance of responsibility and that the United States might withdraw from the plea agreement. Appellant's Br. at 37. With respect to the enhancements Jacobs now argues were incorrect, the United States only made this "threat" with respect to Jacobs's objection to the § 2G2.2(b)(3)(D) enhancement. Presentence Report at 40-41. The United States's "threat" was that Jacobs had stipulated that this enhancement would apply in the plea agreement; objecting to the enhancement could be construed as breaching the plea agreement, allowing the United States to withdraw from it, or as Jacobs's failure to accept responsibility for the offense. Id. Given that the United States's position is supported by the plea agreement, App. at 97, we see no basis to excuse Jacobs's waiver.
Jacobs, 609 F. App'x at 86, n. 8.
The Third Circuit also held that the District Court, in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, meaningfully considered the arguments Jacobs raised, and Jacobs merely disagreed with the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Jacobs' sentence was substantively reasonable because he accumulated a large library of child pornography, defrauded and extorted minors into creating child pornography of themselves, and his conduct had a serious impact on his victims. Id. at 86-87.
Jacobs presented the following grounds for relief, quoted verbatim, in his § 2255 motion:
A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court judgment and conviction may move the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence, if the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; or if the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or if the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In considering a motion to vacate a defendant's sentence, "the court must accept the truth of the movant's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record." U.S. v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)). "The district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing 'unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the movant is notentitled to relief.'" U.S. v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Booth, 432 F.3d at 545.) For the reasons discussed below, the records of the case conclusively show that Jacobs is not entitled to relief, and the Court will not hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter.
Jacobs raises constitutional claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning "as counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Furthermore, the first prong of the test "requires a defendant to show 'that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). There is "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v.Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). "The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (citing ...
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