Jacobsen v. Osborne

• Citation: 133 F.3d 315
• Decision Date: 15 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-30098,97-30098
• Parties: Michael JACOBSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Police Officer OSBORNE, et al., Defendants, City of New Orleans; Unidentified Party; Charles C. Foti, Jr., Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 315

133 F.3d 315

39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1291

Michael JACOBSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Police Officer OSBORNE, et al., Defendants,

City of New Orleans; Unidentified Party; Charles C. Foti,

Jr., Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-30098.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 15, 1998.

Michael Gerard Riehlmann, Brett John Prendergast, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John F. Weeks, II, T. Allen Usry, Usry & Weeks, Metairie, LA, for Defendants-Applellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before JOLLY, DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Primarily at issue is whether, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3), a proposed amendment to a complaint to add new parties relates back to the date of the original complaint, especially for replacing "John Doe" defendants, thereby defeating a limitations bar as to those putative parties. For his action seeking relief under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Michael Jacobsen appeals the denial of his motion to amend in order to substitute the correct defendants (police officers and sheriff's deputies) for an erroneously named officer and a "John Doe" deputy. We AFFIRM as to the deputies; REVERSE as to the officers; and REMAND.

I.

Jacobsen's original complaint contains the following allegations: on 21 August 1994, in New Orleans, someone accosted Jacobsen's wife and brother; an altercation ensued, resulting in the brother being arrested by New Orleans police; after Jacobsen, who had been present, inquired as to the reason for the arrest, the charges, and the location to which his brother was being taken, Jacobsen was arrested for interfering with a police investigation and was jailed by the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff; Jacobsen was subjected to physical abuse and humiliating treatment until his release the next morning; and, later, the charge of interfering with a police investigation was dismissed.

On 17 August 1995, only four days shy of the first anniversary of the incident, Jacobsen filed this action, pursuant to § 1983 and state law, against New Orleans Police Officer Osborne and Deputy John Doe, an unnamed deputy employed by the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, claiming that he was falsely arrested and abused by Officer Osborne and sheriff's deputies. Jacobsen also asserted state law claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the City of New Orleans and the Sheriff, based on respondeat superior.

Service of the complaint was not completed until early October 1995. The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before a magistrate judge, with trial scheduled for September 1996.

The Sheriff answered the complaint in late October 1995; Officer Osborne and the City, early that December. On 30 August 1996, the City and the Officer moved to dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), contending that the Officer was not the arresting officer and, alternatively, that he was entitled to qualified immunity; and that liability against the City was incorrectly premised only upon its being the Officer's employer.

Shortly thereafter, on 3 September, the Sheriff moved to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). That same day, Jacobsen moved to continue trial (set for later that month), asserting that he had discovered new information, requiring an amended complaint. The magistrate judge granted the continuance but did not assign a new trial date.

Two weeks later, on 18 September, over two years after the incident and nearly five months after the court-ordered deadline for amended pleadings, Jacobsen moved to amend to add as defendants the correct officers and deputies. Apparently, he had obtained Officer Osborne's name as the arresting officer from arrest records and an interrogatory answer by the City. But when deposed on 29 August 1996, the Officer had stated that he was only the transporting, not the arresting, officer. Subsequent investigation identified the arresting officers. As for the deputies, after discovery requests failed to identify those involved in the incident, Jacobsen had deposed the Sheriff's office on 29 August 1996, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6), and had been able to identify three deputies.

Later, trial was reset for January 1997. Officer Osborne's Rule 12(b)(6) motion was denied because it sought dismissal on the merits and involved considerations outside the scope of the pleadings. The City's similar motion was also denied.

Jacobsen's motion to amend was denied as well. Regarding the deputies, the magistrate judge ruled that the amendment was untimely and there was nothing to indicate that their identities could not have been discovered earlier; and that, in any event, the amendment would be futile because the claims were time-barred. With regard to the police officers, the magistrate judge ruled that the amendment would be futile because the claims were time-barred and the amendment would not relate back because the officers had not received notice of the action as required by Rule 15(c)(3).

The magistrate judge reconsidered the ruling as to the officers and allowed Jacobsen to add them as defendants to the state law claims because, under Louisiana law, they had not prescribed and the magistrate judge intended to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over them.

The Sheriff's motion to dismiss was then granted because neither he nor any of his employees had been named in the § 1983 claim. Consequently, there was no viable federal claim against any employee of the Sheriff; and the supplemental state law claims against the Sheriff for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were dismissed to allow Jacobsen to bring them in an appropriate state forum.

In early December 1996, Jacobsen moved for entry of final judgment. The magistrate judge noted that the only remaining federal claim was the apparently unfounded one against Officer Osborne. Thus, he refused to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Concomitantly, Jacobsen's motion to dismiss Officer Osborne without prejudice was granted.

II.

Contending that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by denying the motion to amend, Jacobsen asserts that it was neither untimely nor futile because the claims were not time-barred. (To shore up his timeliness claim, Jacobsen notes that no trial date had been fixed when the motion to amend was filed, and that leave was later granted to add the officers for the state law claims.) In the alternative, he claims that, under Rule 15(c), the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original filing.

The denial of a Rule 15(a) motion to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., Moody v. FMC Corp., 995 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir.1993). Likewise, whether to grant such a motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, e.g, Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir.1987); but, that discretion is limited by Rule 15(a), which states that "leave shall be given when justice so requires". Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir.1994). In sum, the motion should not be denied "unless there is a substantial reason to do so". Id. Toward that end, the district court may consider factors such as whether there has been "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment ". In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir.1996)(emphasis added), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 686, 136 L.Ed.2d 611 (1997).

A.

The magistrate judge ruled, inter alia, that the motion to amend, filed over two years after the incident, was futile because the claims against the officers and deputies had prescribed. Of course, for a § 1983 action, the court looks to the forum state's personal-injury limitations period. E.g., Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994). In Louisiana, that period is one year. Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir.1989).

On the other hand, federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues. Moore, 30 F.3d at 620. In the context of such a claim for wrongful arrest and confinement, it is the plaintiff's knowledge of those two events that triggers the limitations period. Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214, 217-18 n. 6 (5th Cir.1993). Accordingly, Jacobsen's claims accrued at the latest on 22 August 1994; therefore, his proposed amendment, sought over two years after the incident, is futile unless, under Rule 15(c), it relates back to the date of the original filing.

B.

Rule 15(c), as amended in 1991 and 1993, provides:

An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when

(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or

(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or

(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (emphasis added).

Prior to the Rule being amended in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), interpreted it to permit...