Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Service

Decision Date13 March 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-1533,86-1533
Citation812 F.2d 1151
Parties13 Media L. Rep. 2371 Harlan L. JACOBSEN, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Robert A. Hirschfeld, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard S. Allemann, Phoenix, Ariz., and James D. Whitney, Tucson, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before NELSON, KOZINSKI and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Harlan L. Jacobsen (Jacobsen) appeals from the denial of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction by the district court in a suit that Jacobsen has brought against the United States Postal Service and General Services Administration (the administrators), 624 F.Supp. 520 (1986). To succeed, Jacobsen must show likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury if denied the injunction or that he has raised serious questions and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.1980).

Jacobsen is the publisher of two newspapers, Singles and Solo R.F.D., directed at the market of young unmarried persons. According to his affidavit, the administrators in September 1985 removed from the entrance to the Lincoln, Nebraska main post office one of his news racks vending Solo R.F.D., and shortly thereafter removed a similar rack from the sidewalk in front of the main post office. A third rack was seized in Lincoln by the administrators in December 1985. Also in December, the administrators removed another of his racks which had been placed on a ledge in front of the post office building in Fargo, North Dakota. Again, in October 1985, the administrators took one of his racks from its location near the post office in Aberdeen, South Dakota. In Jacobsen's experience his newspapers sell better from locations near the entrance to a post office than in other locations, and his fledgling business suffers irreparable harm if the administrators ban his papers from location on property in front of the entrance to post offices.

The administrators rely upon a federal statute, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 107d-3, enacted in 1974 to strengthen the federal government's assistance to the blind. The statute effects a monopoly for blind vendors at federal property by providing that "vending machine income obtained from the operation of vending machines on Federal property shall accrue (1) to the blind licensee operating a vending facility on such property;" or (2), in the event there is no blind licensee operating such facility on such property, to a state agency for the blind. The statute provides that if there is a "blind vending facility" on the premises, 100 percent of all vending machine income from other machines shall accrue to the blind vendor. If there is no blind vendor, 50 percent of the vending machine income shall accrue to the state agency for the blind.

The administrators are willing to allow Jacobsen's racks on federal property if he complies with the statute--that is, if he turns over all his income from the racks to a blind vendor where there is one on the property, or 50 percent of his income from the racks to a state agency for the blind, where there is no blind vendor on the property. Jacobsen has refused to accept this proposition. He has claimed that there has been discriminatory enforcement of the statute, alleging that the administrators permit newspapers of general circulation such as the Minneapolis Star-Tribune to be on federal property without paying anything to the blind, but apply the statute to him because of dislike for his papers. Jacobsen also raises a more general First Amendment contention that the statute as applied to any newspaper is an unconstitutional invasion of freedom of the press. Finally in Count IV of his complaint, he makes the very general claim that the administrators are relying on statutes which "on their face" are "violative of protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution." In his brief, he more specifically presses the claim that what the government is attempting to collect is not a lawful uniform tax, but a royalty extracted for the profit of the blind vendors.

The case is governed by United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). Grace makes three things clear:

1. The government, like a private owner of property, can reserve its property to be used for the purposes for which it meant the property to be used. Id. at 178, 103 S.Ct. at 1707-08.

2. Sidewalks are presumptively a public forum, even though they are owned by the federal government. Where there is no separation, fence or other indication that government sidewalks are being used in some special way in connection with the federal building they abut, the government cannot deprive them of their character of a public forum by the simple expedient of a statutory definition. Id. at 180, 103 S.Ct. at 1708-09.

3. The government may impose, but must justify, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of such sidewalks. Id. at 183-84, 103 S.Ct. at 1710-11.

Here the administrators have two governmental interests to protect--safe, unimpeded access to the post office, see National Anti-Drug Coalition, Inc. v. Bolger, 737 F.2d 717, 724 (7th Cir.1984); and an interest in aiding the blind, whose basis must be located in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, "The Congress shall have power to ... provide for ... the general Welfare of the United States." The blind, partially handicapped and particularly deserving, have long been thought worthy of special federal assistance. Over a century ago, Congress appropriated money to aid the American Printing House for the Blind. 20 Stat. 468 (1879). In 1920, in the wake of World War I, a statute aimed at restoring not merely wounded veterans but disabled persons generally "to civil employment" included the blind within its reach. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735 (1920). In 1936, as part of the massive federal effort to end unemployment, a statute which is the predecessor of the one here in question was passed. It was designed to reach the blind who could not be helped by programs such as the Public Works Administration. House of Representatives, Committee on Labor, H.R.Rep. No. 1094, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936), 2. The new statute authorized the operation on federal property of...

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22 cases
  • Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 88-0142-OG.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 17 avril 1990
    ...vendors all of their income from newsracks on federal property, is consistent with the first amendment. See Jacobsen v. United States Postal Service, 812 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief on behalf of the publishers and remandin......
  • Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno
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    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 8 juin 1998
    ...irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see Jacobsen v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction. 31. The parties agree that the terms "training" and......
  • Dehne v. Avanino
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • 19 septembre 2001
    ...to constitute irreparable harm. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Jacobsen v. United States Postal Service, 812 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.1987). In addition, N.R.S. § 281.525(2) characterizes a violation of N.R.S. § 281.525(1) as a misdemeanor. Not only......
  • Delahunty v. State of Hawaii
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii
    • 30 décembre 1987
    ...or (2) that he has raised serious questions and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Id.; Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir.1987); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 634 F.2d at 1201. Mere allegations, whether contained in plaintiff's complaint or subm......
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