Jacobson & Co., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 232,D,232
• Citation: 548 F.2d 438
• Parties: 1977-1 Trade Cases 61,264 JACOBSON & COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 76-7336.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 438

548 F.2d 438

1977-1 Trade Cases 61,264

JACOBSON & COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 232, Docket 76-7336.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 18, 1976.

Decided Jan. 25, 1977.

Sanford M. Litvack, New York City (James R. Withrow, Jr., John D. Gordan, III, Doris K. Shaw, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

David N. Ellenhorn, New York City (Eugene I. Farber, Moses & Singer, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HAYS, ANDERSON and GURFEIN, Circuit Judges.

HAYS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellee Jacobson & Company, Inc. ("Jacobson") is a contractor in the business of furnishing and installing acoustical ceiling systems, interior partitions, and other interior building products. Defendant-appellant Armstrong Cork Company ("Armstrong") is the largest manufacturer of acoustical and non-acoustical ceiling products in the United States.

In March, 1968 Jacobson was designated an authorized distributor of Armstrong products in New York City, Long Island, Westchester and Rockland Counties (New York State), in Fairfield County, Connecticut, and in northern New Jersey. This relationship continued until March 19, 1976, when Armstrong notified Jacobson that its distributorship was terminated.

In a complaint filed May 26, 1976, Jacobson charged Armstrong with combining, conspiring, and attempting to monopolize and restrain trade, in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13. Essentially, Jacobson alleged that Armstrong had allocated territories among its distributors and had engaged in certain vertical restraints. Jacobson claimed that Armstrong had terminated the distributorship in retaliation for Jacobson's refusal to adhere to these alleged unlawful practices.

Jacobson, arguing, inter alia, that it required access to Armstrong products in order to remain competitive as a ceiling contractor, sought a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining Armstrong from terminating plaintiff as an authorized distributor of Armstrong products and directing Armstrong to sell its products to plaintiff on nondiscriminatory terms. Jacobson also sought treble damages plus costs and attorneys fees.

On July 13, 1976, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Weinfeld, J., entered an order granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, pending resolution of the merits of this controversy at trial. It is from this decision that defendant now appeals. We affirm the order of the district court.

I

The district court recognized that the merits of this case turn entirely on factual determinations. Thus, the central issue presented is whether or not Armstrong terminated the distributorship because of Jacobson's resistance to Armstrong's alleged territorial allocations and resale restrictions. If this factual issue is resolved against Armstrong, then plaintiff will almost certainly be entitled to judgment, under the rule of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379, 87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967). If, however, the termination was for legitimate business purposes, then Armstrong will prevail. ¹

Judge Weinfeld, applying the familiar standard set forth in Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Willington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), ² held that while plaintiff had not made a compelling case of probable success on the merits, it had shown sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation. This, coupled with the court's finding that the potential hardship to Jacobson outweighed any inconvenience that Armstrong might suffer as a result of an injunction, led the court to conclude that plaintiff had satisfied the second alternative of the Sonesta test, and was thus entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Defendant now attacks this decision on two grounds. First, defendant argues that the district court misconstrued the standard to be applied in deciding preliminary injunction motions. Second, defendant claims that, in any event, the record does not support the district court's action. We reject both of these contentions.

II

Armstrong contends that a greater showing is required for the grant of a preliminary injunction which is mandatory rather than prohibitory in form, and that therefore the district court erred by failing to require a showing of "extreme or very serious damage." Clune v. Publishers' Association of New York City, 214 F.Supp. 520, 531 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on the opinion below, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963).

We agree that a different standard applies to mandatory injunctions. Indeed, Judge Weinfeld recognized as much when he referred to "(t)he court's usual reluctance" to grant such relief. Jacobson & Company, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Company, 416 F.Supp. 564 at 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

Nevertheless, issuance of a preliminary injunction, whatever its form, is in the district court's discretion and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of mistake. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra at 1358; S.C.M. Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1974); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 65.04(2) at 65-47-49 (2d ed. 1975). We are not convinced that by failing to articulate the "extreme or very serious damage" formula of Clune the district court abused its discretion. Judge Weinfeld was aware that mandatory injunctions present a special case, but nonetheless held that plaintiff had made a sufficient showing to justify preliminary injunctive relief. We decline to disturb that decision. ³

Nor are we persuaded by Armstrong's argument that the district court misapplied the Sonesta test by granting the injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant did not request an evidentiary hearing below and therefore "cannot be heard to complain" that a hearing was not conducted. Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970). As we said in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 493 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1968),

"if a party is unwilling to have the issuance of a temporary injunction decided on affidavits, he must make his objection known; he may not gamble on the judge's accepting his affidavits rather than his adversary's and then seek a reversal if the result is disappointing."

See also Dopp v. Franklin National Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1972).

Judge Weinfeld had before him not only the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, but also the transcripts of three depositions and a number of exhibits. Where the district court has the benefit of so complete a record, and the parties themselves fail to request a hearing, no evidentiary hearing is required.

Appellant also claims that in order to satisfy either prong of the Sonesta test, the movant must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Essentially, appellant argues that neither Sonesta nor any of the decisions from which the second branch of the Sonesta test is derived, see Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973); Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.,405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999, 89 S.Ct. 1595, 22 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969); Dino DeLaurentiis Cinematografica, S.p.A. v. D-150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 374-75 (2d Cir. 1966); Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Company, Inc., 366 F.2d 199, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1966); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), abandoned the " likelihood of success" requirement. We disagree.

In Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., supra, Judge Frank declared that

"(t)o justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i. e., the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation."

206 F.2d at 740 (footnote omitted).

We elaborated upon Hamilton Watch in Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Company, Inc., supra at 204-05, and Dino DeLaurentiis Cinematografica, S.p.A. v. D-150, Inc., supra at 375, where we held that a showing of probable success on the merits was required only where the movant has failed to show either a threat of irreparable harm or a balance of hardships in his favor. Accordingly, in Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., supra, we affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction because "a review of the involved hardships and equities did not disclose a balance favoring injunctive relief . . . ." 405 F.2d at 323. See also Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra at 692-93.

Against this background, it simply cannot be maintained that a temporary injunction will not be granted except on a showing of a likelihood of success. Chicago, Rock Island & P.R. Co. v. Switchmen's Union of North America, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936, 82 S.Ct. 1578, 8 L.Ed.2d 806 (1962), and Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974), cited by appellant, are not to the contrary. In Switchmen's Union we reversed a preliminary injunction order not for want of a showing of probable success, but because we held clearly erroneous a finding of fact relied on by the district court in granting the injunction. 292 F.2d at 70-71. Furthermore, that case is inapposite insofar as our decision there was mandated by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. ...