Jacobson v. General Motors Corporation
Decision Date | 02 February 1938 |
Citation | 22 F. Supp. 255 |
Parties | JACOBSON v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al. WINKELMAN et al. v. SAME. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Charles Winkelman, of New York City (Arthur Berenson and Bernard Berenson, both of Boston, Mass., of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed, of New York City (J. Harry Covington, Dean G. Acheson, and Charles A. Horsky, all of Washington, D. C., and Bertram F. Willcox, David Sher, and Ralph M. Carson, all of New York City, of counsel), for defendants.
Two stockholders' suits have been brought by plaintiffs, attacking the so-called bonus plan and other methods of supplemental compensation used by General Motors from March, 1918, to 1936, as ultra vires, fraudulent, and illegal. The Winkelman action was originally brought in the Supreme Court of New York county, removed, and consolidated with the Jacobson case, already pending here.
Invoking Equity Rule 27, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723, defendants seek to strike from the complaints the allegations referring to acts prior to May 27, 1929, on the ground that that is the earliest date as to which plaintiffs can allege and prove ownership of their stock.
Equity Rule 27, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723, provides as follows:
It will be seen that the foregoing is a composite of four distinct requirements: (1) Verification; (2) ownership of stock at time of transactions under attack; (3) denial of collusion; and (4) prior demand or its equivalent. The first and third requirements have been construed in the light of the original purpose of the rule to prevent collusive resort to the federal jurisdiction. Cf. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 26 L.Ed. 827. They have, therefore, been held inapplicable to cases removed from the state courts (Maeder v. Buffalo Bill's Company, C.C., 132 F. 280; Earle v. Seattle, L. S. & E. R. Co., C.C., 56 F. 909; Evans v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., C.C., 58 F. 497), or involving merely a federal question, Ball v. Rutland R. Co., C.C., 93 F. 513; Kimball v. Cedar Rapids, C.C., 99 F. 130.
Prior demand or its equivalent, on the other hand, is a universally accepted principle of equity and has been applied in most federal cases, regardless of their origin or nature. Watts v. Vanderbilt, 2 Cir., 45 F.2d 968; Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Company, 235 U.S. 635, 35 S.Ct. 225, 59 L.Ed. 395; Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Company v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 23 S.Ct. 498, 47 L.Ed. 778. Contra, however, Evans v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, supra. Relaxation of the rule where the corporate managers are antagonistic is grounded in equity, not on the fact that collusion in such cases is impossible.
Defendants here contend that the second part of the rule, relating to the time of stock ownership, is likewise an equitable principle, and applies even where no possibility of collusion is present. Express support for this position is found in Venner v. Great Northern Railway Co., C.C., 153 F. 408, and Hitchings v. Cobalt Central Mines Company, C.C., 189 F. 241, where this court unequivocally applied the requirement of contemporaneous ownership to cases removed from the state court. The same has been done in other districts. Reilly v. Fuhrmann & Schmidt Brewing Co., D.C., 13 F.Supp. 361; Church v. Citizens' Street Railway Co., C.C., 78 F. 526; Robinson v. West Virginia Loan Company, C.C., 90 F. 770.
So far as I know, there is no specific holding to the contrary.
In Dimpfell v. Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co., 110 U.S. 209, 3 S.Ct. 573, 28 L.Ed. 121, the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have given to this portion of the rule a status equal to that of prior demand as a principle of equity when it said:
And in Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U.S. 489, 8 S.Ct. 1192, 1193, 32 L.Ed. 179, it said:
To the same effect is the opinion in Venner v. Great Northern Railway Co., 209 U.S. 24, 28 S.Ct. 328, 52 L.Ed. 666.
While these decisions may be rested on other grounds, and in particular on noncompliance in each instance with the requirement of prior demand, the dicta quoted tend to show that contemporaneous ownership is a basic principle of equity in federal stockholders' suits. A substantial number of states are in accord , although the rule, which prevails at common law, in England and in New York, , is to the contrary.
In this district, an anomaly exists in that the requirement in question has been expressly held inapplicable to cases removed from the state court on the ground...
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Winkelman v. General Motors Corporation
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...seems to have given to this portion of the rule a status equal to that of prior demand as a principle of equity." Jacobson v. General Motors Corp., D.C., 22 F.Supp. 255, 257. If this were a question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, no State law or State court decision would be cont......
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