Jacobson v. Lenhart

• Decision Date: 22 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 38003,38003
• Parties: Judy JACOBSON, Appellant, v. Donna LENHART, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 638

195 N.E.2d 638

30 Ill.2d 225

Judy JACOBSON, Appellant, v. Donna LENHART, Appellee.

No. 38003.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1964.

Matthews, Jordan, Dean & Suhler, Aurora (Everett Jordan and John L. Petersen, Aurora, of counsel), for appellant.

Maynard & Maynard, Rockford (James F. Maynard, Rockford, of counsel), for appellee.

DAILY, Justice.

This appeal, taken from an order of the circuit court of DeKalb County, presents a question of the constitutionality of section 21 of the Limitations Act which provides with respect to personal actions: 'If the person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in the nine preceding sections, is, at the time of the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, or if a female, within the age of eighteen years, or insane, or mentally ill, or imprisoned on a criminal charge, he or she may bring the action within two years after the disability is removed.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 83, par. 22.

Plaintiff, Judy Jacobson, was injured on February 24, 1958, while riding as a passenger in a car driven by defendant. At the time she was 18 years old, having attained that age on February 14, 1958. Necessarily, therefore, when the cause of action accrued, plaintiff was no longer a minor and was not within the class of disabilities excepted by section 21 from the operation of the general limitations fixed by 'the nine preceding sections.' On November 8, 1962, approximately four years and nine months after the occurrence, she brought this action to recover for her injuries. Upon defendant's motion, however, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had not brought her action within the general two-year period of limitation fixed by section 14 of the act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 83, par. 15.) When plaintiff elected to abide by her complaint, a final order of dismissal was entered. Here, as in the trial court, it is plaintiff's contention that section 21, insofar as it differentiates in the ages at which males and females, respectively, cease to enjoy the protection and benefits of the section, effects a classification which is arbitrary, discriminatory and without relation to the apparent purpose of the statute. Stated otherwise and starting with the basic premise that equal protection of the law requires the rights of every person to be governed by the same rule of law under similar circumstances, plaintiff contends that, so far as the matter of limitations is concerned, there is no substantial difference between males and females which permits or justifies classification on the basis of sex and age. Her theory is that due process requires that females, as well as males, should have two years after reaching age twenty-one to prosecute an action for personal injuries that arose during minority. This, of course, is but another way of saying that for purpose of limitations males and females should be removed from the disability of minority at the same age, and assumes that twenty-one is the proper age.

The classification of objects, subjects, groups or persons for legislative purposes is, primarily, a question for the legislature and courts will not interfere unless such classification is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary. (Du Bois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295; Krebs v. Board of Trustees, 410 Ill. 435, 102 N.E.2d 321, 27 A.L.R.2d 1434.) There is a presumption that the General Assembly and its committees acted conscientiously and thoroughly in enacting legislation, and, in considering the reasonableness of a classification made, court will not refuse to uphold the legislature merely on the ground that the opinion of the court on the subject might differ, nor will courts consider whether the classification is wise or unwise. (Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193, 197 N.E 768; Du Dois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295.) A classification of a group of persons is not arbitrary if there is a sound basis in reason and principle for regarding one class of individuals as a separate and distinct class for the purposes of the particular legislation. (Hughes v. Traeger, 264 Ill. 612, 106 N.E. 431; Phillips v. Browne, 270 Ill. 459, 110 N.E. 601.) It requires neither extended discussion nor citation of authority for the proposition that age and the differences existing between the sexes are proper bases for legislative classification (e. g. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 523, 91 N.E. 695, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 994; People v. Huff, 249 Ill. 164, 169, 94 N.E. 61), and it is equally well settled that, in the absence of express constitutional inhibition, the age at which a minor shall be deemed to have the legal capacity to do anything or perform any act is wholly a matter within the power of the legislature. (See: People ex rel. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Kowalski, 307 Ill. 378, 138 N.E. 634; ...