Jacobson v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, CA-SA

• Decision Date: 22 September 1987
• Docket Number: CA-SA
• Citation: 743 P.2d 410,154 Ariz. 430
• Parties: Craig E. JACOBSON, Albert D. Jacobson and Donna Jacobson, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Joseph D. Howe, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge. Todd Harry STEINHOFF, Neil C. Steinhoff and Judith B. Steinhoff, Real Parties in Interest. 1202.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 410

743 P.2d 410

154 Ariz. 430

Craig E. JACOBSON, Albert D. Jacobson and Donna Jacobson, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Joseph D. Howe, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge.

Todd Harry STEINHOFF, Neil C. Steinhoff and Judith B. Steinhoff, Real Parties in Interest.

1 CA-SA 202.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department A.

Sept. 22, 1987.

Gallagher & Kennedy by Michael L. Gallagher, Judith A. Morse, Phoenix, for petitioners.

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli by William R. Jones, Kathleen L. Wieneke, Phoenix, for real parties in interest.

GRANT, Judge.

Respondent Todd Steinhoff (Steinhoff), a minor, had been drinking when he lost control of his parents' car while driving with three friends as passengers. One of his friends, Craig Jacobson (Jacobson), was rendered quadriplegic. Jacobson and his parents filed suit against Steinhoff and his parents. In discovery, Jacobson sought copies of Steinhoff's parents' tax returns for the past five years, in an effort to determine their financial worth relevant to a claim for punitive damages. Jacobson maintained that since Steinhoff had been driving his parents' car with their permission, the family purpose doctrine applied to render them liable for Steinhoff's negligence in rolling the car, and to render them liable for punitive damages as well. Jacobson's motion to compel discovery of the Steinhoffs' tax returns was denied, thus giving rise to this special action.

Jacobson asserts that, since the family purpose doctrine imputes liability to the parental providers of a car for their child's negligence in its use, liability for punitive damages should also be imputed to the parents. Jacobson relies on the theory of agency, upon which the family purpose doctrine is largely based, and claims that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable, even for punitive damages, if the tort of his employee is committed within the course and scope of employment. Jacobson argues that since the car was used for the purpose for which it was provided when the accident occurred, the parents should be liable for the negligence of their son, even extending to punitive damage liability. We accepted jurisdiction of this special action, even though we agree with the trial court's ruling, because the issue raised is one of first impression, it is a matter of statewide concern, and it is purely an issue of law. United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 697 P.2d 658 (1985).

Arizona adopted the family purpose doctrine in 1919, Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966 (1919), clearly noting the agency rationale for the doctrine. We have since stated the doctrine is to be applied broadly, Brown v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 487, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (App.1984); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 480, 441 P.2d 73, 77 (1968). The doctrine "holds the owner, or person with control of the vehicle, or 'head of the family,' liable for the negligent driving of a minor child or the spouse using the vehicle with the parent's or owner-spouse's permission, but for the driver's own pleasure or business." E. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 8.13 at 595 (2d ed. 1986). The doctrine is based on principles of agency, although insecurely so, since the "agency for pleasure" concept does "not square with established principles of agency law." Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 479, 441 P.2d at 76. Despite its reliance on agency principles for credibility, its social usefulness is its primary justification; it provides for an injured party's recovery from the financially responsible person--the family head--deemed most able to control to whom the car is made available.

There is obviously an element of unblushing fiction in this manufactured agency; and it has quite often been recognized, without apology, that the doctrine is an instrument of policy, a transparent device intended to place the liability upon the party most easily held responsible.

W. Prosser and P. Keeton, Law of Torts § 73 at 524.

Thus, while recognizing the family purpose doctrine's basis in agency principles, we also note that the doctrine is the purest of fictions, defensible only because of its social usefulness. Any attempt to analogize other agency doctrines to it must be viewed with caution and approached with restraint.

Punitive damages have a rationale entirely separate from the family purpose doctrine. The punitive damage concept is not to be stretched. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 162, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (1986). Punitive damages are intended, of course, to punish a wrongdoer and to "deter others from emulating his conduct." Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 330, 723 P.2d 675, 679 (1986). Arizona's formulation of the punitive damage principle rests on the finding that the defendant's wrongful conduct was guided by evil motives. Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 162, 726 P.2d at 578. Neither Rawlings nor Linthicum address the proposition of imputing punitive liability to a parent or principal for a child's or agent's negligence. We must therefore examine that proposition in light of Rawlings' and Linthicum 's directives to narrow the availability of punitive damages. Like the Supreme Court, we also are wary of overextending such availability, knowing that this would dull "the potentially keen edge of the doctrine as an effective deterrent of truly reprehensible conduct." Linthicum, 150 Ariz. at 331, 723 P.2d at 680, quoting Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me.1985); see also Gurule v. Illinois Mut. Life & Cas. Co., 152 Ariz. 600, 601, 734 P.2d 85, 86 (1987).

The Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed a similar concern, stating that the

concept of punitive damages embodies a rule for individualized punishment of a wrongdoer whose conduct toward the plaintiff is particularly outrageous. Implicit in this concept is the notion that, where punishment is to be exacted, it must be certain that the wrongdoer being punished because of his conduct actually caused the plaintiff's injuries.

Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 183, 342 N.W.2d 37, 54, cert. denied sub nom E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, aka Gastrow, et al., 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 107, 83 L.Ed.2d 51 (1984).

Arizona cases have held that punitive damages are sometimes available against a principal for the tort of an agent through respondeat superior. This is a generally recognized variation from the rule that punitive damages are available only against the wrongdoer himself. The rule in Arizona has been that a principal is liable if his agent's tort occurred "in furtherance of the employer's business and within the scope of the agent's employment." Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, 132 Ariz. 498, 502, 647 P.2d 629, 633 (1982). Where there is a clearly defined master-servant relationship a stronger argument for imputed punitive damage liability is proper because the master defines the scope of employment, often in quite specific terms, and will often closely supervise the servant's activities in the scope of that employment. The master thus has a greater ability to control the servant's actions and prevent the negligent or wilful tort. A parent, on the other hand, frequently has no idea how the car he or she provides is being used and has no direct means of controlling its use. The Restatement rule on this issue, normally...