Jacquemin v. City of Woodson Terrace
| Decision Date | 14 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-418 CAS,4:12-CV-418 CAS |
| Parties | MICAH JACQUEMIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WOODSON TERRACE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Pending before the Court is defendants City of Woodson Terrace and Lawrence Besmer's motion for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff's claims. Also pending before the Court is defendant Lawrence Besmer's second motion for summary judgment, based on the doctrine of legislative immunity, and defendant City of Woodson Terrace's second motion for partial summary judgment, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff opposes the motions, which are fully briefed and ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Court will grant defendant Lawrence Besmer's second motion for summary judgment, and defendant City of Woodson Terrace's second motion for partial summary judgment, and the Court will deny as moot, in part, and deny, in part, defendants' first motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, a former employee of the City of Woodson Terrace (hereinafter "Woodson Terrace" or the "City"), filed the instant employment case against the City and Lawrence Besmer, the mayor of Woodson Terrace (the "Mayor"). In his Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter the Complaint"), plaintiff alleges two counts of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Missouri state law. In Count I, against the City, plaintiff alleges that his longtime employment wasterminated because he reported criminal activity. In Count II, also against the City, he alleges his employment was unlawfully terminated because he campaigned against the Mayor. Plaintiff also brings a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and the Mayor, in the Mayor's individual capacity. In Count III, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights in that they terminated his employment for exercising his First Amendment right to political association.
Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of the claims in plaintiff's Complaint. In their first motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that the undisputed facts show that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for any of the claims he alleges in his Complaint, and in any event, there was a legitimate reason for the termination of his employment. In the Mayor's second motion for summary judgment, he argues that he is entitled to legislative immunity as set forth in Leapheart v. Williamson, 705 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 2013). The City argues in its second motion for partial summary judgment that it is entitled to sovereign immunity as to Counts I and II, and that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against the City.
The standard applicable to summary judgment motions is well-settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Ia. v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) ().Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Once the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence he or she must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Herring, 207 F.3d at 1029 quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific facts that create a triable question of fact. See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004). "Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the court's role to decide the merits. The court should not weigh evidence or attempt to determine the truth of a matter. Rather, the court must simply determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1107 (8th Cir. 2000).
With the standard in mind, Court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of summary judgment:
Woodson Terrace is a duly authorized municpal corporation located in the County of St. Louis, Missouri. Lawrence Bemser was at all relevant times the Mayor of Woodson Terrace. Plaintiff began his employment with Woodson Terrace as a mechanic in May 1996. In April 2001, plaintiff was promoted to Superintendent of Public Works. As Superintendent of Public Works, plaintiff was responsible for overseeing the parts department, the street department and building maintenance. He supervised six to seven employees.
Sometime in October or November 2008, an employee, who plaintiff supervised, came to plaintiff and told him that he believed money was missing from the "kitty fund." The kitty fund, which was funded by selling scrap metal, was used by City employees for coffee, beer, parties and fish fry events. In 2008, the kitty fund contained approximately $500.00, and was stored in a container in plaintiff's unlocked locker. Plaintiff went to the City Police Department and reported that money was suspected missing from the kitty fund. The police advised plaintiff that they would handle the matter. Plaintiff did not perform his own investigation of the missing money.
The employee who spoke to plaintiff also reported the suspected theft to the Mayor. Later that week, the Mayor approached plaintiff about the kitty fund. The Mayor asked plaintiff why he had not approached him regarding the missing money, and he informed plaintiff that he would need to open an investigation. Plaintiff did not state that he had initiated an investigation with the City Police Department. Plaintiff testified that the Mayor was angry, and that he believed he was angry because he had not reported the incident to the Mayor right away. Plaintiff was never implicated inthe missing money. The police report, which the Mayor received in April 2009, did state that plaintiff had said that he "prefer[ed] to keep the matter in house due to the fact he would take care of the matter and he did not wish to involve [the Mayor]." See Doc. 70, Ex. 2 at 1.
As a result of this incident, the Mayor shut down the kitty fund. The Mayor testified that he lost trust in plaintiff, and in June 2009, he demoted plaintiff to the position of Shop Foreman. The Shop Foreman position had not been filled for the previous three years. While he was Superintendent of Public Works, plaintiff never requested that the Shop Foreman be filled, and plaintiff testified that he felt he could discharge his duties as Superintendent without a Foreman. Following his demotion, Doug Zaiz became Superintendent of Public Works.
Sometime in December 2009, the Mayor filed to run for re-election. He had one opponent, Kathy Wheeling. Plaintiff supported Ms. Wheeling and actively campaigned on her behalf. Plaintiff placed yard signs, talked to residents, and participated in public demonstrations supporting Ms. Wheeling. It is disputed as to whether the Mayor was aware or had knowledge that plaintiff was campaigning on behalf of the Mayor's opponent.
The election was held on April 6, 2010, and the Mayor won re-election. On April 9, 2010, plaintiff received notice from the Mayor that the Shop Foreman's position was going to be eliminated by a vote of the Board of Aldermen due to economic reasons. On April 15, 2010, the Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance eliminating the position held by plaintiff, Shop Foreman, "for economic reasons." See Doc. 59, Ex. 6. The ordinance was signed by the Mayor. No other positions were eliminated. It is undisputed that eliminating the Foreman position did save the City money. However, at the time the City considered and took no other cost saving measures. There were other employees with less seniority than plaintiff whose positions were not eliminated, and no writtendisciplinary actions were in plaintiff's personnel file. Sometime after plaintiff's position was eliminated, all City employees received raises.
In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that in fall and early winter 2009, he reported to his supervisor, Doug Ziaz, the fact that gas heaters, light fixtures, ceiling tiles, copper wires, and doors were being unlawfully removed from City property. He also alleges that in January 2010, he reported to the Chief of Police for the City that the Mayor had appointed Donna Conlon an alderman for Ward I, although she lived in Ward II.
Plaintiff was questioned about these allegations in his deposition.
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