Jacques v. Balt. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL SAG-21-02682 |
| Parties | CHEDAIS JACQUES Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Chedais Jacques (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against his employer, Defendant Baltimore City Police Department (“BPD”), asserting claims of discrimination, retaliation, and false imprisonment in violation of state and federal law. ECF 1. BPD filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, ECF 8. The issues have been fully briefed, ECF 8-1, ECF 9-1, ECF 12, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the following reasons, BPD's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are derived from the Complaint, ECF 1, and are taken as true for purposes of evaluating BPD's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff “an African American Haitian male, ” joined BPD as a Police Officer in July, 2008, and has served in its Internal Affairs Unit since May, 2019. ECF 1 ¶¶ 13, 21-22. On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff answered a phone call from a civilian (“the complainant”) who wished to lodge a complaint against BPD Officer Melvin Hill. Id. ¶ 23. During this call, the complainant alleged that she and Officer Hill had engaged in a consensual sexual affair, from which she claimed to have contracted a sexually transmitted infection. Id. ¶ 24. In response, Plaintiff “expressed tremendous sympathy and understanding towards the complainant, ” and mentioned that “that he had known Officer Hill when they previously worked together over ten (10) years ago, hoping to show empathy with the complainant.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
Afterwards, Plaintiff informed his supervisor, Sergeant (“Sgt.”) Lattanzi, and Captain (“Capt.”) Fernandez about the call. Id. ¶ 27. Capt. Fernandez allegedly instructed Plaintiff not to enter the complaint into BPD's Internal Affairs Pro-Active Alert System (“I.A. Pro”), but to “keep the information on hand in case something develops later.” Id. That same day, Plaintiff described the call to Major Lansey and Detective (“Det.”) Geddis, the latter an officer in BPD's Ethics Unit. Id. ¶ 28. In response, Det. Geddis explained that Officer Hill was already under investigation for an unrelated matter. Id.
In subsequent days, the complainant sent several images of Officer Hill to Plaintiff's work phone. Id. ¶ 29. “Plaintiff did not reply to these messages, but as instructed, detailed their contents in his file ‘in case something developed later.'” Id. Approximately a week thereafter, on August 28, 2020, the complainant sent Plaintiff several more images, including a photo, which “showed the complainant driving with a white car coming towards her.” Id. ¶ 31. The image was accompanied by a message stating “‘he is stalking me do something ok I spoke to the state attorney,' or words to that effect.” Id. Plaintiff again did not reply to the complainant, but noted the incident in his personal file. Id. Plaintiff alleges that unbeknownst to him, the complainant developed a mistaken and uncorroborated theory that he had leaked the details of her complaint to Officer Hill. Id. ¶ 32.
On October 2, 2020, Plaintiff received a call from Sgt. Anthony Faulk of BPD's Ethics Unit, who asked Plaintiff to collect his belongs and meet him in the Ethics Office. Id. ¶ 33. Upon his arrival, Sgt. Faulk and Det. Derek Collins directed Plaintiff to a recorded interview room, and asked whether he would like an attorney present during questioning. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff replied affirmatively, prompting Sgt. Faulk to state that neither he nor Det. Collins would tell him anything until an attorney arrived. Id.¶ 35. Sgt. Faulk and Det. Collins subsequently exited, leaving Plaintiff in the room alone. Id. Approximately thirty minutes later, Sgt. Faulk and Det. Collins reentered and told Plaintiff that he was being charged with hindering a public integrity bureau investigation. Id. Plaintiff executed a written acknowledgement of the charge, on which he indicated that he had requested an attorney. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Det. Collins and Sgt. Faulk then exited the room again. Id. ¶ 36-37. Roughly one hour later, Sgt. Faulk returned with Det. Geddis and requested the passwords to Plaintiff's personal and work phones. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff provided the password for his work phone but refused to consent to a search of his personal phone without a warrant. Id. Sgt. Faulk allegedly confiscated both devices and stated, Id. ¶ 38. Sgt. Faulk indicated that he considered the allegations against Plaintiff to be criminal in nature, and exited the room yet again. Id. ¶ 40. Sgt. Faulk and Det. Collins returned roughly thirty minutes later, at which point Plaintiff had been in the interview room for more than two hours. Id. ¶ 41. At this point, Det. Collins allegedly asked Plaintiff, “if we tell you what is going on will you talk to us?” to which Plaintiff reluctantly replied that he would. Id. Plaintiff was read his Miranda rights and informed that he was suspected to have leaked information to Officer Hill regarding the complainant's allegations against him. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff denied the allegations and allowed the officers to search his personal and work phones to “confirm[] that there had been no calls or text messages between Plaintiff and Officer Hill, and in fact, Plaintiff did not even have Officer Hill's contact information in his phone.” Id. ¶ 44.
Plaintiff was subsequently allowed to retrieve his belongings and leave for the day. Id.¶ 45. Plaintiff was told that upon his return on Monday, he should wait for an officer to escort him into the building because his access had been revoked. Id. ¶ 45.
On Monday, October 5, 2020, Det. Geddis escorted Plaintiff to “an isolated room where he was assigned to work for four (4) days.” Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring these four (4) days, [he] was regularly demeaned, humiliated, laughed at, and embarrassed by this treatment.” Id. On October 8, 2020, Sgt. Lattanzi informed Plaintiff that his credentials had been reinstated and he was authorized to return to his regular work station. Id. ¶ 47. Sgt. Lattanzi also allegedly stated that “he had been told to detail Plaintiff out of the office, but that he refused because he knew the allegation was false.” Id. On the way back to his office, Plaintiff allegedly stopped by his Captain's office, who “remind[ed] him that the State's Attorney was on standby, ready to file criminal charges against him should the allegation be deemed truthful.” Id. ¶ 48.
In April, 2021, [1] Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging continuing discrimination on the basis of his race, color, and national origin. ECF 8-3. In relevant part, the EEOC charge states:
The [named officers] accused me of tipping off an officer charged with criminal and misconduct behavior . . . They held me against my will for about 3 hours after my regular shift. They questioned me without an attorney present after requesting one. They unlawfully searched my work and personal phone . . . They denied me access to the premises for about 4 business days. They had me wait at the front desk to be escorted to an isolated room . . . [for] the following 4 days . . . I believe the treatment I received that day is due to my national origin and race.
Id. EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on July 22, 2021. ECF 8-4.
On August 26, 2021, BPD served Plaintiff with paperwork detailing a five day suspension without pay in relation to allegations that he hindered the public integrity bureau's investigation. ECF 1 ¶ 49. Plaintiff rejected the offer and requested a trial board. Id.
Plaintiff filed this Complaint against BPD on October 18, 2021, alleging: discrimination on the basis of his race and national origin in violation of Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (Counts I-II, V); retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count III); discrimination in violation of § 1981 (Count IV); and false imprisonment (Count VI). ECF 1. BPD filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, ECF 8.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (...
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