Jadair Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 95-1946

• Decision Date: 29 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-1946,95-1946
• Citation: 209 Wis.2d 187,562 N.W.2d 401
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: JADAIR INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent, Mesirow Insurance Services, Inc., West Bend Air, Inc., Stanley Aircraft & Engine Service, Inc. and Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Defendants, Blueprint Engines, Inc., Defendant-Petitioner.

Page 401

562 N.W.2d 401

209 Wis.2d 187

JADAIR INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent,

Mesirow Insurance Services, Inc., West Bend Air, Inc.,

Stanley Aircraft & Engine Service, Inc. and

Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Defendants,

Blueprint Engines, Inc., Defendant-Petitioner.

No. 95-1946.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Jan. 9, 1997.

Decided April 29, 1997.

For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Ross R. Kinney, Waukesha.

For defendant-respondent there was a brief by Mark J. Peschel and Johnson & Lindberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN and oral argument by Mark J. Peschel.

¶1 JANINE P. GESKE, Justice

This is a review of a court of appeals decision and order dismissing the appeal of Blueprint Engines, Incorporated (Blueprint) for lack of jurisdiction. ¹ Blueprint attempted to appeal an order granting summary judgment to United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S.Fire) by the circuit court for Ozaukee County, Walter J. Swietlik presiding. U.S. Fire moved to dismiss Blueprint's appeal because its notice of appeal was signed by Edward Rachanski (Mr. Rachanski), a nonlawyer and Blueprint's president. The court of appeals held that because Mr. Rachanski was not a lawyer, ² he could not represent Blueprint and thus the notice of appeal filed on behalf of Blueprint was ineffective to commence an appeal by Blueprint. The court of appeals concluded that because an effective notice of appeal is a prerequisite

to jurisdiction, Blueprint's appeal must be dismissed. We agree and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. ³

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This lawsuit arose out of a claim for damages to an aircraft engine belonging to Jadair Incorporated ("Jadair"). Jadair alleged that these damages were the result of an engine overhaul performed by Blueprint. Jadair sued, among others, Blueprint and U.S. Fire, an insurance company which had issued a general liability airport policy to Blueprint. Jadair did not name Blueprint's president, Mr. Rachanski, as an individual defendant. U.S. Fire denied coverage for Jadair's damages. Blueprint answered Jadair's complaint and filed a cross-claim ⁴ against U.S. Fire, contending that it was entitled to insurance coverage for its potential liability to Jadair.

¶3 On November 14, 1994, U.S. Fire filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal of Jadair's claims and the co-defendants' cross-claims. On November 17, 1994, Blueprint's Illinois attorney filed a motion to withdraw from representation. The motion to withdraw stated: "Defendant, BLUEPRINT ENGINES, INC. has determined that self-representation would be in its best interests and has therefore decided to represent itself in the pending action." At a December 8, 1994 motion hearing, Blueprint's attorney stated that Blueprint felt it was in its best interests financially for him to withdraw. Mr. Rachanski then told the court that, at that time, he did not intend to retain other counsel for the corporation. At that hearing, counsel for other parties, including the attorney for Jadair, Ross R. Kinney, and the attorney for U.S. Fire, voiced no objection to the withdrawal of Blueprint's attorney. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion to withdraw on December 12, 1994.

¶4 Subsequently, Blueprint, acting through its president, Mr. Rachanski, continued to receive copies of correspondence and other documents filed with the court. On May 25, 1995, the circuit court granted U.S. Fire's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Jadair's claims against U.S. Fire. The court also ordered dismissal of the co-defendants' cross-claims against U.S. Fire. ⁵

¶5 The attorney for Jadair, and Mr. Rachanski for Blueprint, filed notices of appeal from the order for summary judgment on July 15, 1995, and August 21, 1995, respectively. On September 18, 1995, U.S. Fire moved to dismiss both appeals, contending that Jadair's notice of appeal was filed too early and that Blueprint's notice of appeal was fatally defective because it had not been signed by an attorney. According to Blueprint's brief, the corporation retained Attorney Ross R. Kinney immediately upon receipt of U.S. Fire's motion to dismiss. ⁶

¶6 In an opinion and order dated October 25, 1995, the court of appeals denied the motion to dismiss Jadair's appeal but granted the motion to dismiss Blueprint's appeal. The court of appeals concluded that corporations must appear by counsel. The appellate court reasoned that because Blueprint's notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney, it was fatally defective. The court of appeals stated that an effective notice of appeal is a prerequisite to the court of appeals' jurisdiction. Consequently, the court of appeals ruled that Blueprint's appeal must be dismissed.

STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION

¶7 This court granted Blueprint's petition for review to decide whether a notice of appeal is fatally defective when it is signed and filed by a nonlawyer on behalf of a corporation. To analyze this issue we turn to court rules, state statutes and constitutional provisions. The pertinent facts are not in dispute.

¶8 Our rules of civil procedure set out the means by which an appeal is initiated. Rules of statutory interpretation are helpful when we interpret rules of civil procedure promulgated by this court. See County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis.2d 1, 21 n. 1, 22 n. 2, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Rule interpretation, as well as statutory interpretation, present questions of law which this court reviews independently of the lower courts. See Stockbridge School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis.2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis.2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996). The goal of rule interpretation is to produce a result not inconsistent with the manifest intent of the supreme court. County of Door, 153 Wis.2d at 22, n. 2, 449 N.W.2d 601 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis.2d at 219, 550 N.W.2d 96; Hughes, 197 Wis.2d at 978, 542 N.W.2d 148.

¶9 We first look to the plain language of the rules and statutes themselves. See Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis.2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). If the manifest intent of the court is clear from the plain language of the rule, we need look no further. Similarly, if the intent of the legislature is clear from a statute's language, a court must give effect to this intent and look no further. See State v. Williams, 198 Wis.2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). If, however, a statute is capable of being construed in different ways, that construction which works an absurd or unreasonable result should be avoided. Braun v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 6 Wis.2d 262, 268, 94 N.W.2d 593 (1959).

¶10 If we determine that court rules or state statutes require that only lawyers may sign and file notices of appeal on behalf of a corporation, then Blueprint raises an additional challenge. Blueprint asserts that such a requirement would be unconstitutional. The party challenging a statute must overcome the presumption that the statute is constitutional, and must prove it to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 263-64, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). The application of constitutional provisions to the facts of a case is a question of law that we decide independently. State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis.2d 1045, 1052, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994).

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

¶11 Blueprint contends that there is no supreme court rule prohibiting an officer of a corporation from signing and filing a notice of appeal on behalf of that corporation. Nor, Blueprint asserts, do the statutes expressly prohibit such an act. ⁷ If, however, we require ¶12 According to Blueprint, a result that would invalidate Blueprint's notice of appeal is too harsh, and would violate constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection under the law. Blueprint also contends that a statutory requirement that only lawyers may sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation would violate the provision of art. I, sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution permitting "any suitor" to prosecute or defend a suit in his or her own proper person. ⁹

                that a notice of appeal filed on behalf of a corporation be signed by an attorney, Blueprint still maintains that a notice of appeal signed by a nonlawyer does not divest the court of appeals of jurisdiction.  Blueprint denies that Mr. Rachanski's action here constitutes the unauthorized practice of law under Wis.Stat. § 757.30. 8  Furthermore, even if Mr. Rachanski's [209 Wis.2d 197] conduct violated Wis.Stat. § 757.30, Blueprint argues that such conduct cannot void the legal effect of the notice if the statutorily prescribed jurisdictional requirements are met
                

¶13 At oral argument, Blueprint's attorney proposed that we consider nonlawyer representation of corporations on a case-by-case basis. Blueprint asserted that such consideration should only be given where a nonlawyer signs and files a notice of appeal. Blueprint agreed that nonlawyers should not be permitted to represent corporations by filing a complaint, or appearing at trial or at any later stage of an appeal including the submission of briefs. The test, according to Blueprint's attorney, should be whether the corporation was reasonable in deciding to have a nonlawyer represent the corporation. To apply this new test, Blueprint suggested that the parties submit affidavits to the court of appeals on the reasonableness question. Alternatively, Blueprint suggested that a special master be appointed to oversee such post-appeal discovery. That post-appeal discovery, according to Blueprint, would extend to...